

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



JULY 1969

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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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A VIET NAM REAPPRAISAL

THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF ONE MAN'S VIEW
AND HOW IT EVOLVED

By Clark M. Clifford

VIET Nam remains unquestionably the transcendent problem that confronts our nation. Though the escalation has ceased, we seem to be no closer to finding our way out of this infinitely complex difficulty. The confidence of the past has become the frustration of the present. Predictions of progress and of military success, made so often by so many, have proved to be illusory as the fighting and the dying continue at a tragic rate. Within our country, the dialogue quickens and the debate sharpens. There is a growing impatience among our people, and questions regarding the war and our participation in it are being asked with increasing vehemence.

Many individuals these past years have sought to make some contribution toward finding the answers that have been so elusive. It is with this hope in mind that I present herewith the case history of one man's attitude toward Viet Nam, and the various stages of thought he experienced as he plodded painfully from one point of view to another, and another, until he arrived at the unshakable opinion he possesses today.

Views on Viet Nam have become increasingly polarized as the war has gone on without visible progress toward the traditional American military triumph. There remain some who insist that we were right to intervene militarily and, because we were right, we have no choice but to press on until the enemy knuckles under and concedes defeat. At the other extreme, and in increasing numbers, there are those who maintain that the present unsatisfactory situation proves that our Viet Nam policy has

been wrong from the very beginning. There are even those who suggest that our problems in Viet Nam cast doubt on the entire course of American foreign policy since World War II. Both schools share a common and, as I see it, an erroneous concept. They both would make military victory the ultimate test of the propriety of our participation in the conflict in Southeast Asia.

I find myself unable to agree with either extreme. At the time of our original involvement in Viet Nam, I considered it to be based upon sound and unassailable premises, thoroughly consistent with our self-interest and our responsibilities. There has been no change in the exemplary character of our intentions in Viet Nam. We intervened to help a new and small nation resist subjugation by a neighboring country—a neighboring country, incidentally, which was being assisted by the resources of the world's two largest communist powers.

I see no profit and no purpose in any divisive national debate about whether we were right or wrong initially to become involved in the struggle in Viet Nam. Such debate at the present time clouds the issue and obscures the pressing need for a clear and logical evaluation of our present predicament, and how we can extricate ourselves from it.

Only history will be able to tell whether or not our military presence in Southeast Asia was warranted. Certainly the decisions that brought it about were based upon a reasonable reading of the past three decades. We had seen the calamitous consequences of standing aside while totalitarian and expansionist nations moved successively against their weaker neighbors and accumulated a military might which left even the stronger nations uneasy and insecure. We had seen in the period immediately after World War II the seemingly insatiable urge of the Soviet Union to secure satellite states on its western periphery. We had seen in Asia itself the attempt by open invasion to extend communist control into the independent South of the Korean Peninsula. We had reason to feel that the fate averted in Korea through American and United Nations military force would overtake the independent countries of Asia, albeit in somewhat subtler form, were we to stand aside while the communist North sponsored subversion and terrorism in South Viet Nam.

The transformation that has taken place in my thinking has been brought about, however, by the conclusion that the world situation has changed dramatically, and that American involve-

ment in Viet Nam can and must change with it. Important ingredients of this present situation include the manner in which South Viet Nam and its Asian neighbors have responded to the threat and to our own massive intervention. They also include internal developments both in Asian nations and elsewhere, and the changing relations among world powers.

The decisions which our nation faces today in Viet Nam should not be made on interpretations of the facts as they were perceived four or five or fifteen years ago, even if, through compromise, a consensus could be reached on these interpretations. They must instead be based upon our present view of our obligations as a world power; upon our current concept of our national security; upon our conclusions regarding our commitments as they exist today; upon our fervent desire to contribute to peace throughout the world; and, hopefully, upon our acceptance of the principle of enlightened self-interest.

But these are broad and general guidelines, subject to many constructions and misconstructions. They also have the obvious drawback of being remote and impersonal.

The purpose of this article is to present to the reader the intimate and highly personal experience of one man, in the hope that by so doing there will be a simpler and clearer understanding of where we are in Viet Nam today, and what we must do about it. I shall go back to the beginning and identify, as well as I can, the origins of my consciousness of the problem, the opportunities I had to obtain the facts, and the resulting evolution of what I shall guardedly refer to as my thought processes.

II

Although I had served President Truman in the White House from May 1945 until February 1950, I do not recall ever having had to focus on Southeast Asia. Indochina, as it was then universally known, was regarded by our government as a French problem. President Truman was prompted from time to time by the State Department to approve statements that seemed to me to be little more than reiterations of the long-standing American attitude against "colonialism." If any of those provoked extensive discussion at the White House, I cannot recall. For the next decade, I watched foreign affairs and the growing turbulence of Asia from the sidelines as a private citizen, increasingly concerned but not directly involved.

In the summer of 1960, Senator John Kennedy invited me to act as his transition planner, and later as liaison with the Eisenhower Administration in the interval between the election and January 20, 1961. Among the foreign policy problems that I encountered at once was a deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia. Major-General Wilton B. Persons, whom President Eisenhower had designated to work with me, explained the gravity of the situation as viewed by the outgoing Administration. I suggested to the President-elect that it would be well for him to hear President Eisenhower personally on the subject. He agreed, and accordingly General Persons and I placed Southeast Asia as the first item on the agenda of the final meeting between the outgoing and the incoming Presidents. This meeting, held on the morning of January 19, 1961, in the Cabinet Room, was attended by President Eisenhower, Secretary of State Christian Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson and General Persons. President-elect Kennedy had his counterparts present: Secretary of State-designate Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense-designate Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury-designate Douglas Dillon, and me.

At President-elect Kennedy's suggestion, I took notes of the important subjects discussed. Most of the time, the discussion centered on Southeast Asia, with emphasis upon Laos. At that particular time, January 1961, Laos had come sharply into focus and appeared to constitute the major danger in the area.

My notes disclose the following comments by the President:

At this point, President Eisenhower said, with considerable emotion, that Laos was the key to the entire area of Southeast Asia.

He said that if we permitted Laos to fall, then we would have to write off all the area. He stated we must not permit a Communist take-over. He reiterated that we should make every effort to persuade member nations of SEATO or the International Control Commission to accept the burden with us to defend the freedom of Laos.

As he concluded these remarks, President Eisenhower stated it was imperative that Laos be defended. He said that the United States should accept this task with our allies, if we could persuade them, and alone if we could not. He added, "Our unilateral intervention would be our last desperate hope in the event we were unable to prevail upon the other signatories to join us."

That morning's discussion, and the gravity with which President Eisenhower addressed the problem, had a substantial impact on me. He and his advisers were finishing eight years of responsible service to the nation. I had neither facts nor personal

experience to challenge their assessment of the situation, even if I had had the inclination to do so. The thrust of the presentation was the great importance to the United States of taking a firm stand in Southeast Asia, and I accepted that judgment.

On an earlier occasion, in speaking of Southeast Asia, President Eisenhower had said that South Viet Nam's capture by the communists would bring their power several hundred miles into a hitherto free region. The freedom of 12 million people would be lost immediately, and that of 150 million in adjacent lands would be seriously endangered. The loss of South Viet Nam would set in motion a crumbling process that could, as it progressed, have grave consequences for us and for freedom.

As I listened to him in the Cabinet Room that January morning, I recalled that it was President Eisenhower who had acquainted the public with the phrase "domino theory" by using it to describe how one country after another could be expected to fall under communist control once the process started in Southeast Asia.

In the spring of 1961, I was appointed to membership on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. In this capacity, I received briefings from time to time on affairs in Asia. The information provided the Board supported the assessment of the previous Administration, with which President Kennedy concurred. "Withdrawal in the case of Viet Nam," President Kennedy said in 1961, "and in the case of Thailand could mean the collapse of the whole area." He never wavered. A year later, he said of Viet Nam: "We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet Nam but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there." I had no occasion to question the collective opinion of our duly chosen officials.

After President Johnson took office, our involvement became greater, but so did most public and private assessments of the correctness of our course. The Tonkin Gulf resolution was adopted by the Congress in 1964 by a vote of 504 to 2. The language was stern: "The United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom."

When decisions were made in 1965 to increase, in very sub-

stantial fashion, the American commitment in Viet Nam, I accepted the judgment that such actions were necessary. That fall, I made a trip to Southeast Asia in my capacity as Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The optimism of our military and Vietnamese officials on the conduct of the war, together with the encouragement of our Asian allies, confirmed my belief in the correctness of our policy. In the absence at the time of indications that Hanoi had any interest in peace negotiations, I did not favor the 37-day bombing halt over the Christmas 1965–New Year 1966 holiday season. I felt such a halt could be construed by Hanoi as a sign of weakness on our part.

In 1966, I served as an adviser to President Johnson at the Manila Conference. It was an impressive gathering of the Chiefs of State and Heads of Government of the allied nations; it reassured me that we were on the right road and that our military progress was bringing us closer to the resolution of the conflict.

In the late summer of 1967, President Johnson asked me to go with his Special Assistant, General Maxwell Taylor, to review the situation in South Viet Nam, and then to visit some of our Pacific allies. We were to brief them on the war and to discuss with them the possibility of their increasing their troop commitments. Our briefings in South Viet Nam were extensive and encouraging. There were suggestions that the enemy was being hurt badly and that our bombing and superior firepower were beginning to achieve the expected results.

Our visits to the allied capitals, however, produced results that I had not foreseen. It was strikingly apparent to me that the other troop-contributing countries no longer shared our degree of concern about the war in South Viet Nam. General Taylor and I urged them to increase their participation. In the main, our plea fell on deaf ears.

Thailand, a near neighbor to South Viet Nam, with a population of some 30 million, had assigned only 2,500 men to South Viet Nam, and was in no hurry to allocate more.

The President of the Philippines advised President Johnson that he preferred we not stop there because of possible adverse public reaction. The Philippines, so close and ostensibly so vulnerable if they accepted the domino theory, had sent a hospital corps and an engineer battalion to Viet Nam, but no combat troops. It was also made clear to President Johnson that they had no intention of sending any combat personnel.

South Korea had the only sizable contingent of Asian troops assisting South Viet Nam, but officials argued that a higher level of activity on the part of the North Koreans prevented their increasing their support.

Disappointing though these visits were, I had high hopes for the success of our mission in Australia and New Zealand. I recalled that Australia, then with a much smaller population, had been able to maintain well over 300,000 troops overseas in World War II. They had sent only 7,000 to Viet Nam. Surely there was hope here. But Prime Minister Holt, who had been fully briefed, presented a long list of reasons why Australia was already close to its maximum effort.

In New Zealand, we spent the better part of a day conferring with the Prime Minister and his cabinet, while hundreds of students picketed the Parliament Building carrying signs bearing peace slogans. These officials were courteous and sympathetic, as all the others had been, but they made it clear that any appreciable increase was out of the question. New Zealand at one time had 70,000 troops overseas in the various theaters of World War II. They had 500 men in Viet Nam. I naturally wondered if this was their evaluation of the respective dangers of the two conflicts.

I returned home puzzled, troubled, concerned. Was it possible that our assessment of the danger to the stability of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific was exaggerated? Was it possible that those nations which were neighbors of Viet Nam had a clearer perception of the tides of world events in 1967 than we? Was it possible that we were continuing to be guided by judgments that might once have had validity but were now obsolete? In short, although I still counted myself a staunch supporter of our policies, there were nagging, not-to-be-suppressed doubts in my mind.

These doubts were dramatized a short time later back in the United States when I attended a dinner at the White House for Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. His country, which knew the bitterness of defeat and occupation in World War II, had declined to send any men at all to Viet Nam. In answer to my question as to when he thought troops might be sent, he stated he saw no possibility of that taking place because of the adverse political effect in Singapore.

Accordingly, I welcomed President Johnson's San Antonio speech of September 30, 1967, with far greater enthusiasm than

I would have had I not so recently returned from the Pacific. I felt it marked a substantial step in the right direction because it offered an alternative to a military solution of the lengthy and costly conflict. Allied bombing of North Viet Nam had by now assumed a symbolic significance of enormous proportions and the President focused his attention on this. The essence of his proposal was an offer to stop the bombing of North Viet Nam if prompt and productive peace discussions with the other side would ensue. We would assume that the other side would “not take advantage” of the bombing cessation. By this formula, the President made an imaginative move to end the deadlock over the bombing and get negotiations started.

I, of course, shared the universal disappointment that the San Antonio offer evoked no favorable response from Hanoi, but my feelings were more complex than those of mere disappointment. As I listened to the official discussion in Washington, my feelings turned from disappointment to dismay. I found it was being quietly asserted that, in return for a bombing cessation in the North, the North Vietnamese must stop sending men and matériel into South Viet Nam. On the surface, this might have seemed a fair exchange. To me, it was an unfortunate interpretation that—intentionally or not—rendered the San Antonio formula virtually meaningless. The North Vietnamese had more than 100,000 men in the South. It was totally unrealistic to expect them to abandon their men by not replacing casualties, and by failing to provide them with clothing, food, munitions and other supplies. We could never expect them to accept an offer to negotiate on those conditions.

III

In mid-January 1968, President Johnson asked me to serve as Secretary of Defense, succeeding Secretary McNamara, who was leaving to become President of the World Bank. In the confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 25, I was asked about the San Antonio formula. The interpretation I gave was in accord with President Johnson’s intense desire to start negotiations, and it offered a possibility of acceptance which I was convinced did not exist with the extreme and rigid interpretations that so concerned me. I said that I assumed that the North Vietnamese would “continue to transport the normal amount of goods, munitions and men to South

Viet Nam” at the levels that had prevailed prior to our bombing cessation. This was my understanding of what the President meant by “not take advantage.”

The varying interpretations of the San Antonio formula raised in my mind the question as to whether all of us had the same objective in view. Some, it seemed, could envision as satisfactory no solution short of the complete military defeat of the enemy. I did not count myself in this group. Although I still accepted as valid the premises of our Viet Nam involvement, I was dissatisfied with the rigidities that so limited our course of action and our alternatives.

I took office on March 1, 1968. The enemy's Tet offensive of late January and early February had been beaten back at great cost. The confidence of the American people had been badly shaken. The ability of the South Vietnamese Government to restore order and morale in the populace, and discipline and esprit in the armed forces, was being questioned. At the President's direction, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had flown to Viet Nam in late February for an on-the-spot conference with General Westmoreland. He had just returned and presented the military's request that over 200,000 troops be prepared for deployment to Viet Nam. These troops would be in addition to the 525,000 previously authorized. I was directed, as my first assignment, to chair a task force named by the President to determine how this new requirement could be met. We were not instructed to assess the need for substantial increases in men and matériel; we were to devise the means by which they could be provided.

My work was cut out. The task force included Secretary Rusk, Secretary Henry Fowler, Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, General Wheeler, CIA Director Richard Helms, the President's Special Assistant, Walt Rostow, General Maxwell Taylor and other skilled and highly capable officials. All of them had had long and direct experience with Vietnamese problems. I had not. I had attended various meetings in the past several years and I had been to Viet Nam three times, but it was quickly apparent to me how little one knows if he has been on the periphery of a problem and not truly in it. Until the day-long sessions of early March, I had never had the opportunity of intensive analysis and fact-finding. Now I was thrust into a vigorous, ruthlessly

frank assessment of our situation by the men who knew the most about it. Try though we would to stay with the assignment of devising means to meet the military's requests, fundamental questions began to recur over and over.

It is, of course, not possible to recall all the questions that were asked nor all of the answers that were given. Had a transcript of our discussions been made—one was not—it would have run to hundreds of closely printed pages. The documents brought to the table by participants would have totalled, if collected in one place—which they were not—many hundreds more. All that is pertinent to this essay are the impressions I formed, and the conclusions I ultimately reached in those days of exhausting scrutiny. In the colloquial style of those meetings, here are some of the principal issues raised and some of the answers as I understood them:

"Will 200,000 more men do the job?" I found no assurance that they would.

"If not, how many more might be needed—and when?" There was no way of knowing.

"What would be involved in committing 200,000 more men to Viet Nam?" A reserve call-up of approximately 280,000, an increased draft call and an extension of tours of duty of most men then in service.

"Can the enemy respond with a build-up of his own?" He could and he probably would.

"What are the estimated costs of the latest requests?" First calculations were on the order of \$2 billion for the remaining four months of that fiscal year, and an increase of \$10 to \$12 billion for the year beginning July 1, 1968.

"What will be the impact on the economy?" So great that we would face the possibility of credit restrictions, a tax increase and even wage and price controls. The balance of payments would be worsened by at least half a billion dollars a year.

"Can bombing stop the war?" Never by itself. It was inflicting heavy personnel and matériel losses, but bombing by itself would not stop the war.

"Will stepping up the bombing decrease American casualties?" Very little, if at all. Our casualties were due to the intensity of the ground fighting in the South. We had already dropped a heavier tonnage of bombs than in all the theaters of World War II. During 1967, an estimated 90,000 North Vietnamese had in-

filtrated into South Viet Nam. In the opening weeks of 1968, infiltrators were coming in at three to four times the rate of a year earlier, despite the ferocity and intensity of our campaign of aerial interdiction.

"How long must we keep on sending our men and carrying the main burden of combat?" The South Vietnamese were doing better, but they were not ready yet to replace our troops and we did not know when they would be.

When I asked for a presentation of the military plan for attaining victory in Viet Nam, I was told that there was no plan for victory in the historic American sense. Why not? Because our forces were operating under three major political restrictions: The President had forbidden the invasion of North Viet Nam because this could trigger the mutual assistance pact between North Viet Nam and China; the President had forbidden the mining of the harbor at Haiphong, the principal port through which the North received military supplies, because a Soviet vessel might be sunk; the President had forbidden our forces to pursue the enemy into Laos and Cambodia, for to do so would spread the war, politically and geographically, with no discernible advantage. These and other restrictions which precluded an all-out, no-holds-barred military effort were wisely designed to prevent our being drawn into a larger war. We had no inclination to recommend to the President their cancellation.

"Given these circumstances, how can we win?" We would, I was told, continue to evidence our superiority over the enemy; we would continue to attack in the belief that he would reach the stage where he would find it inadvisable to go on with the war. He could not afford the attrition we were inflicting on him. And we were improving our posture all the time.

I then asked, "What is the best estimate as to how long this course of action will take? Six months? One year? Two years?" There was no agreement on an answer. Not only was there no agreement, I could find no one willing to express any confidence in his guesses. Certainly, none of us was willing to assert that he could see "light at the end of the tunnel" or that American troops would be coming home by the end of the year.

After days of this type of analysis, my concern had greatly deepened. I could not find out when the war was going to end; I could not find out the manner in which it was going to end; I could not find out whether the new requests for men and equip-

ment were going to be enough, or whether it would take more and, if more, when and how much; I could not find out how soon the South Vietnamese forces would be ready to take over. All I had was the statement, given with too little self-assurance to be comforting, that if we persisted for an indeterminate length of time, the enemy would choose not to go on.

And so I asked, "Does anyone see any diminution in the will of the enemy after four years of our having been there, after enormous casualties and after massive destruction from our bombing?"

The answer was that there appeared to be no diminution in the will of the enemy. This reply was doubly impressive, because I was more conscious each day of domestic unrest in our own country. Draft card burnings, marches in the streets, problems on school campuses, bitterness and divisiveness were rampant. Just as disturbing to me were the economic implications of a struggle to be indefinitely continued at ever-increasing cost. The dollar was already in trouble, prices were escalating far too fast and emergency controls on foreign investment imposed on New Year's Day would be only a prelude to more stringent controls, if we were to add another \$12 billion to Viet Nam spending—with perhaps still more to follow.

I was also conscious of our obligations and involvements elsewhere in the world. There were certain hopeful signs in our relations with the Soviet Union, but both nations were hampered in moving toward vitally important talks on the limitation of strategic weapons so long as the United States was committed to a military solution in Viet Nam. We could not afford to disregard our interests in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, Western Europe and elsewhere. Even accepting the validity of our objective in Viet Nam, that objective had to be viewed in the context of our overall national interest, and could not sensibly be pursued at a price so high as to impair our ability to achieve other, and perhaps even more important, foreign policy objectives.

Also, I could not free myself from the continuing nagging doubt left over from that August trip, that if the nations living in the shadow of Viet Nam were not now persuaded by the domino theory, perhaps it was time for us to take another look. Our efforts had given the nations in that area a number of years following independence to organize and build their security. I

could see no reason at this time for us to continue to add to our commitment. Finally, there was no assurance that a 40 per cent increase in American troops would place us within the next few weeks, months or even years in any substantially better military position than we were in then. All that could be predicted accurately was that more troops would raise the level of combat and automatically raise the level of casualties on both sides.

And so, after these exhausting days, I was convinced that the military course we were pursuing was not only endless, but hopeless. A further substantial increase in American forces could only increase the devastation and the Americanization of the war, and thus leave us even further from our goal of a peace that would permit the people of South Viet Nam to fashion their own political and economic institutions. Henceforth, I was also convinced, our primary goal should be to level off our involvement, and to work toward gradual disengagement.

IV

To reach a conclusion and to implement it are not the same, especially when one does not have the ultimate power of decision. It now became my purpose to emphasize to my colleagues and to the President, that the United States had entered Viet Nam with a limited aim—to prevent its subjugation by the North and to enable the people of South Viet Nam to determine their own future. I also argued that we had largely accomplished that objective. Nothing required us to remain until the North had been ejected from the South, and the Saigon government had been established in complete military control of all South Viet Nam. An increase of over 200,000 in troop strength would mean that American forces would be twice the size of the regular South Vietnamese Army at that time. Our goal of building a stronger South Vietnamese Government, and an effective military force capable of ultimately taking over from us, would be frustrated rather than furthered. The more we continued to do in South Viet Nam, the less likely the South Vietnamese were to shoulder their own burden.

The debate continued at the White House for days. President Johnson encouraged me to report my findings and my views with total candor, but he was equally insistent on hearing the views of others. Finally, the President, in the closing hours of March, made his decisions and reported them to the people on the eve-

ning of the 31st. Three related directly to the month's review of the war. First, the President announced he was establishing a ceiling of 549,500 in the American commitment to Viet Nam; the only new troops going out would be support troops previously promised. Second, we would speed up our aid to the South Vietnamese armed forces. We would equip and train them to take over major combat responsibilities from us on a much accelerated schedule. Third, speaking to Hanoi, the President stated he was greatly restricting American bombing of the North as an invitation and an inducement to begin peace talks. We would no longer bomb north of the Twentieth Parallel. By this act of unilateral restraint, nearly 80 percent of the territory of North Viet Nam would no longer be subjected to our bombing.

I had taken office at the beginning of the month with one overriding immediate assignment—responding to the military request to strengthen our forces in Viet Nam so that we might prosecute the war more forcefully. Now my colleagues and I had two different and longer-range tasks—developing a plan for shifting the burden to the South Vietnamese as rapidly as they could be made ready, and supporting our government's diplomatic efforts to engage in peace talks.

To assess the rate of progress in the first task, I went to Viet Nam in July. I was heartened by the excellent spirit and the condition of our forces, but I found distressingly little evidence that the other troop-contributing countries, or the South Vietnamese, were straining to relieve us of our burdens. Although there had been nominal increases in troop contributions from Australia and Thailand since the preceding summer, the Philippines had actually withdrawn several hundred men. The troop-contributing countries were bearing no more of the combat burden; their casualty rates were actually falling.

As for South Vietnamese officials, in discussion after discussion, I found them professing unawareness of shortcomings in such matters as troop training, junior officer strength and rate of desertions. They were, I felt, too complacent when the facts were laid before them. I asked Vice President Ky, for example, about the gross desertion rate of South Vietnamese combat personnel that was running at 30 percent a year. He responded that it was so large, in part, because their men were not paid enough. I asked what his government intended to do. He suggested that we could cut back our bombing, give the money thus

saved to the Saigon government, and it would be used for troop pay. He was not jesting; his suggestion was a serious one. I returned home oppressed by the pervasive Americanization of the war: we were still giving the military instructions, still doing most of the fighting, still providing all the matériel, still paying most of the bills. Worst of all, I concluded that the South Vietnamese leaders seemed content to have it that way.

The North had responded to the President's speech of March 31 and meetings had begun in Paris in May. It was, however, a euphemism to call them peace talks. In mid-summer, substantive discussions had not yet begun. Our negotiators, the able and experienced Ambassador Averell Harriman and his talented associate, Cyrus Vance, were insisting that the Saigon government be a participant in the talks. Hanoi rejected this. President Johnson, rightly and understandably, refused to order a total bombing halt of the North until Hanoi would accept reciprocal restraints. Hanoi refused. With this unsatisfactory deadlock, the summer passed in Paris.

In Viet Nam, American casualty lists were tragically long, week after week. The enemy was not winning but, I felt, neither were we. There were many other areas in the world where our influence, moral force and economic contributions were sorely in demand and were limited because of our preoccupation with our involvement in Southeast Asia.

I returned from a NATO meeting in Bonn on Sunday evening, October 13, to find a summons to a White House meeting the following morning. There had been movement in Paris. There were no formal agreements, but certain "understandings" had been reached by our negotiating team and the North Vietnamese. At last the North had accepted the participation of the South in peace talks. We would stop all bombing of North Viet Nam. Substantive talks were to start promptly. We had made it clear to Hanoi that we could not continue such talks if there were indiscriminate shelling of major cities in the South, or if the demilitarized zone were violated so as to place our troops in jeopardy.

The President outlined the situation to his advisers. We spent a day of hard and full review. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were unanimous in stating that the bombing halt under these circumstances was acceptable. The State Department was authorized to report to Saigon that we had won a seat at the conference

table for the Saigon government and to request the earliest possible presence of their delegation in Paris. I felt a sense of relief and hope; we were started down the road to peace.

These feelings were short-lived. The next three weeks were almost as agonizing to me as March had been. The cables from Saigon were stunning. The South Vietnamese Government, suddenly and unexpectedly, was not willing to go to Paris. First one reason, then another, then still another were cabled to Washington. As fast as one Saigon obstacle was overcome, another took its place. Incredulity turned to dismay. I felt that the President and the United States were being badly used. Even worse, I felt that Saigon was attempting to exert a veto power over our agreement to engage in peace negotiations. I admired greatly the President's ability to be patient under the most exasperating circumstances. Each day ran the risk that the North might change its mind, and that months of diligent effort at Paris would be in vain; each day saw a new effort on his part to meet the latest Saigon objection.

To satisfy himself that the bombing halt would neither jeopardize our own forces nor those of our allies, the President ordered General Creighton W. Abrams back from South Viet Nam for a personal report. Finally, on October 31, President Johnson announced that the bombing of North Viet Nam would cease, peace talks would begin promptly and Saigon was assured of a place at the conference table. However, it took weeks to get the Saigon government to Paris, and still additional weeks to get their agreement on seating arrangements.

By the time the various difficulties had been resolved, certain clear and unequivocal opinions regarding the attitude and posture of the Saigon government had crystalized in my mind. These opinions had been forming since my trip to South Viet Nam the preceding July.

The goal of the Saigon government and the goal of the United States were no longer one and the same, if indeed they ever had been. They were not in total conflict but they were clearly not identical. We had largely accomplished the objective for which we had entered the struggle. There was no longer any question about the desire of the American people to bring the Viet Nam adventure to a close.

As Ambassador Harriman observed, it is dangerous to let your aims be escalated in the middle of a war. Keep your objectives in

mind, he advised, and as soon as they are attained, call a halt. The winning of the loyalty of villagers to the central government in Saigon, the form of a postwar government, who its leaders should be and how they are to be selected—these were clearly not among our original war objectives. But these were the precise areas of our differences with the Saigon government.

As Saigon authorities saw it, the longer the war went on, with the large-scale American involvement, the more stable was their régime, and the fewer concessions they would have to make to other political groupings. If the United States were to continue its military efforts for another two or three years, perhaps the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong would be so decimated that no concessions would be needed at all. In the meantime, vast amounts of American wealth were being poured into the South Vietnamese economy. In short, grim and distasteful though it might be, I concluded during the bleak winter weeks that Saigon was in no hurry for the fighting to end and that the Saigon régime did not want us to reach an early settlement of military issues with Hanoi.

The fact is that the creation of strong political, social and economic institutions is a job that the Vietnamese must do for themselves. We cannot do it for them, nor can they do it while our presence hangs over them so massively. President Thieu, Vice President Ky, Prime Minister Huong and those who may follow them have the task of welding viable political institutions from the 100 or more splinter groups that call themselves political parties. It is up to us to let them get on with the job. Nothing we might do could be so beneficial or could so add to the political maturity of South Viet Nam as to begin to withdraw our combat troops. Moreover, in my opinion, we cannot realistically expect to achieve anything more through our military force, and the time has come to begin to disengage. That was my final conclusion as I left the Pentagon on January 20, 1969.

v

It remains my firm opinion today. It is based not only on my personal experiences, but on the many significant changes that have occurred in the world situation in the last four years.

In 1965, the forces supported by North Viet Nam were on the verge of a military take-over of South Viet Nam. Only by sending large numbers of American troops was it possible to

prevent this from happening. The South Vietnamese were militarily weak and politically demoralized. They could not, at that time, be expected to preserve for themselves the right to determine their own future. Communist China had recently proclaimed its intention to implement the doctrine of "wars of national liberation." Khrushchev's fall from power the preceding October and Chou En-lai's visit to Moscow in November 1964 posed the dire possibility of the two communist giants working together to spread disruption throughout the underdeveloped nations of the world. Indonesia, under Sukarno, presented a posture of implacable hostility toward Malaysia, and was a destabilizing element in the entire Pacific picture. Malaysia itself, as well as Thailand and Singapore, needed time for their governmental institutions to mature. Apparent American indifference to developments in Asia might, at that time, have had a disastrous impact on the independent countries of that area.

During the past four years, the situation has altered dramatically. The armed forces of South Viet Nam have increased in size and proficiency. The political situation there has become more stable, and the governmental institutions more representative. Elsewhere in Asia, conditions of greater security exist. The bloody defeat of the attempted communist coup in Indonesia removed Sukarno from power and changed the confrontation with Malaysia to coöperation between the two countries. The governments of Thailand and Singapore have made good use of these four years to increase their popular support. Australia and New Zealand have moved toward closer regional defense ties, while Japan, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan have exhibited a rate of economic growth and an improvement in living standards that discredit the teachings of Chairman Mao.

Of at least equal significance is the fact that, since 1965, relations between Russia and China have steadily worsened. The schism between these two powers is one of the watershed events of our time. Ironically, their joint support of Hanoi has contributed to the acrimony between them. It has brought into focus their competition for leadership in the communist camp. Conflicting positions on the desirability of the peace negotiations in Paris have provided a further divisive factor. In an analogous development, increased Soviet aid to North Korea has made Pyongyang less dependent on China. The Cultural Revolution and the depredations of the Red Guards have created in China

a situation of internal unrest that presently preoccupies China's military forces. The recent border clashes on the Ussuri River further decrease the likelihood that China will, in the near future, be able to devote its attention and resources to the export of revolution.

These considerations are augmented by another. It seems clear that the necessity to devote more of our minds and our means to our pressing domestic problems requires that we set a chronological limit on our Vietnamese involvement.

A year ago, we placed a numerical limit on this involvement, and did so without lessening the effectiveness of the total military effort. There will, undeniably, be many problems inherent in the replacement of American combat forces with South Vietnamese forces. But whatever these problems, they must be faced. There is no way to achieve our goal of creating the conditions that will allow the South Vietnamese to determine their own future unless we begin, and begin promptly, to turn over to them the major responsibility for their own defense. This ability to defend themselves can never be developed so long as we continue to bear the brunt of the battle. Sooner or later, the test must be whether the South Vietnamese will serve their own country sufficiently well to guarantee its national survival. In my view, this test must be made sooner, rather than later.

A first step would be to inform the South Vietnamese Government that we will withdraw about 100,000 troops before the end of this year. We should also make it clear that this is not an isolated action, but the beginning of a process under which all U.S. ground combat forces will have been withdrawn from Viet Nam by the end of 1970. The same information should, of course, be provided to the other countries who are contributing forces for the defense of South Viet Nam.

Strenuous political and military objections to this decision must be anticipated. Arguments will be made that such a withdrawal will cause the collapse of the Saigon government and jeopardize the security of our own and allied troops. Identical arguments, however, were urged against the decisions to restrict the bombing on March 31 of last year and to stop it completely on October 31. They have proven to be unfounded. There is, in fact, no magic and no specific military rationale for the number of American troops presently in South Viet Nam. The current figure represents only the level at which the escalator stopped.

It should also be noted that our military commanders have stated flatly since last summer that no additional American troops are needed. During these months the number of South Vietnamese under arms in the Government cause has increased substantially and we have received steady reports of their improved performance. Gradual withdrawal of American combat troops thus not only would be consistent with continued overall military strength, but also would serve to substantiate the claims of the growing combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese forces.

Concurrently with the decision to begin withdrawal, orders should be issued to our military commanders to discontinue efforts to apply maximum military pressure on the enemy and to seek instead to reduce the level of combat. The public statements of our officials show that there has as yet been no change in our policy of maximum military effort. The result has been a continuation of the high level of American casualties, without any discernible impact on the peace negotiations in Paris.

While our combat troops are being withdrawn, we would continue to provide the armed forces of the Saigon government with logistic support and with our air resources. As the process goes on, we can appraise both friendly and enemy reactions. The pattern of our eventual withdrawal of non-combat troops and personnel engaged in air lift and air support can be determined on the basis of political and military developments. So long as we retain our air resources in South Viet Nam, with total air superiority, I do not believe that the lessening in the military pressure exerted by the ground forces would permit the enemy to make any significant gains. There is, moreover, the possibility of reciprocal reduction in North Vietnamese combat activity.

Our decision progressively to turn over the combat burden to the armed forces of South Viet Nam would confront the North Vietnamese leaders with a painful dilemma. Word that the Americans were beginning to withdraw might at first lead them to claims of victory. But even these initial claims could be expected to be tinged with apprehension. There has, in my view, long been considerable evidence that Hanoi fears the possibility that those whom they characterize as "puppet forces" may, with continued but gradually reduced American support, prove able to stand off the communist forces.

As American combat forces are withdrawn, Hanoi would be

faced with the prospect of a prolonged and substantial presence of American air and logistics personnel in support of South Viet Nam's combat troops, which would be constantly improving in efficiency. Hanoi's only alternative would be to arrange, tacitly or explicitly, for a mutual withdrawal of all external forces. In either eventuality, the resulting balance of forces should avert any danger of a blood bath which some fear might occur in the aftermath of our withdrawal.

Once our withdrawal of combat troops commences, the Saigon government would recognize, probably for the first time, that American objectives do not demand the perpetuation in power of any one group of South Vietnamese. So long as we appear prepared to remain indefinitely, there is no pressure on Saigon to dilute the control of those presently in positions of power by making room for individuals representative of other nationalist elements in South Vietnamese society.

Accordingly, I anticipate no adverse impact on the Paris negotiations from the announcement and implementation of a program of American withdrawal. Instead, I would foresee the creation of circumstances under which true bargaining may proceed among the Vietnamese present in Paris. Unquestionably, the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front would do so in the hope that any political settlement would move them toward eventual domination in South Viet Nam. But their hopes and expectations necessarily will yield to the political realities, and these political realities are, in the final analysis, both beyond our control and beyond our ken. Moreover, they are basically none of our business. The one million South Vietnamese in the various components of the armed forces, with American logistics, air lift and air support, should be able, if they have the will, to prevent the imposition by force of a Hanoi-controlled régime. If they lack a sense or a sufficiency of national purpose, we can never force it on them.

In the long run, the security of the Pacific region will depend upon the ability of the countries there to meet the legitimate growing demands of their own people. No military strength we can bring to bear can give them internal stability or popular acceptance. In Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the less developed regions of the world, our ability to understand and to control the basic forces that are at play is a very limited one. We can advise, we can urge, we can furnish economic aid. But Ameri-

can military power cannot build nations, any more than it can solve the social and economic problems that face us here at home.

This, then, is the case history of the evolution of one individual's thinking regarding Viet Nam. Throughout this entire period it has been difficult to cling closely to reality because of the constant recurrence of optimistic predictions that our task was nearly over, and that better times were just around the corner, or just over the next hill.

We cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that this is a limited war, for limited aims and employing limited power. The forces we now have deployed and the human and material costs we are now incurring have become, in my opinion, out of all proportion to our purpose. The present scale of military effort can bring us no closer to meaningful victory. It can only continue to devastate the countryside and to prolong the suffering of the Vietnamese people of every political persuasion.

Unless we have the imagination and the courage to adopt a different course, I am convinced that we will be in no better, and no different, a position a year from now than we are today.

At current casualty rates, 10,000 more American boys will have lost their lives.

We should reduce American casualties by reducing American combat forces. We should do so in accordance with a definite schedule and with a specified end point.

Let us start to bring our men home—and let us start *now*.

SLOGANS AND REALITIES

By George W. Ball

SOMEONE is always devising a slogan or aphorism to dispose of an idea that is too complex for facile solution. At any given moment of time there are a number of such bromides in the public domain, but today the most popular is "No more Viet Nams." It is a phrase usually proclaimed with heavy emphasis as a statement of ultimate truth, but just what course of action it calls for is obscure. Like most serviceable utterances of this genre, it is artfully ambiguous, meaning quite conveniently whatever the user wishes it to mean. Thus, it may serve as a bugle note sounding the retreat to isolationism—or an argument that we should abandon Southeast Asia altogether—or an insistence that we should never again commit American power so uncritically—or a hawkish demand that we cast aside the restraints of limited war, unleash the military and drop lethal bombs without inhibition.

This is by no means the only cliché that currently mars the public discourse, merely the loudest. Thus, the United States, we are constantly told, is "not the world's policeman," although, of course, we should "resist temptations to backslide into isolationism." It is unfair that we should have to "carry more than our share of the burdens," yet at the same time "we must be fully prepared to halt aggression against free nations wherever it occurs."

What all this quite accurately suggests is a country no longer sure of its role in the world, yet unable to redefine it in a satisfactory manner while, meantime, the easy answers of the past no longer furnish their ancient comfort.

Of course, no nation likes to walk a global beat, but in the two millennia since the Athenian flowering, the world has made exiguous progress toward organized tranquility. Living in political structures that were out of date a hundred years ago, man is still so bedeviled by greed and passion that force and authority must be ever at hand if he is not to blow the world up. So, unhappy as may be the policeman's lot, if we do not walk his thankless beat, who will?

Certainly not our traditional allies. Having failed to achieve even the first stages of political unity, no West European

country by itself has either the stomach or resources for significant exertions outside the European parish.

Nor are other sources of force and effort any more promising. Some years ago it was faddish to place great hope on regional organizations, but because in most areas of the world the concept contradicted the realities of power it was always more figure of speech than practical alternative. Based on our experience so far, there is little reason to believe that we can dispose of serious problems through decentralized institutions; yet a universal solution is very little more likely.

It would be pleasant if we could really wash our hands of the world's most troublesome problems by—in the cant of politicians and editorial writers—“taking them to the United Nations.” But we should have learned by now that this rhetoric is quite hollow whenever the United States and the Soviet Union are aligned on opposite sides of a serious issue, as is true in almost all situations that even marginally touch the balance of world power.

Still, the hope remains that, on that epic day when the cold war wears itself out, our universal machinery will become workable. Thus, it is argued, if and as we find expanding areas of common interest with the Soviet Union, we should strive with them to “strengthen the United Nations” and move toward the “rule of law.” Such a prospect is obviously attractive, though in sober moments we know it to be a long way off. Yet, if we are ever to achieve that beckoning goal, we must be careful not to stumble over our own feet as we plod painfully along.

No one can seriously contend that we now live under a universal system or, in any realistic sense, under the “rule of law.” We maintain the peace by preserving a precarious balance of power between ourselves and the Soviet Union—a process we used to call “containment” before the word went out of style. It is the preservation of that balance which, regardless of how we express it, is the central guiding principle of American foreign policy. It is the reason we spend \$80 billion a year for our military establishment and—whether rightly or mistakenly—it is the reason why a half-million Americans are currently slogging through the paddies and jungles of Southeast Asia.

Not only do we still depend on the time-honored device of the balance of power, which both the League of Nations and the United Nations were supposed to render obsolete, but we tacitly claim and recognize other hoary concepts, as, for example,

“spheres of influence” or, more accurately, “spheres of interest.” We paid deference to such a Soviet sphere in 1956 when we sat by while Russian tanks rolled into Budapest, and we recognized it again last summer when we used nothing more lethal than harsh words while the Soviets stamped out those small sprigs of liberalism just beginning to push through the bleak soil of Czechoslovakia.

That is only half the story. For their part, the Soviets tacitly acknowledged our sphere of interest when they stood by while we sent the marines and paratroopers into the Dominican Republic in 1965 (with, of course, OAS ratification) and, earlier and more dramatically, when in 1962 we ordered their missiles out of Cuba.

Irksome though some may find it, we still practice what is derisively called the “old diplomacy” because there seems nothing better to do. All but the wildly romantic are agreed that we will never achieve a workable universal system until the two global powers are prepared to follow parallel, if not common, lines of action on a reasonably broad spectrum of policies. Yet, to make this bright vision come true will not be easy. It will require more will and hardheadedness than we are now exhibiting.

What we need first is squarely to recognize the nature of the institutions presently at hand and how they operate, or fail to operate.

To appraise the United Nations with anything approaching clarity we must avoid the wishful fantasies of its devoted constituency. No matter how much its supporters wish otherwise, the founders of the United Nations did not envisage their creation as a world government, or anything resembling it. At the most, they saw it as a first halting step toward universalism, designed to provide an institutional means through which the great powers could maintain the peace, guided by the body of principles enunciated in the Charter.

Far more clearly than the Covenant of the League, the U.N. Charter placed the prime responsibility for the maintenance of world peace squarely on the Security Council, which, in essential concept, was a club of the great powers—the instrument through which they could reach accord and enforce their decisions.

To understand both the Charter and the Covenant, it is important to recognize their common inspiration. Both drew heav-

ily on the experience of the Council of Europe, that nebulous—even, in some ways, metaphorical—institution through which the concert of great powers sought with fair success to maintain the peace throughout the nineteenth century. In a manner of speaking, that earlier Council served as grandfather to the Security Council, to whom the drafters of the U.N. Charter unequivocally entrusted the maintenance of the peace.

Since then, however, the Security Council has been the victim of a kind of creeping irrelevance, which is a familiar ailment of institutions that are prevented by circumstance from fulfilling their original purpose. In such a climate special interests have an easy time of it since, in the resulting mood of absent-mindedness, they find little resistance to subtle changes that may render the original purpose unachievable.

Thus far the Security Council has not been immune from this debilitating process. Losing sight of the essential great-power underpinning of the Charter, the permanent members have already agreed to an inflation of the Council's membership that has altered its character and impaired the chances for its effective operation, if and when the United States and the Soviet Union reach a broader accommodation. Under the Charter in its initial form, the Security Council was to consist of five permanent members together with six non-permanent members who would be designated to serve on a rotating basis. But from a sense of futility and careless complaisance we have supported the enlargement of the Council from eleven to fifteen, with ten non-permanent members. Of those ten, five are, by courtesy and practice, drawn from the nations of the Afro-Asian bloc.

This inflation is a symptom, not of strength, but of weakness that comes from lack of exercise. It finds a sad parallel in earlier experience, for as the League Council moved unsteadily from frustration to frustration the number of non-permanent members was expanded step-by-step from four to eleven.

The result is that, in the Security Council as now organized, action can no longer be taken merely on the agreement of the great powers. Today they must carry with them not two, but at least four non-permanent members. The consequence is not only to infect the Council with the bloc politics of the General Assembly, but to increase the chasm between responsibility and power that has from the beginning made the Assembly, in Burke's phrase, a mere "talking shop."

II

More disturbing even than the onset of fatty degeneration in the Council is the challenge to its powers and purposes that has recently marked the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Today, the achievement of stability in the Middle East ranks high on the list of priorities. For the United States, as well as for the Soviet Union, the strategic significance of that area exceeds that of the Southeast Asian peninsula by a factor of four or five. It is geographically much nearer the heart of power (which corresponds almost axiomatically with the heart of danger). It contains vast resources of oil, which are not only a major United States investment but a principal source of energy for Western Europe. Including as it does the south and east littoral of the Mediterranean, it has for centuries been a source of attraction for Russian governments. It includes the Suez Canal, which, though no longer commercially important to the United States and, at best, a wasting asset for Egypt, is of major strategic interest to the Soviet Union. Finally, it is an area riven by passion, in which the United States can benefit from friendly relations with both sides but has special emotional and historical commitments to the state of Israel.

It is now two years since the June war of 1967, and the fact that there is as yet no peace nor likely prospect of peace should, it seems, have taught us a lesson. Time has not settled the dust as we had hoped; instead, an indefinite continuance of a strained and abnormal situation in which large pieces of Arab territory remain under Israeli occupation is far more likely to complicate than to hasten a settlement. Raid and reprisal occur in accelerating rhythm, while the Fedayeen are rapidly becoming a super-government whose extreme views inject a new and awkward political element to be accounted for in any settlement.

Nations caught up in a quarrel have only limited options. One option is to settle, another to fight, a third to let matters fester in a state that is neither war nor peace. Yet, if the Middle East festers long enough with no settlement, fighting is almost certain to be resumed, and, from the point of view of American interests and indeed of world peace, renewed war in that irrational area of the world would be too perilous to justify continued passivity.

Yet, unhappily for everyone, there is little prospect that the political authorities on either side can muster the cohesion and domestic consensus that will permit them to take the painful

initiatives and make the accommodations necessary to a settlement. The governments of the Arab nations most immediately concerned are too weak to take a strong lead that will open them to demagogic attack, while the Israeli Government, embroiled in an internal power struggle and facing an election, cannot, within its own ranks, agree on concrete substantive proposals; thus, it will probably continue to insist on procedural positions clearly unacceptable to the other side. In the face of these realities, we have no reasonable option but to move away from a passive policy. The best—and perhaps the only—hope for peace is that, through firm and patient negotiation with the Soviet Union, we may be able to hammer out between us the concrete terms of a settlement that would safeguard the interests of both Israel and its Arab neighbors.

For the United States Government to join in trying to shape such a settlement involves the assumption of grave commitments and responsibilities in connection with the guarantees required for its enforcement. Nor is there any assurance that the Soviet Union can be persuaded to agree to a settlement that would represent a fair balancing of the interests of both sides. That necessarily depends on how much the Politburo really wants peace in the Middle East, and on that question, as on most questions regarding the intentions of that furtive and, no doubt, confused body, the evidence is far from clear. Yet it is imperative that we make every effort to bring the Soviet Union to agreement and coöperation in the design and enforcement of a settlement that will provide Ambassador Jarring with concrete proposals to put to the parties. The fact that this process has now begun in the framework of four-power conversations does not remove the need for bilateral agreement—although it may facilitate it. Though the so-called Big Four no longer reflect the realities of relative power, as General de Gaulle liked to pretend, they are still the effective permanent members of the Security Council. Thus their support is essential to the second step—to obtain the institutional approval of a Council rendered awkward by hypertrophy and clearly biased on the Arab side. Because the Soviet Union has, in this case, shown some willingness to try to make the machinery work, it could well prove a test of the Council's ultimate usefulness.

To utilize the Council effectively, however, we must be clear in our own minds as to what that entails. For quite understand-

able reasons—because it feels that its willingness to withdraw from conquered territory in the past has not assured immunity from Arab attack, and because military success has given it a substantial bargaining position—the Israeli Government has opposed great-power consideration of the problem. In fact, its emphatic admonitions as to the dangers and unacceptability of anything suggesting an “imposed settlement” have been echoed by our own government and treated by our editorial writers as unchallengeable. Yet, regardless of praise or blame, which is not the point at issue, the problem seems more one of semantics than substance.

Here again there is danger that we may be confused by a slogan. “Imposed peace” has an unpleasant ring, with distasteful historical antecedents. It implies the disregard of those pet concepts of the last half-century: “self-determination,” “nonintervention” and the sacred “rights of small nations.” It recalls brutal actions by which the Concert of Europe dealt with local quarrels during the nineteenth century, such as the occasion in 1896 when the then great powers abruptly halted an incipient war between Greeks and Turks over Cyprus by sending a fleet, landing an army and decreeing the terms of a settlement.

Yet the sensitivity reflected in today’s reaction is nothing we can claim to have invented. Even while keeping peace with a strong hand, the leaders of the Concert of Europe were reluctant to admit that they presided over a “naked great-power alliance” or that they made a practice of “imposing peace” without the consent of small nations directly concerned. This, in spite of the fact that whenever the peace of Europe was seriously threatened, they did what they felt they had to do with no apologies.

Unlike Metternich and the other reactionary masters of the Concert of Europe whose compelling ambition was to preserve a dynastic system that had limited survival value even in the nineteenth century, the drafters of the U.N. Charter had more spacious objectives. They expressed these objectives in the Charter as moral and political principles which the institutions of the United Nations were to interpret and enforce.

When the drafters of the Charter met at Dumbarton Oaks and later at San Francisco, they had fresh in their minds an instance of great-power callousness far more shocking than the settlement imposed in Crete. The Western capitulation at Munich—involving, as it did, the dismemberment and ultimate overrun-

ning of Czechoslovakia—was a horrible example of something that should not be permitted to happen again. Thus, the United States delegates were emphatic that the Council should not be given the power to “impose settlements.” It should be able to do anything, everything, to “keep” the peace but not to “prescribe” it. Yet, since others insisted that a rigid adherence to this principle was unrealistic, the issue was compromised in the end by empowering the Council, in the event the parties to a dangerous dispute failed to settle it by negotiation or other peaceful means, “to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.”

Under this provision, the Security Council could set out in detail the terms on which a dangerous dispute should be settled. In the language of art, however, those terms would be only a “recommendation,” not a “decision.” The significance of the distinction relates to the technical means of enforcement. It can be argued that the great powers, acting through their instrument, the Security Council, would not be authorized to “impose” a settlement by employing the mandatory—or, in the last resort, the military—sanctions provided by Chapter VII of the Charter. Yet, quite possibly this distinction is not so important as it seems. Sir Charles Webster, a distinguished English jurist who played an important role for the Foreign Office in the conferences from which the Charter evolved, has written: “. . . at San Francisco it was made quite clear that the Security Council itself could decide what the terms of a settlement ought to be. The question as to how far this right extends is a controversial one, but, in my view, the Security Council has the power to impose a settlement on the parties to a dispute, even if this means the alteration of their legal rights, provided that it determines that such a settlement is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Quite obviously the practical question is not whether the Council can resort to mandatory sanctions to enforce its judgment as to the shape and content of a fair settlement. After all, only once in the history of the Charter have those mandatory sanctions been invoked—and then, I think, quite unwisely. In the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Council made the requisite finding of a “threat to the peace” but on intellectually indefensible grounds.

No responsible national leader wants or expects the global

powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to treat the Middle East as the Concert of Europe treated Crete—nor should that be necessary. Secretary Rogers, it seems to me, got it quite right when he said, “There are lots of ways to influence people without making them do it. I think the force of reasoning and the force of public opinion have a lot to do with influencing nations.”

In saying this, the Secretary reflected the eminently sensible view that in the rare situation when the United States and the Soviet Union can reach agreement on a solution for a major problem which the members of the Security Council accept as within the principles of the Charter, they should not be condemned to helplessness—watching with impotent dismay while the temperature of a whole strategic area of the world moves nearer to the flash point.

Yet this could well be our posture if we let ourselves be confused by a semantic argument over the desirability of an “imposed peace.” Obviously, it is much better if peace can be arrived at through negotiation among the parties to a conflict and recorded in a peace treaty. So long as there is reasonable hope that this may occur, the great powers should do no more than encourage the process. Not only is it a thoroughly decent policy, fully consistent with the ideas of self-determination, sovereignty and nonintervention that have long been a part of our credo, but, most important, it relieves our country of the responsibility of making difficult decisions on complex issues or appearing to meddle in the affairs of other peoples.

But at the moment this seems highly unlikely.

III

The problem of the Middle East is important not only for itself, but because it has stimulated another faddish thought—the assertion that even though the superpowers agree on the settlement of a local quarrel they no longer have the ability to do anything about it. What this implies is that the power structure of the world has profoundly changed—that, as it is sometimes put, “the era of the superpowers is finished.” No longer, so the argument goes, is power polarized between two giants. Instead, the power structure of the world has become polycentric or multicentric, depending on whether one’s taste runs to Greek or Latin neologisms.

This is, it seems to me, a dangerous misconception. Nothing leads more quickly to the abandonment of responsibility than the conviction that there is nothing useful that can be done. To underestimate the central role of both the Soviet Union and ourselves runs two dangers. On the one hand, it could inspire a dispiriting withdrawal from responsibility; on the other, it could encourage a defeatist assessment of the potential of universal institutions even where the two global powers find themselves moving along parallel lines of policy.

Is there really substance in the assertion? In spite of talk about polycentrism, who can seriously challenge the fact that effective political and military power is still highly concentrated in the only two great nations that are organized on a continent-wide basis and are, at the same time, the major industrial producers? Alone among nations, each has not only the capability to destroy the world but—and this is perhaps most important—lays claim to worldwide interests and responsibilities and can muster the means and the will to pursue them.

The history of the last few years has made this crystal clear. Britain is in economic trouble and is systematically contracting her overseas commitments, while most of the states of continental Western Europe are narrowly preoccupied with parochial affairs. France alone has aspired to an expanding role on the world stage, but that has been largely shadow play. What Adam Smith—in a quite different context—referred to as the “real mediocrity of her circumstances” limited de Gaulle’s performance to essentially negative actions; pursuing grandiose goals and tactics, France could tear down and obstruct, but not build.

Nor, at the other end of the world, is Mainland China the serious threat to bipolarity that many assume. Caught up in the distracting throes of an internal convulsion, she finds the very weight of her population a liability rather than an asset in building the modern industrial society that is the only effective basis for world power. Japan, potentially an important factor in world affairs, persists, for the time being—but I suspect not for much longer—in a “low posture.” Thus today the United States and the Soviet Union remain the active centers of world power.

Napoleon, during his exile in St. Helena, predicted that the world would sooner or later be “either an American republic or a Russian absolute monarchy,” though in the fragmentary report of this observation no time span was defined. Two decades later,

de Tocqueville supplied a variant vision in his famous prediction that Russia and the United States would divide the world between them. De Tocqueville's prescience is all the more remarkable in that he could not know that within the next century the powers of Western Europe would tear one another apart in two devastating civil wars. Nor could he perceive that the chaos resulting from the first of these wars would bring to power a communist dictatorship as successor and substitute for Tsarist despotism. This event defined a clear ideological cleavage between the two rival halves of the world and produced a cold war.

The fact, however, that gifted men more than one hundred years ago did foresee the special roles of the Russians and ourselves only tends to confirm the logic of a bipolar world. Nor do I think we are likely to see a material change in this situation for some years to come.

Yet out of the frustrations of Viet Nam have come prophetic voices proclaiming that the age of the superpowers is ended, not because the other industrial nations pose a significant challenge to Soviet or American strength but because the resurgence of nationalism has produced an effective counterforce. The support adduced for this proposition rests on a series of quite dubious assumptions. Most vigorously urged is the contention that the United States has shown by its failure in Viet Nam that it no longer has the power to enforce its will even on a small country. Thus our dismal agony in that morass of jungle and paddy is said to mark the end of the American role as a superpower with a special mission to maintain the peace.

All of this should be taken with a large admixture of salt. Overreaction normally follows frustration and disappointment, and proclamations of the end of an era are normally of a kind with announcements that the world will end next Tuesday. Someone is always averring that a particular phase of history is over, or that we are beginning a new chapter. Yet no one can really be sure of that for many years to come, and then only after the trade union of historians has voted some arbitrary judgments.

Thus, I do not read the lesson of Viet Nam in such dramatic terms. Our experience there has not shown that our power has diminished but rather that there are regions in the world where modern arms cannot be effectively used and thus should never have been committed. The French discovered over a period of

eight years that Viet Nam offered an impossible terrain, in both physical and political terms, for the effective employment of Western power—that it was, as General de Gaulle once described it to me, “rotten country.” This is a fact of nature, not the subject for a doctoral dissertation. At no time since the Second World War could the United States have intervened effectively in Viet Nam. Had we tried to do so in 1954, for example, when a discouraged France called for our help, we would have embroiled ourselves in the same quagmire that proved so disastrous a decade later.

What our experience over the past eight years should, therefore, have taught us is not that our power is failing but that we should use caution and discrimination in engaging it. We must never again be beguiled by the false assumption—the popular slogan of a few years ago—that whenever the Western presence is withdrawn from a less developed country through the breakup of a colonial structure or otherwise, a “power vacuum” is automatically created, which the United States must fill preclusively by its military strength or economic or political influence, lest the communists gain a new beachhead. This postulate is not in accord with history. In most places where colonial powers have been evicted or have left voluntarily there has been no “power vacuum.” A fervent nationalism or a latent tribalism has replaced the colonial authority, and, often, after a brief flirtation, the communists have been heaved out as unceremoniously as were their colonial predecessors.

Thus I find nothing in our experience in Viet Nam to suggest any diminution in our power either in relative or absolute terms. What that experience has done is to help define the outer limits beyond which our power cannot now—and never could—be effectively used and where, therefore, we should avoid embroiling our armies and air force. The fact that we did not learn that lesson some years ago does not prove that the relative power situation has changed; it means only that we had to learn it the hard way.

Not only is there no evidence that the position of the United States as a superpower has weakened in relation to the Third World, but a good argument can be made to the contrary. During the latter 1950s and early 1960s we watched with misgiving the emergence of an increasingly powerful neutralist bloc among the less developed nations, with Nehru as its prophet. But in the

fall of 1962, Peking's foray over the mountain barriers threw the Indian Government into a panic. The pieties of neutralism were forgotten in the frantic effort to seek military aid from the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as from Great Britain.

Thereafter, neutralism as structural cement for bloc politics ceased to prosper. It never recovered from India's demonstration that it was irrelevant as a principle of political action. In time, its other apostles either fell from grace or found the cause no longer interesting. Sukarno, the fatuous hero of the Bandung Conference, was hustled off the scene after the abortive revolution of 1965. Nasser, overburdened with defeat, is today a faded and diminished leader, while for Tito nonalignment has lost much of its plausibility as an organizing ideology.

Except, therefore, in the bloc politics of the United Nations, there has ceased to be, among the nations of the Third World, much organized resistance to the superpower role of the United States. Preoccupied with their individual problems and lacking the sinews of collective power, the nations of the Third World have failed to become the decisive political force that missionaries of the "new diplomacy" were predicting a few years ago.

None the less, some still contend that the upsurge of nationalism in Western Europe has sapped the ability of our country to deal with the increasingly assertive nations of the industrialized North. By building the institutions of unity, Western Europe could indeed have challenged the preëminence of the superpowers. But it lacked the driving will to prevail. What kept it from doing so was that very nationalism which some now mistakenly hail as the limiting factor on superpower dominance.

Thus, in spite of his pretensions to a world role, General de Gaulle at no time posed a realistic challenge to America's star billing; instead, by resisting the future, he confined France and other European states to the limited glories of provincial theater. Rude as it may be to say it, a disunited Western Europe has relatively little influence in the world. The main tasks of keeping world peace continue to rest, as they have done ever since the war, primarily on the United States.

Meanwhile, European nationalism, by stifling the chance to bring West Germany within a politically unified Europe, is responsible for leaving unsolved the most important and dangerous unknown of the cold war. That unknown is the political

orientation of the German people ten, or even five, years from now. What will be the political tendencies of a Germany controlled by a postwar generation no longer haunted by the dark spectre of the Nazi obscenities and denied the scope to employ their energies in the spacious arena of a unified Europe? Will not the new Germans discover that a nationalistic West has neither the will nor the power to permit them the fulfillment of their own nationalism—that is, the recreation of a prewar German state through reunification? And will they then be tempted to turn eastward as they have done so many times in their history?

These are the kinds of questions which we should now be addressing. Two nations—Germany and Japan—upset the balance of power almost thirty years ago and if not dealt with perceptively, they each could—by political, not military, means—do it again. These are points on which our diplomatic attention should focus—not on a France, which, limited in size and resources, proved unable to shift the balance merely by the lever of a strong man's will, and not on an overpopulated China that startles the world less by its power than its ineffable bad manners.

Yet those who are ready to inscribe the superpowers on the retirement list are not content merely to proclaim the growing resistance to American power around the world. They insist that the Soviet Union also has lost its potency on the world scene. Thus, they point out that Moscow no longer commands unchallenged authority over the communist movement and that in the Third World it has scraped bottom on the same shoals of nationalism as has the United States.

Unquestionably, the Soviet Union has had its troubles. It has experienced a notable lack of success in Africa, where its own racial arrogance has clearly shown through, but that is of only secondary importance in terms of the larger balance. What is important is that it has extended its influence into the South Mediterranean, particularly the U.A.R., and its position in the South Asian subcontinent may well be much stronger in a post-Ayub Pakistan than has heretofore been the case.

Thus, whether the Soviet's role as a superpower has, on balance, been eroded is arguable. In many ways the turmoil in China has diminished the effective rivalry of the only other significant center of communist power. The Kremlin's relations with Tito have been intrinsically unhealthy for a long time. Its niggling differences with Castro are not all that important. What

is critical in terms of effective Soviet power is the preservation of its East European empire, and here one must walk with caution. That empire has been threatened with defections more than once during the postwar period. Yet, so far, only one significant state, Yugoslavia, has succeeded in breaking out of the Warsaw Pact corral. Although the experience of Czechoslovakia is fresh in our minds, it is far from presaging the early end of the Soviet empire. Instead, the tragedy must be viewed for what it was: not a self-contained drama but one more episode in a play cycle of relaxation and repression that we have watched for a decade and a half. As early as 1953 riots were put down in East Berlin. In 1956 came unrest in Poland and the bloody affair of Hungary. What the agony of Czechoslovakia signaled was not merely the resilience of the human spirit, but a brutal reaffirmation by the Soviet Union that it was not prepared to lose its East European colonies to the counterattraction of nationalism.

IV

At the risk of affronting the apostles of the "new diplomacy," I would turn back the argument to the essential question as to how in a bipolarized world the U.S.S.R. and the United States can still live uneasily together without blowing one another up. It is assumed in a time-faded metaphor that tunnels bring claustrophobia if one finds no light at the end of them. Aware of this—overcome by it, in fact—we have devised a happy hypothesis (in which I concur) that over the years, if the balance of power is not upset, we and the Soviet Union may each undergo a slow transformation that will enable us to live together in greater tranquility.

Thus, I continue to accept the hopeful assumption underlying American policy that, as we move together into a changing world, the United States and the Soviet Union will, bit by bit, find an increasing number of relatively small areas where the common interests of our two countries overlap, even though they may not be completely congruent. As this occurs, a wise diplomacy will build an expanding base for a negotiated *modus vivendi* compounded of limited settlements. On the testimony of experience, this has proved sound policy. We have been able to make progress in narrowly defined areas: the limited test ban treaty, bombs in outer space, the consular agreement, the civil aviation agreement and, most recently, the nonproliferation

treaty. What we must realize at all times is that the Soviet Government is deeply suspicious of our motives. It will, therefore, be reluctant to undertake any negotiation where the course of the settlement cannot be clearly perceived.

It is a safe assumption that the Soviets' apparent willingness to consider some limitation of missile and ABM development springs primarily from concern over the allocation of a limited stock of goods and skilled manpower. At the moment, the Russians are hard-pressed to meet the requirements of various sectors which operate almost as competing baronies for a finite store of resources. The military sector demands more and more material, equipment and manpower for the production of weapons and the maintenance of a huge military establishment. The barony of heavy industry seeks more money for industrial plants, while agriculture demands huge investment for the production of fertilizer. Finally, the consumer sector needs more and more goods, including automobiles, roads and all the appurtenances of motorized travel, to gratify the increasingly insistent demands of a citizenry on whom it is just beginning to dawn that a one-room apartment in Moscow is a poor reward for fifty years of socialism.

It is feasible, within the corporative structure of the Soviet Government, for the Politburo to undertake negotiations to limit nuclear weapons and thus reduce the requirements of the military. But to persuade the military to go along requires that the problem be kept confined to the field of their own interest. To arrange a settlement that affects the interests of different baronies in different ways by trading the interests of one for another seems quite beyond the range of practicality. It would probably have been too complicated even for Khrushchev; it is clearly outside the capabilities of the present collegiate government which, since no one man dominates, is necessarily reduced to the level of opinion of the lowest common denominator.

Finally, in trying to halt the nuclear arms race and specifically the development of an anti-ballistic missile system, I would point out one further misconception: that is the theory that we might advance our own interests by a strategy of systematically outspending the Soviets. The argument supporting this theory is that because our gross national product is well over three times that of the Soviet Union we could force the Soviets into negotiations by continuing at full speed to escalate the arms race until the strain on Soviet resources became unbearable.

In spite of the surface plausibility of this contention, I am certain it is wrong-headed. For the United States to continue to exhaust itself by devoting a larger and larger share of its national income to sheer economic waste would diminish its ability to compete with nations exempt from such a burden (such, for example, as Japan and Germany) while at the same time enlarging and distending what it is now fashionable to call the "military-industrial complex," thus transforming the American economy into a Strasbourg goose with an overdeveloped liver.

That, however, is only part of the story since I am convinced that the theory misreads the ultimate Soviet reaction. To assume that, at the end of the course, the Soviet Union would be likely to break off and seek a cessation of the arms race overlooks the effect of extravagant military spending on the structure and psychology of Soviet politics. To expand the military sector of the Soviet system disproportionately would mean weakening the non-military elements that might favor a more benign policy and a progressively more liberal society.

The creeping dominance of the military would, to my mind, almost certainly increase the dangers of armed collision between our two countries, while the suffocating burden on resources of an increasingly heavy weight of weapons might generate overwhelming pressure to use them. Thus, I think it likely that the continuance and acceleration of the arms race would ultimately bring about exactly what we do not want. It would impede, and perhaps even set back, those evolutionary changes in the Soviet system which seem necessary if we are ever to share this shrinking globe other than in armed semi-belligerence. At the same time, it would encourage the more reckless utilization of the new weapons in order to justify the expenditure.

v

I come back, finally, to the theme that this is still a polarized world and that the best hope for peace continues to depend on the ultimate broadening of common interests between the super-powers. Meanwhile, the world, as I see it, is likely to be a far more hazardous place if the United States either fails to maintain an effective power balance with the Soviet Union or ceases its efforts to resolve local quarrels when they arise in strategic areas of the world. And since we cannot wait to perfect the insti-

tutions that will satisfy the purists—we may all be blown up before then—we must settle for the possible.

This is not, of course, the kind of counsel one likes to read, for ever since our brief Wilsonian enchantment we have indulged a fondness for brave rhetoric. Yet before we demand much of others, we Americans should search our own souls. For years we have been taught that a stronger United Nations would relieve our country of many of the burdens it now carries. Wilson—the last President to write his own speeches—was a gifted phrase-maker, and the vaulting slogans of his fight for the League lie deep in our national subconscious. Yet that, after all, is only part of our tradition.

Any measure that would materially strengthen the peace-making authority of the United Nations would encounter considerable opposition from American domestic opinion. Because it would, by definition, involve a significant relinquishment of our national sovereignty, Americans by the thousands would be ready to fight it, particularly at a time when we are concerned and sensitive about our own internal problems.

Repugnant as we may deem the thought in its abstract form, we remain, as we have historically been, a notably nationalistic country. Only in narrowly limited areas have we ever reconciled our nationalism with a willingness to submit to the arbitrament of international institutions. After all, it was America that under the Connally Reservation refused to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. It was our Congress that almost passed the Bricker Amendment that would have hamstrung our capacity to make treaties. And at San Francisco we were no more willing than were the French, Russians or British to forgo a veto in the Security Council on measures that directly affected our own country.

Moreover, we should stop boasting of the fact that we have not exercised our right to veto, while the Soviets have used theirs 105 times; our restraint carries a suspicion of false pride, if not of arrogance. It has been made possible because we have had the strength and influence (and from time to time the economic leverage) to block any Security Council action we regarded as seriously harmful. Yet now is not forever. With the shifting power balance in the Council there is no longer even a near certainty that we can invariably muster an adequate blocking vote. I would be surprised if the Nixon Administration were not com-

pelled to break our long record of abstention fairly early in its career.

I suggest, therefore, that to avoid even the appearance of sanctimony we should begin to talk about the United Nations in less metaphorical terms, abjuring slogans for reality, and explaining its limitations rather than trying to conceal them. That would, in my view, be a service to the organization itself, for otherwise we not only create false expectations but weaken the authority of its existing institutions and enormously complicate the task of turning them into anything more effective than they are.

Meanwhile, we should get on with the bitterly hard task of trying to stabilize the military balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union, something that cannot be done in a climate of self-induced fright but only by avoiding hyperbole and getting on in a practical mood with the grubby but essential business of diplomatic haggling. This is a high endeavor in the mutually rewarding purpose of world survival.

THE GREAT POWERS, THE ARABS AND THE ISRAELIS

By Bernard Lewis

DURING the months that followed the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, the view gradually gained ground in the West that the Arab defeat represented a considerable Russian victory. Some more imaginative observers argued that the Russians had deliberately engineered both the war and the defeat in order to achieve this result; others, without going as far as to ascribe conscious purpose, nevertheless agreed that, by increasing the hostility of the Arabs to the West and their dependence on the Soviet Union, the crisis, the war and their aftermath had greatly strengthened the Soviet political and strategic position in the Middle East and correspondingly weakened that of the United States. Observers and commentators spoke with mounting anxiety about the growth of Soviet influence in the area and the threat which it offered to the interests of the free world.

More recent developments have suggested that this mood of dejection, like the vicarious euphoria which followed immediately after the Israeli military victory, is misplaced or at least exaggerated. The situation in the Arab lands and the attitude of their peoples and even governments are more complex and less one-sided than might appear. The Soviet Government has been sufficiently dissatisfied with the position to make repeated attempts—and with growing urgency—to change it. The latest of these is the four-power talks to devise, and possibly apply, a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Israeli reaction to this proposal was predictably hostile. Of the four governments concerned, two appear to be firmly committed to the Arab cause, the other two are seen in Israel as practicing a kind of unilateral evenhandedness. This was exemplified in the debate at the Security Council over Israeli-Arab clashes at the very moment when the four-power talks were beginning. The United States and Britain wanted to condemn both sides; the Soviet Union, followed by France, insisted on condemning Israel only. In the Israeli view, a bench consisting of two impartial judges and two hostile advocates is unlikely to arrive at a balanced judgment. More immediately relevant is the Israeli conviction that any compromise likely to be reached

among the four powers would be at Israel's expense. The November resolution did indeed require concessions from both sides—but the Israeli concession, being territorial and strategic, could be reversed only by another victory in war, while the Arab concession, being diplomatic, could be reversed by a simple declaration. To Israel, the sacrifices and the risks seemed unequal.

Israeli opposition to the four-power talks was manifest from the start. Such talks, they argued, were foredoomed to failure, and in the meantime their effect was to paralyze the Jarring mission and encourage Arab recalcitrance. Israeli spokesmen were at pains to show that the fear of an explosion and a nuclear confrontation, which had impelled the West to agree to the talks in the first place, was greatly exaggerated. The Middle East, they said, was not at peace—but it was not at war either, and there was no immediate danger requiring precipitate action.

Arab leaders took an obliquely opposite view of the four powers, but seemed to share the Israeli assumption that an agreed settlement would be to Israel's disadvantage. The Arabs, like the Israelis, made it clear that they would not submit to an imposed settlement; they appeared, however, to expect that an agreement, if reached, would be such that no imposition would be necessary on their side. Their attitude to the talks was therefore much more hopeful than that of the Israelis, and became more so as Israeli fears visibly mounted. Arab governments agreed that the situation was explosive, and did what they could to emphasize and exemplify this point.

The really crucial attitude is of course that of the Soviet Union. The talks were begun on a Russian initiative; their outcome will depend largely on what Russia is willing and able to do. It is therefore important to examine the causes and purposes—the two are not identical—of the Russian approach.

In part, no doubt, the Soviet Government—in this as in other initiatives—has sought a propaganda advantage. Even if the talks came to nothing, they could still serve the useful purpose of accentuating the polarization of the Middle East; they could identify the United States more firmly with Israel in Arab eyes, and thus improve the waning image of the Soviets. But propaganda is clearly not the only purpose. The Soviets are visibly concerned about their position in the Middle East—and about more than their image. The timing of the Soviet initiative—between American administrations—could be tactical, with a view

to catching the other side at a disadvantage. It could also reflect a sense of urgency—a desire to seize the earliest possible opportunity to avert a serious danger to Russian interests.

II

Broadly, there are two views of the Russian position in the Middle East, which can be expressed in extreme form as follows.

According to one view, the Russians have during the last two years achieved an immense success—the fulfillment of the centuries-old dream of the Tsars. They have won great political influence in the Arab lands—dominant in some, powerful in others, threatening even in those countries that are still more or less in the Western camp. Russia is now an established Mediterranean power, with friendly ports on the eastern and southern shores, and is reaching across the land bridges to Asia and Africa.

A diametrically opposite view is expressed in the saying that the Middle East is Russia's Viet Nam. According to this interpretation, Russia was unwittingly sucked in on the losing side, with a perilous and endless commitment, in an undertaking of great risk, high cost and dubious results. There is a further parallel in that the Russian involvement in the Middle East appears to be highly, even symbolically, unpopular with such public opinion as can be discerned in Russia and her East European satellites. This is indirectly confirmed by the charges of Zionism leveled against liberals and reformists in Czechoslovakia, Russia and elsewhere, and by the effort and energy devoted in communist domestic propaganda to discrediting Israel.

A critical assessment of the Russian position shows both gains and losses. In several Arab states, the régimes in power have become dependent on Russian support, though whether against the enemies or against the people of their countries is not always clear. Soviet power in the Mediterranean, though no doubt of limited military effectiveness in the event of a major great-power clash, is of considerable political value in the rather Victorian style of imperial diplomacy currently pursued by the Russians.

Two substantial gains have already been achieved. With a Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, a Western intervention such as that of 1958, when American marines landed in Lebanon and British troops in Jordan, is no longer possible. That is to say, such a landing would not now be possible for either side, and this represents a net Soviet gain. A second Soviet gain is the

ability to exercise additional pressure on Turkey and Iran, which can now be threatened from the south as well as the north. To achieve this result may well have been the original purpose of the whole Soviet operation in the Arab lands; it is still a major objective of Soviet policy, and one which is being pursued with some success.

These Soviet gains have, however, been counterbalanced by serious losses. While the advance of Soviet power has been accelerated in the Mediterranean area, it has been virtually arrested in the southern half of the Middle East, in the countries bordering on the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In May 1967, the prospects for a southward expansion of Soviet influence seemed excellent. In Somalia, the Soviets were already strongly entrenched and were encouraging Somali irredentist claims against both Ethiopia and Kenya. In southern Arabia, British rule was coming to an end, and there was no reason to doubt that it would be followed by a régime closely linked with Cairo and thus also with Moscow. With the coast from Hodeida to Aden under their control, the Egyptians would not have needed to trouble themselves with the Yemeni interior. With the Suez Canal and Aden at its disposal, the Soviet Navy would soon have established supremacy in the Red Sea, and the régimes on both shores would have been due for realignment or replacement. The way was open to further penetration in southern and eastern Arabia, and especially in the Gulf, where Iraq was already in the revolutionary camp and Iran could be isolated and threatened at its weakest point.

All this was stopped by the June war. With the closure of the Canal, Soviet naval activity east of Suez was severely limited; the Egyptians withdrew from the Yemen, and the ripe plum of Aden fell to the ground and was not picked. The Somalis, deeply discouraged by the Soviet failure to help the Arabs, decided that irredentism with Soviet support was unsafe, and, since war was not practicable, they proceeded with unusual logic to make peace. In the Gulf, in Arabia and in North Africa, the conservative forces rallied, and the Arab monarchs were even able to impose a halt in subversion on an Egyptian Government that was now financially dependent on them.¹

¹ Unlike earlier similar agreements with the West, the truce in radio propaganda reached with the three monarchs seems to have been effective. One possible reason is that the Saudis, Kuwaitis and Libyans themselves understand Arabic, and do not need to rely on translated abstracts.

Even in the Mediterranean area, the Soviet posture is not as comfortable as it might have seemed. Without the Suez Canal, without air-transit rights across Turkey or Iran, without contiguous land access and the possibility of moving troops over the border as in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet position remains precarious and exposed. Politically, too, Soviet influence is a diminishing asset. The Russians have now become heavily involved in the Arab lands, and are thus losing what was previously their main psychological advantage, remoteness. Like Nazi Germany in the past, Soviet Russia at first appeared to the Arabs as an almost mythical champion of their cause—the enemy of their enemies, the mighty power that would defeat and destroy them. Unlike the Nazis, the Russians arrived and revealed themselves to their admirers—with the inevitable disillusionment. Instead of Westerners, it was now Russians who appeared in the roles of experts, advisers, technicians and teachers; and it was Russians who suffered and inflicted all the innumerable irritations and exasperations that are inseparable from these roles. At closer quarters, the Russians and their methods began to look suspiciously familiar. Other powers in the past had used the same combination—the expert, the engineer, the concessionaire and the missionary on the one hand, with the fleet and the flag on the other. The concessionaires used different methods, and the missionaries brought a different message, but they still worked with the same pattern of native princes, native clients and native converts to maintain and extend their authority.

No one loves protectors, still less protectors who do not protect. The Russian failure to help the Arabs in war or save them in peace could no longer be concealed, and there were growing signs of impatience with the Soviet combination of hectoring and inefficiency. The invasion of Czechoslovakia brought a new shock. Arab governments in general felt obliged to support or at least excuse the Soviet action, and some spokesmen even went so far as to rejoice that the Soviets had now demonstrated their readiness and ability to defy the world and occupy a country in a few hours. This, it was said, was how they could deal with Israel, when the time came. More perceptive Arabs, however, were deeply alarmed by the Czechoslovak affair and the memories of Hungary which it evoked. This kind of action, they observed, was taken by the Soviets, not against their enemies, but against their allies. It was a profoundly disturbing thought.

Some Soviet strategists would no doubt prefer to maintain, rather than solve, the Palestine problem. As long as it exists, Russia will be able to outbid America in hostility to Israel, and will therefore be better placed to win Arab support. This is an advantage to the Soviet Union, and an embarrassment to the United States, in those Arab countries that are still neutral or pro-Western. There are, however, signs of another and more disillusioned Soviet approach to the Middle East, and of a growing consciousness of the hazards of Middle Eastern adventure.

The Russians are of course well aware of the decline in their popularity, and of the wistful glances now being cast toward the West. There are also other considerations which may well cause them anxiety. The Russian involvement in the Arab lands is better than the American predicament in Viet Nam, in that there is no loss of life—that is, of course, of Russian life. But it is worse in two important respects, the one economic, the other political. The immense cost of the Viet Nam operation can still be borne out of the vast surplus of the American economy, causing only minor dislocation at home; the cost of the Russian adventure in the Middle East has to be met by a Soviet public that is still short of many basic consumer goods and becoming increasingly resentful of such deprivation.

Perhaps the most serious aspect of the situation, from the point of view of the Soviets, is the political danger to which they are exposed. This danger takes two forms. On the one hand, their political ascendancy in some of the Arab states, without effective air and military support, remains precarious, and can be terminated by internal political action. Recent developments in Syria and Iraq indicate a desire in those countries to extricate themselves from too close a connection with Russia. Still more alarming is the possibility of another war and another Arab defeat. The Russian commitment to the revolutionary Arab states appears open-ended. By precipitate action on the part of régimes with which they are associated but which they do not control, the Russians might again be forced to choose between humiliation and confrontation. It is not a pleasing prospect, and one can well understand the Soviet anxiety to escape from a situation in which such a choice might be forced on them.

Soviet interests and purposes in the Middle East have changed since the time of the first Soviet penetration into the Arab world. In those days, the West was still predominant in the area, and

was therefore interested in stability; the Russians were outside, and consequently interested in disruption. Today, with Soviet influence predominant in part of the area, their interest in stability in that part may outweigh their interest in disruption in the remainder. Stability could enable them to consolidate and exploit the position they have gained, and perhaps in time extend it. The most immediate advantages they would gain would be the use of the Suez Canal, with the consequent extension of their influence east of Suez, and release from the constant danger of involvement in another military defeat. There might even be some advantage to the Soviet Union in the resumption by the United States of a certain role in Arab affairs. It would no doubt be too much to hope for a return to an earlier phase, when the United States shared in the cost of maintaining a Soviet satellite, but some sharing of the cost and odium of supporting the existing régimes might not be altogether unwelcome.

III

In the West there have been, broadly speaking, two opinions on the whole question of the four-power talks, each with its own characteristic judgments and forms of expression. According to one, there is in the Middle East an "explosive situation" which needs to be "defused" before it detonates into a nuclear confrontation. Both East and West, it is believed, recognize this danger, and are prepared to offer some sacrifices in order to avert it. By negotiation and compromise the powers could devise a reasonable formula of settlement, and could then induce (the word "impose" is, in Anglo-American usage, unacceptable) their respective protégés to accept it.

According to the second view, the danger of an unintended confrontation is remote, and there is in consequence no real willingness to make the kind of sacrifices that might produce a great-power agreement. Even if there were, the great powers could not make good their undertakings, since they cannot compel their protégés to act against what they regard as their vital interests.

Supporters of the first view argue that in any case initiative is better than drift. The attempt is worth making, and even if it fails the position is no worse than before. Critics of the four-power talks point out that the mere proposal to hold such talks brought an immediate worsening of the situation along the cease-fire lines, and that the progress of the talks has been accom-

panied by mounting tension and violence, designed specifically to influence them. When the talks, as is inevitable, fail to produce any substantial result, the situation, it is argued, will be worse than before. The parties to the dispute will have worked themselves into new and more intransigent military and political attitudes; the great powers will have further diminished their own credit and authority—their ability to inspire respect or fear in their own protégés or those of their opponents.

Three main points are at issue: the danger of a nuclear confrontation, the possibility of a Russo-American compromise, and the ability of the superpowers to impose a solution on Israel and the Arabs.

The danger of a confrontation exists wherever the interests and spheres of influence of the two superpowers meet—in East Asia, Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean, Germany, even the Caribbean. It has, however, much decreased since the Cuban missile crisis and the resulting awareness on both sides of the risks involved. If ever a confrontation in the Middle East seemed likely, it was in the summer of 1967, when an uncontrolled political and military crisis threatened to involve both superpowers. Both refused to become involved, and each signaled its refusal clearly to the other. Since then the risks and possibilities of the situation are better understood, and the chances of a confrontation by accident—a collision in the dark—correspondingly reduced. There remains the possibility of a confrontation by choice. This would, as things are now, have to be Russia's choice, since in the event of another local war it would almost certainly be the Arabs, not Israel, who would need to be rescued. One of the present aims of Russian policy is to avoid the need to make such a choice; another aim, which could be either complementary or alternative, is to change the present situation in the Middle East in such a way as to transfer the burden of choice to the other side, *i.e.* to the United States. Such a transfer would, however, only be possible, if at all, with American assistance, which is hardly likely to be forthcoming.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are seen as the patrons of their respective protégés—Israel and the revolutionary Arab states. Both superpowers may at times yearn audibly for release from this uncomfortable and compromising relationship, but there is little prospect of either of them being able to achieve it in present circumstances. The world sees them as pro-

tectors, and judges them by the effectiveness of their protection. If they falter or fail, even those who benefit by their failure will despise them and be confirmed in the wisdom of their own choice of patron. Neither patron can afford to be seen as faithless, unreliable or inept; but equally neither can afford to appear too obviously ruthless and overbearing, selfishly subordinating its protégés' interests to its own.

One of the Soviet Union's purposes is to restore confidence—among the Arabs and elsewhere—in its effectiveness and reliability as a patron. This can be achieved only by giving its protégés effective support. Another is to escape from its present dilemma in the Middle East. This could be achieved either by extricating itself from its commitments, or by transforming the situation in such a way that it would be able to meet these commitments with relative ease and safety. The first would be damaging to Russia's influence with its Arab clients, or to those clients' influence with their own peoples; the second could involve very great risks. The Soviet Government's assessment of those risks, and consequent choice of direction, will be decisively affected by the content and expression of American policy.

IV

In the English-speaking countries we still feel a strong inner compulsion to act, in great matters, in accordance with moral principles, or at least to persuade ourselves that we are so doing. When obliged by circumstances to have dealings with the adversary, we feel a corresponding compulsion to see him as something other and better than what he is, and thus morally to justify our dealings with him. This can be dangerous. It may be necessary to negotiate and compromise with the Soviet Government. It would be very foolish to cherish delusions as to the nature and purposes of Soviet power.

It is possible, but not likely, that the four-power talks will end in open disagreement. It is possible, but still less likely, that they will produce a workable settlement, acceptable to both parties. The most probable result is some amplification of the November resolution, perhaps even including the outlines of a general settlement of specific issues, such as frontiers, refugees and navigation, but leaving the details of application and the methods of implementation to the Arabs and Israelis. If, in spite of their differences, the four powers manage to agree on a detailed settlement,

and, what is more important, on the manner and sequence of its implementation—what then? There would still be the problem of persuading Israel and the Arab states to comply effectively with its provisions; and the chances are that any settlement likely to be accepted by the four powers would be rejected by one or all of the parties to the dispute. One of the facts of the present international order is the ability of even the smallest countries to defy the great powers in what they regard as matters of vital national interest. There are no doubt powerful means of persuasion at the disposal of the Russians in Cairo and Damascus and the Americans in Jerusalem, but it would be politically difficult, if not impossible, to use them. The two superpowers have to consider the effects of such pressure on neutrals, allies, clients—even, in varying measure, on their own domestic opinion. Neither the Israelis nor the Arabs have much reason to rely on the United Nations for the protection of their vital interests; neither can be wholly confident that its patron would come to the rescue in any conflict with a purely local enemy. Both therefore would be reluctant to accept any sacrifices which might weaken their position, politically or militarily, in the event of another local war.

The two major problems of the area—the East-West rivalry and the Arab-Israeli conflict—would remain. The two are not necessarily connected, and the West has usually tried to keep them separate. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has tried to combine them in order to maximize anti-Western feeling and to exploit its advantage in hostility to Israel. But the Russians, too, may begin to recognize the dangers of this policy and to see the merits of some measure of disengagement.

If there is indeed a danger of nuclear confrontation in the Middle East, it would be enormously increased by a guaranteed settlement, which would involve the guarantors in every border incident. It might, however, be reduced by a limited and agreed disengagement. This could not be general, since the powers have vital interests in the area apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict; it could not be unilateral, since this would merely mean the victory and domination of the other side. But all four powers might well find some advantage in achieving that measure of *détente* which lies in their own hands, *i.e.* by separating the Arab-Israeli conflict from their own mutual relations, and reducing it to the relative harmlessness, to world peace, of the Cyprus and Kashmir disputes.

At the present stage, the Arab-Israeli conflict is virtually insoluble. In Arab eyes, an Israeli solution would mean submission to intolerable injustice and humiliation; in Israeli eyes, an Arab solution would mean the immediate or slightly deferred extinction of their state and society. In time there will no doubt be some changes of outlook and assessment on both sides, and a possibility of compromise may then arise. (For example, the replacement of Zionism and pan-Arabism by Israeli and Egyptian patriotism would make an accommodation much easier. But this is still very problematic.) Meanwhile, there is little that the great powers can do.

That little should not, however, be neglected. The imagery of gunpowder and explosion that is often used with reference to the Middle East is somewhat misleading. The Arab-Israeli crisis is not so much explosive as inflamed, not a bomb to be defused but a fever to be isolated and cooled. To this end the powers could make some contribution by administering poultices instead of irritants. They could restrict the entry of weapons into the area—equitably and by agreement; they could call a moratorium on their own probing and propaganda, which spread infection and raise the temperature; they might even agree to a cease-fire in public debate, and thereby give the patient some relief from the glare of publicity and the passion and posturing that it evokes. These things would not solve the Palestine problem, but they would bring the time of solution perceptibly nearer.

Such a policy would of course require a degree of restraint from the superpowers which may well prove unattainable. The failure of either is the failure of both. And in the meantime, with or without such a disengagement, the larger problem of their political and strategic confrontation across the Middle East would remain. Here it would be well to recall that the Arab-Israeli conflict, for all its importance and the attention it receives, is not the only issue in the region, nor the most decisive in the real relationship between the great powers. If the object of Western policy is to prevent Soviet domination of the Middle East, then it would be wise to devote rather more attention to the southern and eastern waters, where the intrusion of Soviet naval and air power would transform the whole balance of strength in Asia and Africa, and above all to Turkey and Iran, the guardians of the northern approaches.

ON THE CAUSES OF OUR DISCONTENTS

By Thomas L. Hughes

IN 1770 Edmund Burke, that greatest of late eighteenth-century English conservatives and friend of America, published his famous tract entitled "Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents." Among its opening lines are some which, reread today, carry a contemporaneousness that is as inescapable as it is striking:

To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind. . . . There is hardly a man in or out of power, who holds any other language: That government is at once dreaded and contemned; that the laws are despoiled of all their respected and salutary terrors; that their inaction is a subject of ridicule, and their exertion of abhorrence; that rank, and office, and title, and all the solemn plausibilities of the world, have lost their reverence and effect; that our foreign politicks are as much deranged as our domestick economy; . . . that we know neither how to yield nor how to enforce; that hardly any thing above or below, abroad or at home, is sound and entire; but that disconnexion and confusion, in offices, in parties, in families, in the nation, prevail beyond the disorders of any former time: these are facts universally admitted.

Burke thereupon offered to the public of two hundred years ago his thoughts on the causes of the discontents which he saw all around him.

Without presuming to emulate Burke, or to offer anything as luminous in phraseology, as insightful in psychology, or as over-reaching in concept, let me submit four thoughts in particular:

On Complexity as a Way of Life;

On Policy as the Prisoner of Paradox;

On the Use and Abuse of Ambiguity; and

On Keeping Our National Interest Interesting.

One way or another, each of them is relevant to our present discontents.

I. ON COMPLEXITY AS A WAY OF LIFE

We are all discontented now. Almost everyone is discontented with the way the war is going. Some are discontented with the way the war is ending. Many will be discontented with the eventual peace without victory. Still others will be discontented that the outcome will not end the argument.

At home as well as abroad, we are discontented with complexity. Each of us finds it hard to adjust to complexity as a way of life. We accept, without being reconciled to, the complexity of the life around us—our intellectual life, our bureaucratic life, our local community life, and the life of the world. Undeniable and apparently irresistible, the complexities are increasing in all the significant environments in which we move, often increasing well beyond optimum size.

And the consequences of complexity mount. Especially because the United States is as big as it is, and the United States Government is as big as it is, and the role of the United States in the world is as big as it is, the complexities swirl at the vortex of United States foreign policy.

Complexity can, of course, confound the policy-makers as well as the newspaper readers. Complicated situations like Viet Nam require tediously complicated explanations which lead to further complications themselves. The complexity surrounding the issue of Berlin tends, over time, to erode potential public support for Berlin when the crisis comes, thus adding new psychological dimensions to the policy-maker's problems in sustaining a national commitment. An ideology-distorting, alignment-splitting issue like Biafra offers vexatious human and political complexities all its own.

Complexity can thus be a problem in policy-making. Potentially it can distort it and defeat it. Sometimes the complexities can become so frustrating, and the consequences so infuriating, that the hapless policy-maker stamps his feet, like Queen Victoria in the Turkish crisis, and says, "I cannot *stand* it."

Bureaucratically, complexity has a loosening effect on the decision-making process inside government. Complexity helps assure that arguments will be close enough so that any sophisticated person can temporarily accommodate to a decision either way. Thus complexity also assures that a decision may only be a decision for a day. A decision carrying little intrinsic conviction evokes commensurably little loyalty. The sheer complexity surrounding such a decision invites reconsideration at the next meeting. Hence complexity can be inconvenient for policy.

But complexity can also be convenient for the policy-maker and appealing to him. He has compensatory uses for it: for complexity as a message; complexity as an obfuscator, neutralizer,

immobilizer; complexity as an explanation; complexity as an excuse. "The situation is more complicated than you think." For the throng who worry lest they seem naïve, this can be a devastating message, especially when used by someone with superior access to information. This is the advantage which complexity regularly gives to the government over the citizen. Naïve is the one thing that every aspiring policy-maker is consecratedly determined not to be. There is no dirtier word. Naïveté, wherever it still subjectively lurks, covers itself with the sophisticated gloss of complexity.

Often the greater the knowledge, the less the wisdom, focus or point: the more complicated, the less coherent; the more complex, the less cohesive. Complexity lets us all down easily, sadly shaking our heads. Armed with complexity, one can half-disclose intellectual arguments that can throw intellectual critics off balance. Complexity pulls the teeth of argument. Psychologically, complexity can damp down one's doubts.

Either inside or outside of government, complexity can be a necessary precursor of change in either direction, constructive or destructive. A long-standing ally of incrementalism and gradualism, complexity can slow policy down. But the road to revisionism also lies along the route of complicating the issues. Complexity is a vehicle for making the conventional wisdom controversial. Any going concern that is to be successfully dismantled, whether it is the AID program or NATO, must first be made more complicated. From the base of complexity, once established, one can move on to the job of further destruction.

G. K. Chesterton used to say that in almost every gathering, someone demands that a practical man be heard, and unfortunately one is always available. Complexity becomes the playing field of pragmatism. The complication of issues can become a deliberate assignment. How simple are the situations that one sets out to complicate? The object of the complicator is to assure that ideas and policies never be allowed to succeed or fail on their own merits—to assure the constant presence of flanking attacks. Complexity and the arts of indirection are ready allies. Folded into the protective layers of policy, hidden among policy's seven veils, complexities lurk in the form of the strange bedfellows, the ironic allies, the unwilling tools, the awkward accomplices, the not-so-innocent partners in crime who flourish in the life and death of institutions. They help assure that if,

perchance, the merits of the argument are about to be reached bureaucratically, complexity can leap into the breach.

It follows that complexity can do work for complicity by complicating what otherwise would be simple, unpalatable things. Complexity can serve as a converter: of minorities into majorities, of liberals into conservatives, of civilians into soldiers; of protest into compliance, of anguish into acquiescence, of battle cries into whimpers. Complexity can induce the public to give up, if only out of sheer satiation.

When political simplicities collapse, the successive complexities can submerge the Plimsoll line of political intake. At a given point in history much can depend on which side of the great debates the simplicities and complexities lie. Grave issues of war and peace may be simple or complex, and hence popular or peripheral. If the issues of war are simple, and the issues of peace complex, the politics will run toward the war. If the simplicities and complexities are reversed, the politics will run the other way. In either case the degrees of complexity and simplicity will affect the ways all of us think—and how toughly we think—about both war and peace. They will also affect the way we talk. For as Viet Nam so conclusively demonstrates, the complexity of a policy in crisis can lead to a crisis in explainability. And to paraphrase Burke from another context, a policy without the means of explanation is without the means of preservation.

II. ON POLICY AS THE PRISONER OF PARADOX

Frustrated by complexity as a way of life, the public seeks satisfactory explanation and finds paradox instead. In recent years official explanations have come to seem more and more paradoxical to their public beholders—reminiscent, almost, of that day a generation ago when our United Nations Representative earned renown by calling on the Arabs and Jews in the Middle East to settle their differences in a Christian way. At the end of the day for the Washington watcher, policy often appears as the prisoner of paradox—of inconsistencies, opposites and contradictions. Statements of policy come through, when they do, as public relations manifestations of a swinging society, oscillating among the paradoxes:

here dictators disturb us, and there they don't;
here we espouse self-determination, and there we decry seces-
sion;

here we recognize, and there we repudiate;
 here we are insurgent, and there we are counterinsurgent;
 here we denounce tariffs, and there we rely on them;
 here we are royalist, and there republican;
 here coups bother us, and there people accuse us of conducting
 them;
 here we spurn trade sanctions, and there we insist that others
 employ them;
 here our allies seem all sweetness and light, and there they look
 like simple s.o.b.s;
 here we befriend the exiles, and there we deal with the usurpers.

Nor are we oblivious of these impressions of paradox even inside the Department of State. Occasionally we think of setting up sets of those large Pentagon maps of the world, one each at opposite ends of the room, replete with their colored flags, pins and markers, to keep score of the paradoxes. This way, on a regular basis, we could chart the daily kaleidoscope of paradox, catching real-life glimpses of the ever changing world of principles in conflict.

Such an exercise would be nearly as disconcerting for most of the real-life people inside the government as it is for their critics outside—at least for all those who cling to notions of precedents and principles, but who lack the lawyer's appreciation that circumstances alter cases. Indeed the government insider is perhaps even more aware than the outsider of a set of more general paradoxes which permeate his work and make him pensive:

the paradox that most nations consider us to be the most powerful
 state on earth, but do not feel obliged to do our bidding—
 the audio-visual paradox that others see us but they do not
 hear;

the paradox that our political influence has effectively lessened
 at the same time that the primacy of our power is being
 reconfirmed;

the paradox that the revolution of rising expectations is now
 being accompanied by the counterrevolution of falling prospects
 engendered by the technological gap and the population
 explosion;

the paradoxes of interdependence and the new nationalism—
 the independence of the dependent, the limits of U.N. peace-
 keeping, the recalcitrance of cultures;

the paradox of the escalating volume of communications and
 their declining meaning and significance;

the paradox that where governments are for us, their people may be against us; and that where governments are against us, the people may still be on our side.

Such paradoxes assure that in the real world of policy, we will continue to live out the further paradox of conducting conflicting policies at once. And paradoxical policies will gravitate to paradoxical rationales and recruit them for service. Frequently even while consistent initiatives in one area are undertaken, they will be accompanied by paradoxical desires to take out insurance against failure.

The more self-conscious a policy-maker is about his leadership role, the more concerned he will be about the public implications of these paradoxes. In an age of instant communication and quantum jumps in public intellectuality, the pressures born of paradox increasingly impact on policy. They render acute a policy-maker's psychological predicament of consistency in semantics, outlook and stance. His problem of performing articulately before alert and inconsistently interested audiences vexes him. And he, after all, is but one of the many policy-makers whose corporate behavior makes up a government's reputation. It is hard for even the most upright of policy-makers to operate on this hazardous terrain without inviting accusations of hypocrisy. Public surveillance is constant to detect discrepancies between the way people in government talk from one occasion to another, not to mention the discrepancies between the way government talks and the way it acts. Government and citizen alike react to paradox and create more of it.

As he contemplates all of this, the policy-maker asks himself: Can a twentieth-century foreign policy be successfully conducted despite the hangup of the paradoxes? Will the American people support it more if they know more about it? Or will increased public interest mean reduced public support, as educated impatience clashes with paradox? How can our future foreign policy requirements be kept from outrunning the American people's disposition for complexity, toleration for paradox and scope for acquiescence? And what are the likely consequences of this train of thought for elitist mentalities inside the government and for democratic demands outside?

Whatever the answers, we confront the primacy of paradox. This is a somber time in the pernicious polarizing of logic and life. At such a time, not surprisingly, the policy environment be-

comes an acculturating experience that trains people to be more comfortable with conflict situations than is normally the case. For a hard look at the paradoxes of life can also lead to rather abnormally high appreciations of ambiguity, both as actuality and as art.

III. ON THE USE AND ABUSE OF AMBIGUITY

This is the Age of Complexity and therefore the Age of Paradox and therefore the Age of Ambiguity. But heightened levels of education, communication and democracy make it also the Age of Clarity. The Age of Ambiguity tries against odds to compete and survive in the Age of Clarity.

Clarity on occasion can rescue ambiguity, sometimes dramatically. In August 1914, Italy defected from the Triple Alliance and declared her neutrality as her German and Austrian allies went to war. In praising the Italian decision, Viviani, the French Foreign Minister, attributed it to "the clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect."

Ambiguity can likewise rescue men and institutions, usually with less drama but nevertheless rescue them, from clear and present dangers. Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School, observing the changing voting behavior of the Supreme Court in the days when the court-packing threat still hung over them, concluded that "a switch in time saved nine."

Ambiguity can be constructive and destructive, creative and confusing, unconscious and contrived, public and private, essential and non-essential. Both governmentally and personally, the need for inner clarity deepens as the environmental ambiguities grow. Ambiguity can be a policy requirement or a personal convenience. It can be a diplomatic necessity, a lubricant of government and a domestic political tool. Clarification can destroy ambiguity and create trouble all around. Yet, paradoxically, the drive for clarity is inescapable in an educated democracy. It is essential if we are to have either responsible citizenship or responsible government. It is required if the government is to think clearly itself.

One of the causes of our present discontents is that we are all caught up on these intersecting wave lengths of clarity and ambiguity. It is hard to say which plight is more poignant, the plight of clarity seeking irrational support, or the plight of ambiguity seeking clear-headed acquiescence.

Ambiguity may properly become a fundamental objective of high policy. Some of our most inventive and persistent diplomatic talent spends much of its time on highly ambiguous operations. Thus, even in the case of North Korea, a deliberately fraudulent apology, repudiated in advance, finally proved efficacious, when all else had failed, in releasing the *Pueblo* prisoners. In Paris a carefully ambiguous formula for the Viet Nam talks was deliberately framed to permit inconsistent interpretations to be made of it by any participant who wished. It is still assailed by the champions of clarity. An even more ambiguous formula avoided a table with two sides or four sides, and enabled talks to occur among participants all of whom believe there are three sides but disagree on which sides are which.

When it comes to artificial table shapes in Paris and disavowable apologies in Panmunjom, ambiguity can be a necessary instrument of progress. It can add up to a constructive non-meeting of minds. The object is not to find an honest way to have unalterable minds meet. The object is to bypass the hopelessness of achieving real agreement by finding words to solve a problem tactically—to discover mutually acceptable ambiguities which everybody can satisfactorily interpret to his own ends. Sometimes the words in fact do work.

The purposeful, creative use of ambiguity for foreign policy purposes can tie up countless man-hours of high-salaried people in Washington. After the ambiguity is discovered by an alert foreign government, or an enterprising American newsman, the government expects to be vilified for its naïveté, excoriated for its mindlessness and ridiculed for its amateur approach to matters about which informed outsiders think seriously. Sometimes such criticism is deserved. Often it is an ungenerous lack of appreciation. For ambiguous statements of high policy often take a lot of work. There are experts in the arts of ambiguity, specialists in this business of blandness, devotees of the worthwhileness of word flavoring. A Secretary-General of the United Nations himself, Dag Hammarskjöld, was called a “Machiavelli of peace” because he liked ambiguous resolutions that gave him leeway in carrying them out. Foreign-policy-makers really do have a stake in ambiguity which clear-minded citizens lack.

In situations of maximum complexity and paradox—especially situations of mounting crisis accompanied by deliberately graduated escalatory pressures, like Viet Nam—policy-makers

in private come close to crying out: Mirror, Mirror On the Wall: Who can be most ambiguous of all? Many of those who Meet the Press, or meet the Congress, excel in their dedication to ambiguity and are proud of their reputation.

These practitioners of ambiguity need not be cryptic about it, nor necessarily cynical. Indeed a great many of them feel an extra degree of dedication to ambiguity these days in what may be a final historic effort to preserve the indispensably ambiguous foundations of that twenty-five year old, liberal-conservative foreign policy coalition of ours, which is showing every sign of breaking up over Viet Nam, over our national accumulation of cold-war battle fatigue, and over our necessarily increased attention to the home fires that are burning up our domestic society. Sometimes the results may remind an onlooker of Mort Sahl's remark about Marshall McLuhan: "He's not meant to be understood, he's meant to be respected." But that is what the positive case for ambiguity is all about.

The case for ambiguous policies can be greatly overstated, however, just as the qualities of ambiguous men can be greatly overrated. The art of ambiguity can be used and abused. An official policy of keeping foreigners guessing can mean, in practice, that we are keeping ourselves guessing as well. Instincts for ambiguity, let loose abroad, can come home to roost.

Ambiguous talking can lead to ambiguous thinking. Ambiguous practices can produce ambiguous people. Habits of compromising language are hard to shake. The disease of persuasive non-communication is catching. A talent for ambiguity, admirable in smoothing over certain situations, can spill over into other situations where what is needed is clarity, above all.

Consciously or unconsciously, everyone involved in the total policy process, from the citizen in the street to the clerk in the bureaucracy, moves between the poles of ambiguity and clarity. All experience the sharpened frustrations of our present discontents, and all live and work aware of the instability of our current national mood. Some in this process, especially the lawyers, consciously speculate over what degrees of ambiguity and clarity are mutually bearable. I say especially the lawyers, because they are sensitive to the use of words; they are experts in precision and imprecision. Wherever they are in the process, whether they are working for ambiguity or for clarity, their ambiguities are more often than not deliberate.

Some foreign-policy-makers fervently believe in private just what they say in public. Others sharply separate their role as spokesmen from their role at their desks, where they desire the most disinterested analysis, in the clearest terms, of the real problems they confront. Congressmen loyally oppose the Executive Branch by turning the fishy eye of clarity toward it as they seek to influence policy, score points or make a record. In their approach to the voters, however, they often manipulate the forces of ambiguity as they strive to broaden their reputations and, along with them, their electoral majorities. Staff men inside government can spend their time either way—either by inventing new ways to hide differences through language, or by using language creatively to expose important differences.

Congress, press and public alike reflect the educated impatience of an increasingly knowledgeable America as it brings new intellectual pressures to bear on the operational men of government. Pulled in many directions at once, these men struggle for room for manoeuvre. Thus they may strive for new records in ambiguity just at the time when various knowledgeable publics outside, and various knowledgeable experts inside, separately clamor for clarity. The operational men of government know that penalties will be paid, and consequences suffered, for deciding as well as for not deciding at all.

Outside and inside government the explosion of knowledge acts as a fragmentation bomb. For the consequent impulses for clarity have nothing necessarily to do with a wider sharing of viewpoint or a broader agreement on concept. Nor do they have anything necessarily to do with coherence of impact upon or within government. Instead they tend to multiply the vantage points of criticism, sharpen the demands for clarification, and deepen the frustration of articulate advocates when they realize they are not being followed. Thus the clarity of vision required by new multitudes of advocates and analysts proliferates the criticisms without proportionately increasing the satisfactions. The result is a gross increase in the number of individual opportunities for finding and taking offense. One critic's solution is another critic's problem, but both can enlist full time in the campaign for clarity. Yet clarity is subjective. In the last analysis, its logic is the logic of one.

On its part, ambiguity can be a jealous mistress. Once the practice is indulged in, it becomes progressively more difficult

to tell where to stop. In unintended ways, ambiguity may even become dangerous to the practitioner. He may thereby put power in the hands of those willing to interpret his ambiguities unambiguously. An official who follows his own inclinations for ambiguity may thus devolve power without really trying. The federal bureaucracy is full of people who happily pursue conflicting implementations of ambiguous decisions reached at superior levels. By definition, ambiguities never begin and end with fixed dimensions. Like all loopholes, they tend to enlarge as the numbers that pass through them wear them away. Hence in the creation and implementation of policy, ambiguity can be both the blessing and the bane of bureaucratic existence.

Thus we walk the razor's edge between the ambiguity that we have finally accepted as inevitable, and the ambiguity that we have gradually learned to like. On the one side are the ambiguities dictated by the unavoidable, inescapable givens. If we fail to recognize them, we are in a significant way maladjusted. On the other side are the ambiguities that beckon with their own excessive fascinations, the ambiguities that invite by their own enamoring embrace.

Today informed political action publicly endangers the life of the Necessary Ambiguities. But simultaneously the Unnecessary Ambiguities privately threaten the decision-making processes of government. Altogether, inside and outside government, these forces could add up to a dangerous discontent with democracy. They intensify the dilemma of the executive-politician: how to engage in sufficient ambiguity to get elected and to govern, while operating, outside as well as inside, in environments which steadily register both insistent demands and undeniable needs for clarity.

Outside, the ambiguities which are increasingly necessary for election to office are increasingly intolerable in the politics of confrontation favored by a growing proportion of educated, affluent, emancipated, post-adolescent American youth. Inside, the ambiguities necessary to administer a huge bureaucracy increasingly work against the indispensable clarities needed for intelligent decision-making. Outside, the negativizing divisiveness of clarity confronts the fraudulently unifying process of ambiguity. Both inside and out, the protective ambiguities permit and prolong wishful thinking. Their removal can expose the underlying complexities and lay bare the paradoxes that impris-

on policy. Ambiguity is the tribute which complexity pays to paradox.

Complexity, paradox and ambiguity: so much a part of our present discontents, and potentially the cause, and effect, of so many more. For complexity is not very inspirational. Paradox is not particularly uplifting. Ambiguity does not fire a people. All of them seem to work against that persistent pursuit of priorities which is required by today's conventional wisdom. Complexity, paradox and ambiguity—the noblest sentiment to which they add up is that tantalizing, obscure, quicksilver one called “the national interest.” Inevitable and inescapable, they can go on to envelop and overwhelm us if they are indiscriminately admired. If we become overfond of turning these necessities into virtues, they can not only rob us of personal integrity but drain our national interest of communicable content.

In effect they conspire to thwart precisely those people who are capable of seeing, symbolizing and expounding the national interest. They frustrate and retire those who are capable of making our national interest interesting. They show up just at the wrong point in history, when we might otherwise face with enthusiasm the rediscovery of creative naïveté, the rebirth of the integrated personality, the reassertion of the lost art of standing for something, the reaffirmation of doing your thing.

Integrated personalities with conceptual views can always be gunned down by complexity, paradox and ambiguity. It is easy for the latter to drive the former out of government into opposition, and out of public into private life. There they can simmer, steam and boil over along with the other—what shall we say, one million?—contemporary Americans who see themselves as qualified critics, deeply concerned and insatiably interested in the formulation, conduct and purpose of American foreign policy. So gross an imbalance between the massive concern and the minimal involvement is itself pregnant with implications for the fate of our national interest.

IV. ON KEEPING OUR NATIONAL INTEREST INTERESTING

“I was under the necessity of forming some fixed ideas,” Burke later wrote in his speech on “Conciliation with America,” “. . . in order, amidst so vast a fluctuation of passions and opinions, to concenter my thoughts; to ballast my conduct; to preserve me from being blown about by every wind of fashionable doctrine.

I really did not think it safe, or manly, to have fresh principles to seek upon every fresh mail which should arrive from America.”

And Burke knew whereof he spoke, because in the 1770s, fresh mail from America brought fresh principles with it.

“Let facts be submitted to a candid world,” said Thomas Jefferson and his colleagues in 1776 when they drafted the Declaration of Independence. Complexity, paradox and ambiguity were not what Mr. Jefferson had in mind. Nor did he rest contentedly on the phrase, “the national interest.” Indeed it was the national interest itself which he sought to define, as uncomplicatedly, unparadoxically and unambiguously as he could.

The latest bibliography of the books supplied by the United States Information Agency to stock American libraries around the world still begins with Jefferson’s reference to the candid world. Leading the 250-volume introductory collection of these books we send abroad are the notable ones from America’s literature of liberty—American classics of democratic thought, American exhortations to revolution, American proclamations of inalienable rights and the equality of man—basic doctrines which from the beginning have made our national interest uniquely interesting to others.

And, at least historically speaking, this is as it should be. For two hundred years, others have contemplated our national interest and identified themselves with what they saw—with Project Hope, writ large. We Americans have understood from the beginning that power, like patriotism, is not enough. At each high point in our history, the custodians of our national interest have made it interesting to us and to others.

This achievement is all the more impressive when contrasted with what national interest usually means. Traditionally the concept has hidden things otherwise unacceptable, things which do not readily lend themselves to a more inspiring description. The term national interest is at least suggestive of a conflict with broader human interests. It often signals a foreign adventure conducted in the face of domestic discontent. It can carry an implied reflection on the quality of the cause. It can embrace all those non-democratic, undemocratic and anti-democratic associations which democracies find embarrassing. Especially considering all that has gone before, we Americans beat a major retreat from a far wider and more appealing tradition whenever we reduce our appeal to the language of national interest. Its use

is apologetic, a confession of incipient inadequacy in American foreign-policy terms.

No one's national interest is self-defining. It is a kind of UFO—an unidentified flying object. It is a label for uninspiring policies pursued by uninspired men. By definition, national interest, whatever it is, lacks primary interest to others. Indeed, the more any power states its policy in terms of its national interest, the more assuredly it loses the interest of others. For America this is particularly self-defeating, because we thereby thoughtlessly discard our unique historic reputation for disinterestedness. Hitherto that has been one of our most important national assets, even on the strictest Bismarckian scales of *Hoch-und-Realpolitik*.

Most nations have never made their wars interesting to others. America traditionally has. The world's favorite impression of the American national character has never been that of a normal or abnormal great power. It has been of America the disinterested, the selfless. It has been our inexplicably genuine departures from self-interest, while everyone else behaved in a predictably self-interested manner, that always made us something special.

Lincoln could have reduced his cause to the language of national interest at Gettysburg, but he didn't. Wilson could have limited himself to the language of national interest and submarine warfare in 1917, but he didn't. Roosevelt after Pearl Harbor could have restricted himself to the national interest language of repelling aggression, but he didn't. Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt at moments of supreme national crisis made our national interest interesting to others by identifying us with ideas that move mankind. And they were not just applying cosmetics to power. They were credible, because they thought the way they talked. Language was close to life, propaganda to performance, public relations to personal commitment.

Complexity, paradox and ambiguity, by contrast, prevent both rhetoric and policy from rising above national interest to the larger issues involved. If our causes themselves are so poor that they will not support a better justification, then we had better have another look at our causes. At any rate, when we talk national interest, we lose friends for America. When we talk common purposes, we gain them. It is no service to render us indistinguishable from other big powers among which our pre-

eminent value is simply that we are the biggest of all. In that sense, it is not in our national interest to stress our national interest.

As all of us move toward the twenty-first century, the grip of the many patriotisms around the world will everywhere become less and less. The full qualitative dimensions of all national causes, in all their cross-sections and costs, will be freely aired and universally evaluated. The dual explosions of education and communication assure nothing less. In America, we are face to face with the predicament of how an open society makes up its mind—of how, as a society, we move up from the quantity issues to the quality issues, from simple open-mindedness and simple power politics to the constructive closing of our national mind. Tendencies toward complexity, paradox and ambiguity can quickly and easily reinforce temptations toward inequality, injustice and inhumanity. These temptations are fraught with implications for our choices of means and ends in domestic and foreign policy alike.

Paradoxically, there are matters, however complex, about which no genuinely open society can afford to have an open mind. Paradoxically, there are issues and values on which a great democracy cannot really be intrinsically ambiguous without ceasing to be a great democracy. The penalties for failing to grapple with these issues are predictable. The complexity-minded, the paradox-minded and the ambiguity-minded can easily slip into—and inculcate—habits of mind avoiding engagement and severing the nerve of action, rather than informing judgment and instructing decision.

We could, instead, return to our beginnings and live again in bold and active proof that we have indeed made up our minds—that this open society is closed to the claims of inequality at home and abroad. If we did this more convincingly and credibly—convincingly because it was honest, credibly because it was real—our national interest could once again become interesting to others in the special way it has often been before. If we did this unreservedly, a host of unnecessary complexities, superfluous paradoxes and distorting ambiguities would peel away.

Complexity, paradox and ambiguity—here are some causes of our present discontents. Generally recognized as part of the reality, increasingly practiced as part of the solution, they are now becoming part of the problem.

ELEMENTS OF A NIGERIAN PEACE

By Joseph C. McKenna

OF all the upheavals that have marked Africa's transition from colonialism to political independence, none has been more tragic than Nigeria's civil war, either in terms of the immediate human suffering it has caused or the shadow it has cast on the continent's prospects for harmony and prosperity. After two years of inconclusive warfare and the collapse of three major initiatives toward negotiations, genuine peace in Nigeria seems very far away. One prerequisite to bringing it closer is the identification of the issues with which the peacemakers must deal. The present article undertakes this task, first briefly reviewing the war's background and then outlining the questions that must be considered in negotiating a settlement.

The secession of Nigeria's Eastern Region in May 1967 and its assumption of national sovereignty as the "Republic of Biafra" erupted out of a complex skein of historical experiences, cultural differences, economics, party politics and ethnic antagonisms. The federal structure which was adopted when Nigeria became independent in 1960 was intended to accommodate the local autonomy of diverse cultural groups with the economic unity of extensive and complementary resources and markets. The identification of the three regions (later four) with a particular political party and a single predominant ethnic group effected a polarization of political forces which certainly contributed to the present cataclysm. In the elections of 1959, on which the Independence Government was based, the efforts of the Yoruba-dominated Action Group (AG) and the Ibo party, the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), to win constituencies outside their own respective regions achieved only modest success.

Political action centered then on the struggle to gain or hold control of the Federal Government. The Government which emerged in 1959 was a coalition of the Hausa-Fulani-dominated Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) and the NCNC. From then until 1966, a prime anxiety of each major group was the possibility of a shift in the balance at the center, which might allow a single region, group and party to dominate the others at the national level and to carry away the rewards of power: government

jobs, contracts, loans, scholarships and community amenities.

Of the ethnic antagonisms, two things must be noted. First, the friction was not, for the most part, the heritage of open warfare among tribal groups. There had been little of this, but tribal xenophobia was deep-seated. Particularly as political modernization moved ahead, special resentment was roused by the favoritism shown by the powerful toward members of their own ethnic groups in the distribution of government largesse or of employment in private business.

Second, the three major tribes, the Hausa, Yoruba and Ibo, far from exhausted the tribal diversity of Nigeria. Each region included large ethnic groups which were culturally different from the regional majorities. All these were as anxious over domination by the majorities in their respective areas as the regional majorities were about each other on the national level. If, as was suggested in the constitutional talks preceding independence, more "regions" had been created, following ethnic lines, the three polarized regional power blocs would have been broken up. This would have accorded with a thesis of classic federalism: that the dominance of one or two disproportionately strong members paralyzes a federal system, and that a multiplicity of balanced units—permitting flexible adjustments of political alliances—is therefore necessary.

The months preceding the military coup of January 1966 were marked by widespread violence in the West, following a fraudulent election of the regional parliament, and by growing public restiveness over blatant corruption in government. Although it was executed by a small group of junior officers, the most prominent of whom was an Ibo major, Chukwuma Nzeogwu, the coup was populist in its original orientation. And the coup's leaders did not gain power for themselves but were apprehended and detained when a rump cabinet formally transferred power to Major-General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi, the commander of the army, and likewise an Ibo. When Ironsi appointed as military governors of the regions officers native to each, the Ibo Lieut.-Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu came to head the East.

Despite the fact that many prominent officials, including the Federal Prime Minister, had been killed, the immediate public reaction to the coup was relief and optimism. But as time passed, attitudes changed. Many came to interpret the coup as an Ibo plot to seize control of the country. A talented and enterprising

people, but aggressive and self-assured, the Ibos had long since evoked widespread resentment among other groups. It was noted that only one Ibo officer had been killed in the action, that the Ibo Premiers of the East and Mid-West had survived, and that Nzeogwu and other plotters had not been punished. When, on May 24, Ironsi issued a decree making the "federal" government the "national" government, this was read by others as an attempt to implement the Ibos' pre-independence preference for a unitary state in which they would enjoy the maximum opportunities for advancement in government service. Four days later came the first pogrom against Ibos in the North. With the connivance of local government, rampaging mobs began attacking the Ibos settled among them, killing hundreds and possibly thousands and spurring others to leave the North and return to their native East.

Then, during the second military coup, which occurred on the night of July 29 under the leadership of Northern officers, General Ironsi was killed, and Ibo troops at various military posts were attacked by their non-Ibo comrades-in-arms. Lieut.-Col. Yakubu Gowon, who had tried to negotiate with the mutinous troops on behalf of the Federal Military Government (FMG), by a curious twist won their acceptance as the new Commander-in-Chief and head of state. Gowon, though himself a Northerner, is from one of the Middle Belt tribes. In strictly legal terms his title to succeed Ironsi is not clear, for there was not, as in January, any formal transfer of power and Ojukwu, still Governor of the East, studiously refrained from officially acknowledging Gowon's position. The July events further stimulated the dispersed Ibos to return eastward, and in talks on constitutional reform, held in the following months, the Ibos shifted from support for a unitary state to advocacy of a confederal structure assuring maximum autonomy for the regions.

The most painful and provocative incident leading to the war was the outburst of attacks on Ibos by civilians—sometimes aided by troops—which swept the entire North at the end of September and the beginning of October. Between ten and thirty thousand were killed and countless others severely injured. An estimated 1 to 1.5 million Ibos from the North crowded into the densely populated East and hundreds of thousands more came from the West. Unable now to feel secure away from their native soil, the Ibos saw themselves as the target of genocide. The

trauma induced by the September riots, coming on the heels of the violence in May and July, cannot be overestimated. Secession had become almost inevitable.

By May 27 relations between the East and the FMG had deteriorated to such an extent that the consultative assembly of distinguished citizens appointed by Ojukwu to advise on policy mandated him "at an early practicable date" to take the East out of the Federation. On the following day, General Gowon responded with the announcement of a decree reorganizing the Federal structure, replacing the four "regions" with twelve "states": six in the North, three in the East and two in the West, with the Mid-West remaining as it was.

The provisional boundaries of the new states followed ethnic lines which appealed to the important minorities of the North and the East. And at the national level, the arrangement removed the threat of domination by the huge undivided North. At another time this would have been extremely pleasing to the Ibos. But only one of the new Eastern states encompassed Iboland. The other two states carved out of the East were controlled by minority tribes, thereby encouraging the dissidence of non-Ibos against Ojukwu's government. The new arrangement also threatened him with the loss of ports at Calabar and Port Harcourt and with the loss of the precious Eastern petroleum—almost all of which lay outside Iboland. Ojukwu's answer to Gowon's decrees was the secession that his consultative assembly had urged.

Even after actual hostilities had begun, they proceeded fitfully. Nevertheless, by September 1968, the Federal military strategy had pushed Biafra into a desperate and painful corner, reducing Biafran-held territory from about 30,000 to about 5,000 square miles, into which were crowded about 8 million people. Relief agencies in Biafra estimated that civilian deaths from starvation and associated illnesses had risen from 300 per day in May to over 6,000 per day in August, mostly children. But at about this time, the military situation stabilized for more than six months; the Biafrans, whose equipment had been markedly inferior to that of the Federal troops, were now acquiring more and better arms, with French assistance. Negotiations arranged by the Commonwealth and by the Organization of African Unity in mid-1968 proved fruitless. A new effort by the OAU in April 1969 similarly failed.

II

Such is the background of the tragic situation in Nigeria. The elemental motivating force behind Ibo secession, clearly, was fear. Underlying all else, after the Northern riots and the second coup of 1966, the Ibos felt that their lives were under constant threat anywhere in the country except in the East. Beyond life was livelihood. Because under the existing constitution the most lucrative sources of public revenue were outside the control of the regions, the East could not sustain the population which had crowded into it—certainly not at the levels to which the Ibo leadership aspired. The Ibos accordingly faced the need of either modifying the Federation or abandoning it. Whatever may have been their intention before the FMG's "States Decree," the establishment of the two new Eastern states ended hopes of any viable, autonomous economy within a revised federal structure. Provided that these areas and their assets were taken along, however, complete independence seemed feasible and, now, desirable. Though small in area, the new country would have the eighth largest population of the 41 countries on the continent, including an unusually high proportion—for Africa—of skilled and educated people. The oil would provide the capital to finance development. Although the dissidence of the minorities was a formidable difficulty, it could be met.

It must be reiterated, however, that fear and personal insecurity were the prime driving force of the Ibos' move. Whether it was well-founded or not, the fear was a fact, and a fact to which the Nigerian Government has never given the weight it deserves.

The prime motivation behind the Federal effort to suppress the secession was less elemental and emotional than that of the Ibos. Despite strong overtones of tribal animosity, the Federal response was grounded in rational concern for the interrelated political and economic integrity of Nigeria. The prestige which the country has consistently enjoyed in international forums rests partly on its size and economic promise. Successful secession by the Ibos would set a precedent for other tribal groups that might feel alienated. Moreover, the FMG was not disposed to abandon the Eastern oil that promised development capital for the whole country. The essentially confederal solution put forward by the Ibos at the constitutional talks of 1966 and at the Aburi conference of early 1967 would inevitably cause dissolu-

tion or paralysis of the Government. But to concede Ibo independence would cause enduring conflict in Africa as bitter as that of Arabs and Israelis in the Middle East, permanently draining the resources of both sides into a senseless arms race and possibly exposing the area once more to a dangerous rivalry of major powers.

The specific issues of the war which must be resolved fall into several clusters of related problems. The strict legitimacy of both the Gowon and the Ojukwu régimes and of their official acts is one such central question. Since Gowon's title to succeed Ironsi has been explicitly challenged, the legality of his States Decree could be queried. But the legitimacy of Ojukwu's own military government in the Eastern Region, dependent as it was on Ironsi's own tenuous title, is also questionable. In any case, the Eastern government's secession, assertion of sovereignty and claim to the region's former territorial boundaries are the central legal issues of the war. On this the positions of the Biafran and Federal authorities are in direct and apparently irreconcilable conflict.

A second and really more fundamental set of issues relates to the bitter inter-ethnic hostilities that escalated into war. In as much as the failure of the Ironsi Government to prosecute the leaders of the January coup is still cited as a Federal grievance, it does remain a grievance. Investigation is in order, but its scope should include the July coup as well. The failure of the Northern authorities and the FMG to protect the Ibos in the riots of May and September and to indemnify them adequately for deaths, personal injuries, loss of jobs, income and property also remains an issue—a more serious one than the coups themselves in terms of far-reaching impact on identifiable individuals. And similar situations have arisen during the war both from the victimization of Ibo civilians in parts of the Mid-West and East taken by Federal forces and in the harassment of non-Ibo civilians by Biafran forces in territories controlled by them.

Future Ibo security, however, is certainly the most critical issue of all; unless it is met, "one Nigeria" is an impossibility. In the first instance, the Ibos will need protection from organized or casual attack by Federal troops in the East Central State following a cease-fire or Biafran surrender. Even more difficult, it will be necessary after a peace settlement to reestablish their freedom to move without fear in the other eleven states. Nigeria

cannot be fully integrated unless all its citizens fully share the benefits of its complementary economy. To this end the Ibos will need to disperse once more from the East Central State, whose slender resources could not sustain them at a minimally satisfactory level. And the rest of the country will have need of the Ibos' talent to revitalize its disrupted economic structure. The largest problem in assuring Ibo mobility will be to provide effective police work over a huge territorial expanse. But the complexities of employment policy will also be the source of major dilemmas. The return of Ibos to jobs they had fled would raise technical questions of job perquisites like seniority and pensions. Additionally, however, their reinstatement would pose the issue of equity toward those who had succeeded them; and this could be incendiary.

A third group of issues is constitutional. The twelve states presumably must be accepted, both because the FMG has committed itself to the minorities on this point and because the new structure holds greater promise of political stability than the old. But in giving the system definitive shape, many questions raised in earlier constitutional conferences will recur. Especially relevant to the grievances that led to the war would be the equitable distribution of tax burdens and tax revenues among the states; the Ibos had long complained that a disproportionate share of Federal revenue derived from the Eastern Region was being assigned to other areas. A guarantee of reasonable legal, political and socio-economic autonomy to the states will also be needed.

A fourth set of issues concerns the security forces. Against the background of the war, their future internal deployment had best be controlled by the constitution; but an interim, provisional arrangement must be made. An issue immediately linked with the very making of peace will be the treatment of charges against military personnel—especially Biafran—arising from secession and the conduct of the war. At longer range will be the general reorganization of the armed forces and police: reintegrating Biafran personnel into the national services with appropriate regard for perquisites, and safeguarding against future military intervention in politics. A particularly formidable problem will be demobilization. While the prewar army numbered about 10,000, the estimated current total for both sides is around 160,000. Mostly men of little education, the ex-servicemen will

have poor job prospects. Although they have learned to use the lethal weapons which, one fears, will be abundantly available after the war, their too-rapid recruitment and training have not developed tight military discipline. The return of servicemen to civilian society will require imaginative planning and energetic execution to spare Nigeria a grave and enduring threat to public order.

A fifth general problem is the validity of fiscal acts and financial commitments made by the Biafran government during secession—for example, the incurrence of indebtedness and the issuance of currency. Though highly technical, questions of this kind can have serious substantive implications—most strikingly as they relate to foreign governments or agencies that may have given financial support to the Biafran war effort.

A sixth grouping comprises the issues connected with relief and rehabilitation after the war. Relief must be provided and rehabilitation promoted promptly, efficiently, honestly and without discrimination against any ethnic group or geographic area.

A final cluster of issues concerns the actual cessation of hostilities. The key problem in any cease-fire is to assure each party that its adversary will gain no major military advantage when hostilities end. In the present instance, the arrangements should prevent the hard-pressed Biafrans from replenishing their arms supply, and the Nigerians from regrouping their forces for a major assault. If the cease-fire be taken as the prelude to Biafra's reincorporation into the Federation, the arrangements should also guarantee against disarmed Biafrans being placed at the mercy of Federal troops.

III

In planning an agenda on which negotiations could proceed, the most urgent immediate problem is to end hostilities. For the cease-fire to hold the confidence of both sides, a large force of military observers will be needed. Such a force would not be an infringement of sovereignty, as some Nigerians protest, but an exercise of sovereignty. (At the FMG's request, a very small party of observers has already inspected Federally held territory.) The invitation could be extended by the Nigerian Government, but with the assent of Biafra, to the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth Secretariat or the United Nations. The force's members could then be recruited anywhere.

The smaller non-African countries might best assure not only an accepted impartiality but also an almost indispensable "visibility." The force should be positioned before the cease-fire, and should be guaranteed a life of one year and unimpeded movement for itself and its supplies. Its function would be to verify the cessation of hostilities for both parties and for the international community. By focusing the full light of international publicity on the situation and by intervening physically if necessary, the force would prevent victimization of the Ibos and at the same time protect Federal forces against charges of genocide. It would check any movement by either side to rearm, regroup and renew hostilities and would supervise any disarmament process, taking custody of the weapons surrendered.

Among the legal issues, the most direct clash is over sovereignty. Although one party must yield, its concession must be rendered as easy as possible by an earnest respect for its sensitivities. On the assumption that Biafra rejoins the Federation, the emphasis should be on the legal position *post bellum*. Judgments on the past should as far as possible be avoided. Biafra would affirm its unity with the Federation under the terms of the States Decree, and Nigeria would affirm Biafra's membership in the Federation. This exchange would imply Biafran recognition of the FMG and renunciation of the claim to sovereignty without prejudice to the past. It would also imply Federal assurances that the new state would suffer no discrimination in comparison with other states. Admittedly such a solution will not avoid abundant civil litigation involving events between the first coup and the final settlement. But civil litigation under private law will strain the social fabric less than acrimonious debate under public law.

A further politico-legal question is Iboland's access to the sea, cut off by the States Decree. In view of the loss of Port Harcourt, the FMG should undertake feasibility studies and subsequently establish, if practicable, a new river port on the Niger.

Besides the protection provided through the observer force, additional measures to mitigate ethnic bitterness could be incorporated in the settlement. The FMG could, for example, grant a general amnesty to all citizens who might be charged with political offenses, including treason, connected with the two coups and the Biafran secession. This would assuage both Ibo and anti-Ibo hostility and set the stage for a new politics of accommoda-

tion. The FMG could also facilitate the emigration of Ibos who might wish to leave the country—reversing the deliberate bureaucratic obstructionism that hampered the issuance of passports for several months before the war. This measure would relieve the Ibos' fear of physical danger and open up economic opportunities abroad in place of those curtailed in Nigeria.

To assure both Biafran and international confidence in the impartial functioning of relief and rehabilitation agencies, the FMG could appoint to the responsible governmental bodies personnel nominated by the Biafran authorities; appropriate international agencies could also be invited to appoint observers.

Other important issues involve an interweaving of political and technical considerations too complex for immediate adjustment. The FMG could create tripartite commissions to examine these problems—with members appointed by the Federal and Biafran authorities and by mutually agreeable third parties. These last would, again, assure detached evaluation of the commissions' functioning and public confidence in the findings. The commissions would enjoy freedom of access to places, persons and documents needed to complete their respective missions. Minority reports, if there were any, would be published.

Four such commissions can be envisaged. The first would study the reabsorption of Ibos into the labor force in both public and private sectors. It would look into measures to assure the Ibos personal security outside their own state, into technical questions of job perquisites, and into the provision of equity both for Ibos seeking reappointment to jobs they had abandoned and for non-Ibos who had replaced them. A second commission would examine the legal and fiscal problems raised by the actions of the Biafran government during secession, and particularly by its financial obligations. A third commission would investigate the communal riots of 1966—determining their causes, identifying persons who might have committed criminal acts in the course of them, verifying property and personal damages sustained and recommending appropriate action. A fourth commission would consider the reorganization of the armed forces and police on both sides—including technical aspects of reincorporating Biafrans into the corresponding Federal structure, reduction and redeployment of manpower, demobilization of redundant personnel and their retraining for civilian life, and the disposal of surplus military equipment.

For the permanent return from military to civil government, a new national constitution will be necessary. To frame it, the FMG might convoke a convention within six months of the termination of hostilities, to which each of the states would send equal numbers of representatives. The final draft should be submitted to a referendum, in which approval by a majority of voters in each state would be required for final acceptance. In order again to assure public trust, the FMG might invite international observers to attend the convention, watch the referendum and publish a report. In drafting the constitution, particular attention would have to be given to incorporating solidly "entrenched" clauses on the critical issues affecting national confidence. These would include the existence of the twelve states and the process for creating new ones, the amendment procedure, the formula for legislative representation, the control and possibly the internal deployment of security forces, the assignment of the Federal tax burden and the distribution of Federal revenue among the states, and the allocation of reserved, concurrent and residuary powers.

IV

Although the lines of settlement sketched here are intended to be suggestive and not conclusive, their acceptability to either party even as a starting point for negotiation may be questioned. Is it realistic to expect the Biafran or Federal authorities even to talk about them?

The rigidity of both sides thus far is not encouraging. Lieut.-Col. Ojukwu asserts that even if defeated in the field, his people will wage guerrilla warfare until Federal troops retire from their soil. He is training his people for it and is prepared to supply them by air-drops if he loses control of the airstrips. Foreign journalists who visit Biafra uniformly report that his people are solidly behind him—to the point of restricting his own freedom to make concessions. But the FMG believes that the capture of the airstrips and possibly of Orlu will end major resistance, or that the deterioration of the Biafran military situation or civilian supply system will permit covert dissidents among the Ibos to force Ojukwu to step aside for the sake of peace. It should nevertheless be clear to the warring parties, as it is to outside observers, that continuance of the conflict makes no sense for either.

It may be possible for the Ibos to wage guerrilla warfare long after they have lost their last airstrip. But what they could gain would hardly seem to justify the heavy losses. Guerrilla warfare would invite reprisals against civilians as the line between civilian and enemy soldier became invisible. Death from starvation would rise as the distribution of food and medicine became more irregular and disorganized. Even if guerrilla tactics do compel a Federal withdrawal, Biafra would remain surrounded by hostile forces, caught in an arms race, landlocked and with only minimal natural resources on which to build a viable economy.

Though it may be possible for the Federal forces to inflict a conventional military defeat on the Biafrans, if they are faced with guerrilla warfare, the Gowon Government's primary war aim would be as far from realization as ever. "To keep Nigeria one" is not a matter of physically controlling territory, but of uniting people in the pursuit of an ordered, tranquil and prosperous community life whose benefits are shared by all its members according to the norms of social justice. Prolonged maintenance of an "army of occupation" among a sullen and recalcitrant populace would not be compatible with such a definition of "one Nigeria." The continuing effort to repress guerrillas, moreover, would further aggravate the war damages and war costs that one economist already estimates at \$2.3 billion, and would further magnify the military and civilian casualties that may already exceed 1.5 million persons—all, be it remembered, citizens of Nigeria.

Continuance of hostilities would be equally distressing in terms of the positive values thus sacrificed. Economically, the peoples of Nigeria would prosper far more together than apart. Both parties would profit from a reopening of rail and motor roads from the northern states to Port Harcourt and Calabar; from the electric power and water-level control on the Niger afforded by the new Kainji Dam; and from the complementarity of Enugu coal and Jos tin, of Ogoja yams and Owerri markets, of Ibo managerial and technical skills and Rivers oil. In the long politico-military contest between the Ibos and the FMG that began in July 1966, the mutual advantage in coming to terms has seldom been as clear as in the first half of 1969.

If a settlement were to be achieved along the lines suggested, its success would still be problematic. The bitterness of the last three years will take many decades to heal. The acceptance of

the Ibos by other Nigerians will be slow. The recovery of Ibo confidence in other Nigerians will be slower. Within the FMG itself, tensions that have been subordinated to finishing the war could burst forth in a power struggle involving the military leaders themselves and old-line political elements who were displaced in 1966. The task of reconstruction will be vast. Its dimensions will be stretched by the development needs of the new states, especially in the North, where resources are slender. Ethnic antagonisms within some new states will create pressures for still more such units. In short, the situation will remain volatile.

But it could hardly be much more volatile than in the crisis-ridden years 1964-1965, and it will certainly assure greater stability than would be inherent in an international confrontation on the banks of the Niger. The new states do have the potential to replace the rigid polarization of the old Federation with a more flexible political pluralism. The economic base of the new Federation will be as strong as that of the old, and some of the economic controls imposed by the war may stimulate the indigenous capital formation that is so much needed.

An optimistic forecast of Nigerian prospects naturally depends entirely on the recognition by the warring segments of the mutual advantages in negotiating a settlement while negotiation is still possible. It is a truism that the struggle can be settled only by the Nigerians and Biafrans themselves. Third-party diplomacy can, nevertheless, contribute by helping both sides to understand their own interest in an early peace and to find formulas for a settlement.

ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: THE COMMUNIST DIMENSION

By Joseph R. Starobin

IT is surely a suggestive irony that just at the point when younger American historians had made serious intellectual headway with their reinterpretation of the cold war, fixing historical responsibility in terms of the mistakes, delusions and imperatives of United States policy, the Soviet Union astonished friends and foes by overwhelming Czechoslovakia and turning its clock of history backwards. If the cold war has not revived, small thanks are due the Soviet leaders. Their extraordinary nervousness, their manoeuvres to propitiate both the outgoing and incoming American Administrations, indicate very plainly how much they have feared political retaliation; this in itself is a comment on where responsibility for the cold war today should rest. That Prague should have been the vortex in 1968 as it was in 1948 of critical problems within communism is uncanny, but on deeper examination it may not be fortuitous.

After all, the least credible explanation of Moscow's desperate attempt to resolve the crisis within its own system of states and parties is the one which pictures Czechoslovakia as the helpless Pauline at the crossroads of Europe, about to be dishonored by West German *revanchards*, with agents of the CIA grinning in the background, suddenly saved by the stalwart defenders of socialist honor and morality. Today this type of argument is reserved within the communist world for its most backward members—that is, for the Soviet public and the fringes of the most insignificant and expendable communist parties. Yet arguments of this kind had wide currency a generation ago. New Left historians would have us believe that Stalin was simply reacting to external challenge. In their view, the cold war might not have set in if small-minded American politicians had not been determined to reverse bad bargains, if congenital imperialists had not been mesmerized by the monopoly of atomic weapons which statesmen and scientists knew to be temporary. Since all this is so plainly a half-truth when juxtaposed to events of today, then clearly the half-truth of yesteryear will hardly explain the whole of the cold war.

Sophisticated communists, both East and West, are asking

why Czechoslovakia, which escaped the upheavals in Poland and Hungary of 1956 after a decade of Stalinist pressure, then experienced such a mounting crisis in the subsequent decade of relative *détente* and peaceful competition. How is it that twenty years after communist rule had been secured in February 1948 basic verities are now placed in question—whether centralized planning may not be counterproductive, whether a one-party régime can really articulate the needs of a politically evolved people, whether the inner relations of such an unequal alliance as that administered by the Soviet Union are not so inherently antagonistic as to become explosive? Indeed, why did the rebirth of Czechoslovak political life in the first half of 1968—viewed with hope and excitement by Western communists—raise such menacing ghosts from the past and such fearful question marks for the future that supposedly sober-minded men in Moscow took fright?

Twice within a dozen years the unmanageability of the communist world has been revealed. The crisis which shattered the Sino-Soviet alliance after manifesting itself first in Eastern Europe now rebounds at the supposed strong-point of Czechoslovakia. And it has done so both in conditions of intense external pressure and times of relatively peaceful engagement. Perhaps it is here, in the dimension of communism as a contradictory and intractable system, that one may find the missing element in the discussions thus far on the origins of the cold war.

II

That world history would someday polarize around two great nations, America and Russia, was a de Tocquevillean insight with which communists were familiar a long time ago. Stalin gave it what seemed like a very clear definition back in 1927 during a talk with an American labor delegation. He envisaged that a socialist center would arise “binding to itself the countries gravitating toward socialism” and would engage the surviving capitalist center in “a struggle between them for the possession of the world economy.” The fate of both would be decided by the outcome of this struggle. What appeared at first glance as a sweeping projection was, however, profoundly ambiguous on close examination. Stalin did not spell out how the countries “gravitating to socialism” would get there. Good communists believed this could come about only by the formulas of the Octo-

ber Revolution; yet even Lenin, in 1922, had lamented that perhaps a "big mistake" was being made in imposing Russian precepts on foreign communists. Nor did Stalin elucidate how new nations recruited to socialism would order their relations with Russia as the hub of the socialist center. Presumably "proletarian internationalism" would replace the domination of the weak by the strong which was, in their view, the hallmark of capitalism. Yet even by 1927 the Russification of the international movement had brought catastrophic results—in Germany and China.

Stalin did not, moreover, meet the fundamental intellectual challenge of whether "the struggle for the possession of the world economy" necessarily had to be military in character. On this crucial point, everything could be found in the Leninist grabbag. "Peaceful coexistence" is there, but so is the expectation of "frightful collisions" between the first workers' state and its opponents; the caution that socialism had to be secured in one country first is to be found along with pledges that once socialism was strong enough in Russia, it would raise up revolts in the strongholds of capitalism.

The one possibility which Leninism did not anticipate was a stalemate between rival systems, precluding a "final conflict." The notion was not even entertained that an equilibrium between contending forces might set in, that the subsequent evolution of both contenders under the impact of this equilibrium could alter their distinguishing characteristics and therefore outmode the original Leninist theorems.

Out of such doctrinal ambiguities the Second World War created policy choices affecting most of humanity. The Soviet Union and the international communist movement found themselves allied with democratic-capitalist states among whom public power had grown drastically in an effort to overcome the great depression; the welfare state was expanded by the very demands of warfare while democracy was in fact enhanced. Keynes had made a serious rebuttal to Marx. Would capitalism in the West collapse in a repetition of the crisis of the 1930s after withstanding the test of war? Or had the war itself changed something vital within the workings of capitalism? Moreover, the first global war in history led to the end of colonialism and hence a new relation of metropolitan states to subject peoples. Would the former necessarily collapse because, in Lenin's an-

alysis, they had depended so heavily on colonies? Or might they undergo transformations—short of socialism—to make them viable? Would the countries of the underdeveloped world make socialism the indispensable form of their modernization or might they, dialectically enough, find a new relation with capitalism?

Thus, the war brought on to the world stage a powerful Russia on whose survival a rival system's survival also depended. Simultaneously America came to center stage with a greatly expanded economy no longer limited by laissez-faire economics and inwardly altered by technological change created by the war. America was indispensable to Russia as an ally but formidable as a rival in a sense far deeper than its outward power. This wartime relationship was unexpected, and it challenged ideology and practice on all sides.

Something very particular happened within communism, considered as a most uneven system of a single state and a variety of parties. The fortunes of war, thanks perhaps to Churchill's postponement of the second front, brought the Soviet armies beyond their own borders where they had to be welcomed by the West if only because their help was also being solicited on the plains of Manchuria once Hitler was defeated. Yet at the moment of Russia's greatest need and harshest difficulties, the communist movements *least* helpful to her were those of Eastern Europe; in the one country outside of Russia where a decade before the communists had been a real power—namely, in Germany—the party lay shattered. No anti-Hitler force of any practical significance emerged. On the East European landscape there were only two exceptions. In Yugoslavia a handful of veterans of Comintern intrigue and the hard school of the International Brigades in Spain had succeeded in establishing their power—prior to the arrival of Soviet forces in the Danubian basin. In Czechoslovakia, a communist movement of a very different sort—that is, with a legal and parliamentary tradition—was joined by Slovak guerrillas. Both came to terms with the leadership of the government-in-exile, which both Moscow and the West recognized. A long-term coöperation of diverse social forces was implied.

On the other hand, the communist movements underwent a spectacular resurrection in a wide arc from Greece through Italy, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia, while in widely separated corners of Asia they also flourished—in Northwest

China, in the peninsula of Indochina, in the Philippines and Malaya. All of them were successful to the degree that they identified with the defense of their nationhood and either subordinated social issues or subsumed them in national ones; where this proved too complicated, as in India, long-term disabilities resulted. But all these movements grew at a distance from the Soviet armies; their postwar fate could not depend on physical contact. Even parties at the periphery of world politics showed striking changes. They entered cabinets in Cuba and Chile, emerged from prewar disasters with great dynamism in Brazil, became legal in Canada and stood a chance of legitimizing their considerable influence in Britain and the United States. In these latter countries, they could hope to achieve "citizenship" only by ceasing to be propagandist groups reflecting Soviet prestige, and only as they grappled with the specific peculiarities of their societies in rapid change.

Yet for all this success, and perhaps because of it, communism faced the gravest problems. The peculiarity of the moment lay in the fact that some definition of Russia's relation with the West was essential to assure the most rapid conclusion of the war in Europe, and this had to precede a common strategy in Asia. Hence Moscow was obliged to define relations with the communist parties. Simultaneously these movements—of such unequal potential and geographical relation to Russia—had to make a fresh judgment of their strategies in view of those changes within capitalism which challenged their own doctrine. Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to do this came in May 1943 with the dissolution of the Communist International.

Stalin, who had sworn at Lenin's bier to guard this "general staff of the world revolution" like the apple of his eye, was now abandoning it; and in so doing he signaled to Churchill and Roosevelt that he would project the postwar Soviet interest in essentially Russian terms. This decision was consistent with the fact that the Russian Communists had not been able to rely on ideology or internationalism in mobilizing their own peoples for the enormous sacrifices of the war. They had been forced to appeal to the Russian love of soil and the solace of the Orthodox faith. "They are not fighting for us," Stalin had once mused to Ambassador Harriman. "They are fighting for Mother Russia."

All of this would not, of course, make Russia easier to deal with. And in studying the details in the monumental accounts

of Herbert Feis or W. H. McNeill, one is struck by Stalin's political opportunism and the enormous part which is played in his calculations by the need to exact material resources from friend and foe. Throughout 1944, Stalin dealt with anyone who would cease fighting, or mobilize men and matériel for the Soviet armies, safeguard their lines and pledge reparations; and everyone was suitable to Moscow in terms of these objectives—agrarians and monarchists in the Axis satellites, veteran communist-haters in Finland, a Social Democratic old-timer in Austria, Dr. Beneš in Prague or Comrade Tito in the Yugoslav mountains. Had the putsch against Hitler succeeded in July 1944, Stalin was prepared, by his committee of Nazi generals rounded up at Stalingrad, to bargain.

His only real complication arose over Poland. Here the Soviets had the tactical advantage that a generation earlier the victors at Versailles had been willing to establish the Curzon Line as Russia's western frontier. Churchill and Roosevelt were now obliged not only to ratify this line but to impose it on the intractable London Poles. Moscow's own dilemma lay in the fact that the pro-Soviet Poles, exiled in the U.S.S.R., had little political substance; they had one thing in common with their counterparts in London—lack of standing inside Poland. The Polish Communists had been decimated in the great purges and the Polish officer corps had been wiped out in the Katyn murders. Perhaps it was the need to shift the balance in his favor that led Stalin to such extraordinary measures as letting the "Home Army" be wiped out at the banks of the Vistula or continuing to murder Polish Socialists as they came to Moscow as guests. The earlier hope of some prestigious figure who would bridge the gap between Poles and yet be satisfactory to all the great powers had faded with the death in an airplane accident of General Wladislaw Sikorski.

But it is questionable whether this Soviet use of vestigial figures of Comintern experience should be viewed, as of 1944, in terms of "communization." Everything we know of the Kremlin at that time denies this. In the remarkable account by Milovan Djilas in his "Conversations with Stalin," the Kremlin was far from being a citadel of revolution, as this young Montenegrin idealist expected (like so many in Moscow for the first time, before and after him). The Kremlin was really a sort of Muscovite camping-ground such as the great Russian painter, Repin, might

have portrayed. Crafty and boorish men, suspicious of all foreigners and of each other, contemptuous of communists who were non-Russian but expecting their obedience, were crowded around the maps of Europe as around some Cossack camp-fire, calculating how much they could extract from Churchill and Roosevelt, to whom they felt profoundly inferior.

Thus, when Ulbricht and Rakosi, Anna Pauker and even Dmitroff were being prepared to return to the homelands where they had previously failed, Stalin advised them not to spoil their second chance by their chronic leftism and adventurism.¹ They did not go back as revolutionaries. For all of Moscow's hopes that they root themselves in native soil, they were intended to be the guarantors of control, to stabilize this backyard of Europe and mobilize its resources on Russia's behalf. The troubles with the Yugoslavs began for the very reason that as revolutionaries they would not let themselves be used.

Was Stalin already building a bloc? To be sure he was. But he also knew that the onetime *cordon sanitaire* was a veritable swamp of historic and intractable rivalries and economic backwardness, even though wealthier in immediate resources than the U.S.S.R. itself. Hoping to transform this bloc, Stalin also entertained most seriously the idea of a long-term relationship with America and Britain based on some common policy toward Germany that would make its much greater resources available to Russia. Thus, when Churchill came to Moscow in September 1944 to work out a spheres-of-influence agreement, demanding 50-50 and 75-25 ratios in the political control of areas already liberated by the Soviet armies, Stalin agreed by the stroke of a pen. He did so without comment. He contemptuously left it to Churchill to decide whether the piece of paper should be retained by him or destroyed. The cobbler's son from Gori, the onetime seminary student, was giving a descendant of the Marlboroughs a lesson in Realpolitik.

But as he disposed of Greeks and interposed with Yugoslavs (without asking their consent) the Soviet dictator demanded no quid pro quo in Western Europe where the ultimate world bal-

¹ Herbert Feis is the source for the famous and revealing anecdote that when Stalin said farewell to Dr. Benes, after signing a mutual assistance pact, he urged Benes to help make Klement Gottwald, the Communist leader now become Premier, "more worldly and less provincial"—an amazing piece of arrogance. Having themselves helped emasculate their foreign friends, the Russians now taunted them and hoped that perhaps the bourgeois world might make men of them. ("Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin," Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 569)

ance could be determined, and where communist movements had powerfully revived, guided by intimates of Stalin—Togliatti and Thorez—whose work he respected. Molotov is on record as inquiring about the disposition of Italian colonies, but not about the operations of the American Military Government in Italy in which Russian participation was passive. At the moment when the French Communists were debating whether to turn in their arms, Moscow recognized the Gaullist régime and invited it to sign a treaty with what de Gaulle was to call “*chère et puissante Russie*.” Churchill’s assault on Belgian and Greek Communists was reproved, in private. But no Soviet leverage was employed to help them, and the Greek Communists were advised to strike the best bargain they could to avert civil war. Only much later, when assistance was useless to them, did the Soviets reluctantly help the Greeks, though their hapless plight was useful for cold-war propaganda. Even as late as February 1945, at Yalta, Stalin pledged to renew his pact with Chiang Kai-shek in return for special treaty control of Dairen and the Manchurian railways. Half a year later, the Soviet armies ransacked the industrial installations that were by right Chinese. In central Asia they dickered with warlords, advising them against joining the Chinese Communists. Stalin shied away from the governance of Japan, asking and getting its northern islands instead. All this was accompanied by rather snide references by Molotov to Mao Tse-tung’s “*margarine communists*.” American liberals and roving ambassadors may have been more naïve but they were also less offensive in believing the Chinese Communists to be “*agrarian reformers*.”

III

How then did the communist parties respond to the Comintern’s dissolution? Its final document had some curious and pregnant phrases, alluding to “the fundamental differences in the historical development of the separate countries of the world”—differences, it was now discovered, which had “become apparent even before the war;” communists were now told most authoritatively that they were “never advocates of the outmoded organizational forms.” This suggests that a great watershed had been reached. The implicit self-criticism was bound to encourage those Western communists for whom the “popular front” of the 1930s and the experience of the Spanish Republic

were not defensive deceptions but major experiments in skirting the limits of Leninism. The Chinese Communists, as the specialized literature shows, saw in the disappearance of the Communist International a ratification of their own "New Democracy," in which the peasantry and the "national bourgeoisie" had been credited with revolutionary potentials for which no precedent existed in the Russian experience.

The most interesting instance of how new systems of ideas and new organizational forms were bursting the Leninist integument came in the minor party of a major country—among the American Communists. Their leader, Earl Browder, concluded that peaceful coexistence had become obligatory; he saw such coexistence as a whole historical stage in which the contradictions between antagonistic social systems would have to work themselves out—short of war; it is curious that he ruled out war as too dangerous to both sides *before* the advent of the atomic bomb. To give this very novel view some inner logic, Browder postulated a new type of state power, intermediate between capitalism and socialism, which, he thought, would prevail between the Atlantic and the Oder-Neisse Line. Thus he anticipated the "people's democracy" concept which was to have wide currency in the next few years only to be brusquely rejected by the end of 1948, when the cold war demanded rationales of another kind.

To what extent Browder had sanction in Moscow, or only *thought* he had, or whether this sanction was ever intended to be more than temporary are all fascinating matters; but for our discussion what seems more important is the fact that Browder revealed the incoherence of communism and tried to overcome it. Perhaps America was not as backward as European communists traditionally assumed. The more advanced country was simply showing a mirror to the less advanced of the problems of their own future, to borrow an image from Marx.

One may put this dilemma in very specific terms. In 1944–45, a quasi-revolutionary situation prevailed in key areas of Western Europe and East Asia. The communist parties had become mass movements. They were no longer Leninist vanguards but had significant military experience. The old order had been discredited and few charismatic rivals existed. One of two options could be taken, each of them having its own logic. If the communists seized power they might be able to hold it, as in Yugoslavia, with great good luck. But as the Greek experience was to

show, the success of a prolonged civil war would involve the rupture of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition; and the war with Hitler was by no means over, while the Pacific war appeared only begun. To pursue this option meant to oblige the Soviet Union to assist revolutions at a distance from its own armies at a moment of its own greatest weakness and when it seriously entertained the possibility of a long-range postwar relationship with the West. Alternatively, the U.S.S.R. would be obliged to disavow its own ideological and political allies in an even more explicit way than the dissolution of the Comintern suggested. Stalin's entire diplomacy warned against revolution now. So did his opinion, in a speech of November 6, 1944, that whatever disagreements existed among the great powers could be overcome; he had said flatly that "no accidental, transitory motive but vitally important long-term interests lie at the basis of the alliance of our country, Great Britain and the United States."

On the other hand, to reject the revolutionary path meant for the Western parties (if not for the Chinese and Vietnamese) forgoing an opportunity that might not return; for a generation this choice caused intense misgivings and internal battles within these parties. To take part in the whole-hearted reconstruction of their societies on a less-than-socialist basis would have involved a revision of fundamental Leninist postulates, a fresh look at capitalism, and presumably a redefinition of their relations with the Soviet Union. Having taken such a sharply Russocentric course, could Stalin give his imprimatur to the embryonic polycentrism of that time? The U.S.S.R. was in the paradoxical position of trying to be a great power with a shattered economic base, and of trying to lead a world movement whose interests were quite distinct from those of Russia, both in practice and in ideas. The ambiguities inherent in communism, in Stalin's projections of 1927, had come home to roost.

IV

If one tries, then, to make intellectual sense and order out of the bewildering events between early 1945 and mid-1947, the least satisfactory themes are the ones which have been so popular and have dominated the discussion of the origins of the cold war. The revisionist historians are so hung up on the notion that a meticulous rediscovery of America will reveal the clues to the cold war that they ignore the dimension of communism al-

together. They have little experience with communism (and perhaps they are better off for it) but they have yet to show the scholarship required to explore it. To say this is not to deny the value of reappraising American policy, especially since so many of today's follies have roots in the past. Communists, anti-communists and ex-communists have all had troubles with the imperatives of coexistence. But this is quite different from explaining the cold war on one-sided grounds and succumbing to the elementary fallacy of *post hoc, propter hoc*.

On the other hand, the most sophisticated and persuasive rebuttal to the younger historians—that by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. in these pages²—suffered from the limitations of his own major premise: the assumption that communism was a monolithic movement which disintegrated only as the cold war was vigorously prosecuted. Certainly the monolith functioned in a pell-mell fashion after 1948 but one wonders whether its explosive decomposition in the late fifties, continuing to the events in Czechoslovakia, can be comprehended without realizing that all the elements of crisis within it were already present in its immediate postwar years. It was the futile attempts by Stalin and the communists who everywhere followed him (even if hesitantly and in bewilderment) to stifle the nascent polycentrism and to curtail the inchoate attempts to adjust to new realities which constitute communism's own responsibility for the cold war. Herein also is the key to communism's own disasters.

Thus, the events of 1946 and 1947 were in fact incoherent and contradictory, and for that very reason offer an important clue to the origins of cold war. For example, Earl Browder was roundly denounced by the French Communist leader, Jacques Duclos, in an article written early in 1945 (with data that was available only in Moscow), on the grounds that the very concept of peaceful coexistence and Europe's reconstruction on a bourgeois-democratic basis was heresy; yet the curious thing is that most of the communist parties continued to operate on Browder's assumptions—including the party led by Duclos. Such a state of affairs suggests that the Duclos article was not the tocsin of the cold war but one of the elements of communism's incoherence. By the close of 1946, only the Yugoslavs—and William Z. Foster, who had ousted Browder in the United States—were convinced that even the "temporary stabilization" of capi-

² *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967.

talism was unlikely. This concept was of course an echo from the 1920s. "Relative and temporary stabilization" was Stalin's own justification in the late 1920s for "turning inward" and seeking a truce in external affairs. Ruling out this concept in the 1940s, Foster went even further than Tito in raising the alarum over an ever-more-imminent danger of an American attack on the Soviet Union. It is not generally known that when Browder's successor visited Europe in March 1947 he was amazed to find that few communist leaders agreed with his views, and one of those who disagreed most sharply was Jacques Duclos.

In studying the French Communists of that period one finds unusual emphasis on the need for a policy of "confident collaboration" with "all of the Allied nations, without exception," and a declaration by Duclos that "we are not among those who confuse the necessity and fertility of struggle with the spirit of adventurism. That is why—mark me well—we ask of a specific historic period what it can give and only what it can give . . . but we do not ask more, for we want to push ahead and not end up in abortive and disappointing failures."

In this same year of 1946, it is sometimes forgotten that the Chinese Communists negotiated seriously for a long-term coalition with Chiang Kai-shek. They did so under the aegis of General George Marshall, which suggests that their own antagonism to "American imperialism" had its limits; their view that the United States was necessarily hostile to a unified China with a large communist component was a later development. During the recent Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Chinese historians blamed this coalition strategy on the now-disgraced Liu Shao Chi, alleging that he was under the influence of "Browder, Togliatti, Thorez and other renegades to the proletariat." But the official Chinese Communist documents show that at the time Mao Tse-tung took credit for it and was himself viewed as a "revisionist"—by the Indian Communists, for example. In those same months, Ho Chi Minh led a coalition delegation to Paris, trying to work out the terms for remaining within the French Union; it is a curious but revealing detail that Ho had the previous winter dissolved his own creation, the Communist Party of Indochina, in favor of an Association of Marxist Studies, without, however, receiving a rebuke from Jacques Duclos.

Throughout 1946, almost every communist leader in the West voiced the view that peaceful roads to socialism were not only

desirable but were—because of objective changes in the world—now theoretically admissible. If in Eastern Europe this popularity of the “people’s democracy” can be explained in terms of Stalin’s attempt to stabilize a chaotic region of direct interest to Russia, in Western Europe it was part of a serious effort to implement the non-revolutionary option which the communists had chosen, and for which they needed a consistent justification.

Nor were the Soviet leaders immune to what was happening within communism. Stalin himself can be cited in contradictory assertions which also stimulated the diversity within the communist world as well as baffling some of its members. Early in February 1946 Stalin declared that wars could not be abolished so long as imperialism prevailed; this came in his election campaign speech which is viewed by Sovietologists as another tocsin of the cold war. Yet throughout 1946 Stalin gave interviews to British and American newsmen, and held a long discussion with Harold Stassen that spring, in which the key theme was the viability of peaceful coexistence. In September 1946 Stalin declared that the ruling circles of both Britain and the United States were *not* in fact oriented toward war—a view which communists from China to Italy hailed, although it baffled Tito and William Z. Foster. Stalin also told a British Labor delegation headed by Harold Laski that socialism might well come to Britain by parliamentary means, with the monarchy remaining as a genuine institution. Earlier in the year, in a polemic with a certain Professor Razin on the significance of the doctrines of Clausewitz, Stalin is quoted as believing “it is impossible to move forward and advance science without subjecting outdated propositions and the judgments of well-known authorities to critical analysis. This applies . . . also to the classics of Marxism.” Significantly, this exchange was published a full year later—in February 1947—on the eve of cold-war decisions which made such thinking heretical throughout the communist movement.

Yet in 1946 Soviet diplomacy was in fact moving “with all deliberate speed” toward settlements of a partial kind with the West—as regards the peace treaties, the evacuation of northern Persia and other matters. Browder was cordially received in Moscow in May after his expulsion from the American party—a rather unprecedented detail in the annals of communism. The deposed communist leader was heard out by Molotov, at the latter’s request, and was given a post which enabled him to work

energetically for the next two years in behalf of the proposition that Stalin wanted an American-Soviet settlement.

All students of this period have paused on the famous Varga controversy. The title of the book which the foremost Soviet economist, Eugen Varga, published in November 1946 (it was completed the year before) in itself suggests what was bothering Russian leaders, namely: "Changes in the Economy of Capitalism Resulting from the Second World War." Within six months, Varga was under severe attack, which he resisted for the following two years. Major issues lay at the heart of the controversy. When might a crisis of over-production be expected in the United States? How severe would it be? And to what extent would rearmament or a program for rebuilding Western Europe affect capitalism's inherent propensity for crisis, which was, of course, taken for granted. Another question was whether the new role of governmental power, so greatly enhanced by the war, might not have a bearing both on the onset of the crisis and the terrain of communist activities. Varga did forecast an early crisis, after a brief postwar boom. In so doing, he surely misled Stalin into one of his most fundamental cold-war miscalculations. But Varga also clung to the view that something important had changed within classical capitalism; he insisted that "the question of greater or smaller participation in the management of the state will be the main content" of the political struggle in the West, and he deduced that people's democracy was in fact a transitional form between the two systems, replacing the "either-or" notions of classical Leninism. There was a plaintive protest in Varga's answer to his critics (one of whom was Vosnessensky, who would shortly disappear because of mysterious heresies of his own). "It is not a matter of enumerating all the facts so that they inevitably lead to the former conclusions of Marxism-Leninism," Varga argued, "but to use the Marxist-Leninist method in studying these facts. The world changes and the content of our work must change also."

v

In what sense, then, did all these crosscurrents determine Stalin's decision for cold war? It would seem that the matter turned on the incompatibility between immediate Soviet objectives and the real interests of the communist parties—or more exactly, in the particularly Stalinist answer to these incompati-

bilities. The Russians, it will be remembered, had set out to achieve rapid and ambitious reconstruction including, of course, the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They were most concerned with reparations. When it became plain that little help would come by loans or trade with the West (they had used up what was still in the pipelines after the abrupt cessation of lend-lease in mid-1945 and were not getting a response to their \$6 billion request to Washington), they needed either the resources of Germany beyond what they could extract from their own Eastern Zone, or a desperate milking of their friends and former foes in Eastern Europe. At home, moreover, they could not rely on the ultrachauvinist themes which had served them during the war; rejecting liberalization of Soviet society, they tightened the screws and fell back on the doctrine of the primacy of the Soviet party, the purity of its doctrine and the universal validity of that doctrine. Consistent with these objectives, the Soviet leaders wanted to erase all sympathy for America which until then was widespread in the Soviet Union.³

These objectives, taken together, ran counter to all the tendencies among the foreign communist parties. Both the revolutionary ambitions of the Yugoslavs, their jealous quest for autonomy as well as the emphasis on peaceful non-Soviet roads to socialism—that is, the “revisionist” themes so urgently needed by the parties in the West—could be countenanced by Moscow only if it were prepared to accept diversity within international communism. This very diversity (which they had themselves half entertained) now became an obstacle. The Stalinist premise that what was good for Russia was good for all other communists (a notion which he himself considered abandoning) was now reaffirmed.

The origins of the cold war lie deeper, however, than any analysis of Russia's own interest. Nor can they be understood only in terms of an attempt to prevent economic recovery and political stability in Western Europe. The cold war's origins must be found in a dimension larger than the requirements of Soviet internal mobilization or the thrust of its foreign policy; they lie in the attempt to overcome the incipient diversity within a system of states and parties, among whom the changes pro-

³ This task was assigned to the late Ilya Ehrenburg following his 1947 visit to the States, when he deliberately oversimplified everything American with the crudest methods. The pattern for this had been set late in 1946 by Andrei Zhdanov.

duced by the war had outmoded earlier ideological and political premises. The conditions for the transformation of a monolithic movement had matured and ripened. The sources of the cold war lie in communism's unsuccessful attempt to adjust to this reality, followed by its own abortion of this attempt. For Stalin the cold war was a vast tug-of-war with the West, whereby not only internal objectives could be realized but the international movement subordinated; its constituent parts went along—bewildered but believing—on the assumption that in doing so, they would survive and prosper. The price of the Stalinist course was to be fearsome indeed; and by 1956 the Soviet leaders were to admit that the cold war had damaged the U.S.S.R. more than the West, that a stalemate of systems had to be acknowledged, and ineluctable conclusions had to be drawn. Thus, the cold war arose from the failure of a movement to master its inner difficulties and choose its alternatives.

The analysis could be continued to the turning-point of mid-1947—the Marshall Plan decision and Stalin's riposte, for example, in humiliating his Czechoslovak and Polish partners, who thought in terms of what might be good for them, and indirectly for the Soviet Union. Such an analysis would take us through the near-insurrections of late 1947 in France and Italy, adventurist upheavals in Asia, the Berlin blockade and the coup in Prague in 1948. But this involves another subject—how the cold war was fought. It was indeed fought by both sides. But to say this cannot obscure the crisis within communism, where its origins lie. The record would show how recklessly entire communist movements were expended and to what a dangerous brink the Soviet Union itself was brought. In 1956, Khrushchev was to lament these miscalculations but he did so with such a *desinvolture* as to leave a memory-bank of disasters and skeletons that still rattle in communism's closets. Was the cold war but a test of strength between systems? Or has it not also been the process whereby communism disclosed such an intellectual and political bankruptcy that a dozen years after Khrushchev's revelations, the issues still agonize—as in Czechoslovakia—all the states and parties involved? A world movement claiming to comprehend history and accepting the responsibility for “making history” still grapples with the alternatives opened by the Second World War. It has yet to face what it has tried to avoid at such a heavy cost to coexistence—namely, understanding itself.

THE COMMON MARKET AFTER DE GAULLE

By Harold van B. Cleveland

TROUBLE is no stranger in Brussels. From the beginning, the European Economic Community has lived from crisis to crisis. One ought not, therefore, to conclude, simply because the Community is now confronted by rapidly mounting agricultural surpluses and a serious disequilibrium between the French franc and the German mark, that this resourceful institution is in serious trouble. And conversely, one should not assume that President de Gaulle's retirement will put things right.

In recent years the Community's problems have indeed worsened. Basic assumptions previously unquestioned, such as the irreversibility of economic integration, have been overtaken by events. The morale of that formerly optimistic and uniquely creative organization, the Commission, has declined. The "Community spirit" has deteriorated. The "Community method" no longer seems to work. Few qualified observers believe any longer that the ultimate creation of the "single market" or economic union, contemplated by the Rome Treaty, is a reasonably sure thing.

Certainly, de Gaulle's negative attitude toward the Community and toward its underlying aim of political unification contributed to this state of affairs. But the Community has problems more fundamental than de Gaulle. Conflicts of economic interest among the member governments have sharpened, while the Community's ability to compromise differences and get on with economic unification has diminished. In consequence, economic integration in Western Europe may have reached its high-water mark. Increasing difficulties and, possibly, retrogression are likely.

During its first years, the Community enjoyed economic conditions peculiarly favorable to progress toward the goals set by the Rome Treaty. These were years of rapid, uninterrupted economic expansion in Western Europe. The Community's first task under the Treaty was to create a customs union to eliminate tariffs and other barriers to the international flow of industrial products within the Community and to erect a common external tariff. The expansive economic environment meant that the

problem of competitive adjustment to trade liberalization was far less serious than had been anticipated.

A second favorable factor was that the members of the Community all had large overall surpluses in their international payments. This was in the main the result of American military spending in Europe and the massive inflow of U.S. direct investment into the Community (attracted by the opportunity to exploit a six-country, tariff-free market), coupled with relatively low interest rates in the United States and the undervaluation of some European currencies relative to the dollar. With their official reserves of gold and dollars growing rapidly, it did not much matter whether or not the members' payments with each other were in balance.

In its early years, therefore, the Six were able to avoid the thorny problem of monetary integration—the problem of harmonizing domestic economic policies to minimize payments imbalances within the Community. Earlier it had been expected that as trade barriers came down, serious payments problems would arise. Escape clauses were accordingly written into the Treaty, but until the French crisis last year, they were never invoked.

Thus, two major economic obstacles to integration of industrial markets foreseen when the Rome Treaty was signed—protectionism and payments problems—failed to materialize.

Unlike industry, agriculture could not be integrated simply by removing trade barriers. Each of the member governments supported most agricultural prices and restricted imports to the extent necessary to prevent price supports from being undermined. The alternatives were, therefore, either to leave agriculture out of the “single market,” or to unify agricultural markets by creating a common system of price supports with unified target prices, jointly financed by the member governments and buttressed by controls on imports from non-member countries. The Community boldly chose the second course.

Setting common support prices proved to be a thorny problem. The separate support prices in the member countries differed greatly, reflecting gross inequalities in the efficiency of their agricultural sectors. To get agreement on unified prices, it was necessary to set them rather high—well above the average level prevailing in the Community before the common agricultural policy, as it came to be known, was established.

Agreement on the key wheat price, finally achieved in December 1964 in a marathon session of the Council of Ministers, was facilitated by the fact that the Community as a whole was a net importer of the principal agricultural products. Thus, the higher price level could initially be achieved mainly by raising the level of protection against imports from the rest of the world by means of import levies. The levies are so administered as to keep imports from undermining the target prices. If the Community had been initially self-sufficient—worse, if output of major agricultural products had initially exceeded consumption—a larger increase in the members' budgetary outlays for price support would have been required. The problem of sharing the financial burden would have been correspondingly more difficult.

A favorable factor more critical, perhaps, than any of those mentioned was the transformation of France's economic situation, which happily coincided with the coming into effect of the Rome Treaty. During the 1950s, the French economy had made rapid strides in productivity and internal growth, but it had suffered from chronic inflation and serious payments problems. Although the Common Market was primarily a French conception, it appeared at the time the Treaty was signed that France would be unable to participate without extensive resort to escape clauses. The devaluation of the franc in December 1958 and Jacques Rueff's accompanying stabilization measures did just what was needed. Exports surged, the French economy continued to grow satisfactorily despite restrictions on domestic demand, and the franc changed from the weakest currency in Europe to one of the strongest. The structural improvements in French industry in the 1950s began to pay off in a competitive vigor which French industry had hardly known since the nineteenth century. The sudden strengthening of France's balance of payments and competitive position in 1959 made it possible to go wholeheartedly into the Common Market.

II

But the economic conditions which favored European integration in the early and mid-sixties were, in part, temporary. France's competitive position and balance of payments gradually weakened as wages in France rose faster, relative to labor productivity, than wages in Germany and Italy. Germany and Italy have overcome a tendency to inflation and have enjoyed

remarkable price and cost stability in the last two or three years, while wages in France have continued to move up a good deal faster than labor productivity. The resulting disequilibrium within the Common Market reached critical proportions last year, because of massive wage increases in France growing out of the general strike in May–June 1968.

The emergence of this particular payments disequilibrium within the Community unfortunately coincided with a deterioration of the general international payments system. The climate of international monetary ease which helped the Market through its early years has now given way to a “tight” international monetary environment, which magnifies the problems of countries with payments deficits. The result is that the currencies of deficit countries are frequently under speculative pressure. Deficit countries are strongly tempted to resort to exchange controls and even to import controls.

This has happened within the Common Market as well as outside it. Last November, France reimposed comprehensive exchange controls, raised border taxes on imports and even imposed certain temporary import quotas—all of which applied to trade and payments within as well as outside the Market. The belief that trade and payments liberalization within the Community had passed the point of no return (as was frequently asserted in Community circles in the past) was rudely upset.

The Community is now up against the problem of monetary integration. Either the members’ fiscal, monetary and wage policies will somehow have to be harmonized, or exchange rates will have to be readjusted from time to time. Otherwise, freedom of trade and payments within the Community will be subject to periodic abrogation by trade and exchange controls. Of these policy alternatives, only the most difficult—harmonization of domestic economic policies—is consistent with the aim of the Rome Treaty. For an economic union presupposes fixed exchange rates (if not a common currency) and complete freedom of trade and payments on current and capital account.

The common agricultural policy, too, has run into serious difficulty. Not surprisingly, high prices have stimulated agricultural output and led to large surpluses over and above what can be consumed within the Community. The surpluses must either be dumped on external markets at prices far below the support price or allowed to pile up in storage. The financial cost of the

common agricultural policy is skyrocketing. In the 1968-69 fiscal year, the cost of price supports will be \$1.8 billion, of which less than half is provided by the proceeds of levies on agricultural imports. The balance is a direct budgetary outlay. If the target prices are not lowered sharply, the cost of price supports could go as high as \$8-9 billion by 1980, as production increasingly outstrips consumption and surpluses pile up. As output rises, agricultural imports from the rest of the world will decline, so that import levies will make a diminishing contribution.

Under the cost-sharing arrangements, each member makes contributions to, and receives reimbursements from, a common fund. The members' contributions are fixed on a proportional basis, under an agreed formula, while each country is entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses of supporting agricultural prices within its own territory. As a result, some countries are net contributors and others net receivers. Germany, for example, is the largest net contributor and France the largest net beneficiary. Germany's total farm output is a good deal smaller than France's; it therefore costs Germany less than France to support prices. Also, Germany is a much larger importer of agricultural products and accordingly contributes more import levies than France to the common fund. As farm output rises and the total cost of price supports grows, such differences in the balance of costs and benefits under the system raise divisive questions, as is now happening.

Take the case of wheat, for example. Germany is the high-cost producer and France the low-cost producer. To Germans, the question is whether it makes sense to go on making larger and larger net contributions to France in order to help maintain unified wheat prices at a level lower than German farmers want. The German Government is therefore inclined to ask for a ceiling on its contributions. From France's standpoint, the question is whether it makes sense to support wheat prices at a level considerably higher than the French Government would like—and which yields rapidly growing surpluses—unless France can count on a German financial contribution which increases as France's wheat output grows. France therefore takes the position that joint financial responsibility (on the present basis) and unified prices stand or fall together.

In short, with the common prices at their present levels and surpluses growing, the principle of joint financial responsibility

gives rise to serious conflicts of interest among the members. Logically, the way out is to lower the prices sharply. But the governments have been unable to agree even to the modest reductions the Commission has proposed.

III

The conflicts of economic interest among the Six are, then, sharper than they were. But this does not wholly explain why the Community is in trouble. What also needs to be explained is why the Community was able to deal creatively with conflict in its earlier years, while now it seems increasingly unable to do so. The question is essentially political.

It should be recalled that the Community has always been considered by its founders and principal supporters as a *political* enterprise. The building of a customs union and then an economic union was seen more as a means to the end of political union than as an economic measure. The prevailing view in Community circles was that in the process of creating an economic union, a kind of supranational economic government would arise, which (so it was argued) would in time acquire functions in the fields of defense and foreign policy. Whether or not this expectation was realistic, it was powerfully effective in motivating the Community's activities in the early years. The commitment of the six governments to the goal of political union (however remote and ill-defined) made it possible to move ahead rapidly, for a time, with economic integration.

Perhaps the customs union could have been accomplished primarily on its economic merits, but this was not true of the common agricultural policy. The economic benefits of this sort of agricultural integration were too uncertain and the conflicts of interest involved too serious, even at the start, for the policy to stand on its economic merits. Much the same may be said of other provisions of the Rome Treaty which go beyond the customs union, such as tax harmonization, common transport policy and the other provisions whose purpose is to harmonize the "conditions of competition" within the Market. Here, too, the economic benefits are marginal. The motivation and justification for the immense effort spent in trying to carry out these provisions of the Treaty have been political.

A "single market" complete in all these respects was deemed essential—not because the Six could not prosper economically

within a simple customs union, but because it was assumed that the more thoroughly integrated their economies became, the more likely they would be to move on from economic integration to political union. In sum, the Community's progress beyond the customs union toward the goal of economic union has depended critically on a common commitment to—and a sense of movement toward—European political unity. It is therefore not surprising that progress has slowed down and threatens to go into reverse. For the commitment of the Six to the European idea has been greatly weakened.

The European idea, whose aim was to build a powerful grouping of European nations organized supranationally and able to play a major role on the world stage, has lost much of its relevance. As long as the goal remained remote and largely undefined, it served to unify the Six and to provide a political *raison d'être* for economic unification. But as concrete steps were proposed to give it institutional form, divisive questions were raised—about the external purpose, the membership, and the internal political structure of the “Europe” the Six would create. The Six have been divided on whether or not the external orientation should be “European” or “Atlantic”—whether Europe should be unified in order to be independent of the United States, as de Gaulle always insisted, or whether a unified Europe should remain associated with the United States, as Germany and the others desired.

The Six have also been at odds on the question of supranationality. Moreover, their views were internally contradictory. De Gaulle, whose aim was a “European Europe,” ought logically to have favored a tightly organized supranational union, capable of mobilizing the combined economic and technological resources of the members for military purposes. Yet he had nothing but contempt for supranationalism. The members of the Community who gave general support to the idea of a supranational Europe—Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands—rejected the goal of European independence, thereby cutting the ground from under the argument for supranationality. For why trouble to create a European superstate unless full independence and a great-power role are the purpose of unifying?

Indeed, the wholeheartedness of these three governments' support for a supranational Europe has long been doubtful, although this was largely hidden while de Gaulle was there to keep

the question from being seriously raised. The German Government, which earlier gave some general support to the idea of a supranational Europe, has apparently changed its mind. In their increasing preoccupation with their Eastern problem, Germans are now inclined to see a tightly organized Europe as a hindrance to their freedom of manoeuvre in the East.

The idea of political union still hangs in the European air as an attractive vision of power and autonomy. But it has ceased to be a strong moving force in European politics and in the work of the Community. Thus the Community is living largely on momentum. Deprived of its unifying political purpose, its efforts to move further down the road to economic union are frustrated by growing conflicts of economic interest. Indeed, there is a real question whether all the ground won can be held.

This conclusion may seem premature, in view of de Gaulle's resignation and indications that his successor may be more "European." Certainly, it is not easy to judge the relative importance of de Gaulle and the other more objective factors which have blocked European unity. The French President's policies undoubtedly helped bring to consciousness, and make respectable, national interests and attitudes inconsistent with the European idea. Nevertheless, other obstacles would probably have been effective—although the outcome would have differed in detail—even if de Gaulle's opposition had been less.

The disagreements and the divisions which have undermined the European idea have not been simply the product of one man's stubborn will. Rather, they reflect the European nations' objective situation. National states which have found themselves adequate to deal with their economic problems without supranationality are reluctant to contemplate the transfer of their economic power to supranational authorities. Former great powers which have again become used to the exercise of independent diplomatic influence have learned again to prize an independent foreign policy. Countries so long protected by the American nuclear umbrella are reluctant to undertake the costs and accept the risks of reaching for the kind of independence which only political union could provide.

It is, then, unrealistic to assume that the change of government in France will make possible a rebirth of the European idea and such a rekindling of the Community spirit as to give the Common Market a major lift on its way to economic union.

IV

The Community's changed political environment, together with its new economic problems, will affect profoundly the Market's internal development. But all the Community's activities will not be affected equally. Some depend more than others on the political impulse. Those achievements like the customs union which are essentially completed will be affected least. Those like the common agricultural policy which require continual readjustment to changing circumstances, and whose economic value is dubious from the standpoint of some member governments, are likely to run into increasing difficulty and to be greatly modified.

The twin principles on which the common agricultural policy rests—unified prices and joint financial responsibility—are increasingly incompatible, because the high prices lead to growing surpluses which make the problem of cost-sharing politically unmanageable. In theory, there are several ways of preserving the present system.

First, the common prices could be cut drastically. The rest of the world would applaud, but the large differences in production costs within the Community make this solution improbable.

Second, lower common prices might be rendered more acceptable to the high-cost countries if direct income subsidies were paid to less efficient farmers in lieu of higher prices. For example, the common wheat price might be reduced to the level of wheat prices prevailing in France before the common price was set, and German wheat farmers might be paid a subsidy out of the common fund to make up their loss of income. As a permanent arrangement, this expedient would raise major political difficulties. European governments and agricultural organizations have traditionally preferred price supports to subsidies. Moreover, it would make the common prices somewhat fictitious. It would raise the fundamental question whether or not Germany (in our example) might not prefer a system of national wheat price supports. *For what economic purpose is served by maintaining unified wheat support prices, unless those prices are the effective determinants of farmers' incomes and economic decisions?*

Production controls are a third possibility for saving the common agricultural policy. But, except in the case of sugar, produc-

tion controls have traditionally been opposed by European governments and farm organizations.

Reflections such as these led the Commission to propose in January 1969 a far-reaching program for restructuring European agriculture. The Mansholt Plan, as it is known, calls for accelerating the outflow of labor from agriculture and greatly increasing the efficiency of farm units. The aim is to lay the groundwork for reducing prices and surpluses while at the same time raising farmers' living standards. But the plan, which calls for joint financing, would cost many billions of dollars. It would be years before the plan would make it possible to lower prices and reduce surpluses. For several years at least, its cost would be on top of the cost of price supports. It would also disturb European farmers' traditional ways. The Mansholt Plan, in sum, is a radical attempt to preserve the "single market" in agriculture, but at a political and financial cost which seems to be far in excess of what the governments will be willing to pay.

Finally, changes in exchange rates, which are probable from time to time within the Community, will put further strains on the fabric of agricultural integration. When the main outlines of the common agricultural policy were laid down in the Community's early years, it was tacitly assumed that after the common prices had been set, the relative value of the members' currencies would remain fixed indefinitely. The common prices were accordingly expressed in terms of a common unit of account whose value in terms of the members' currencies was fixed. The effect was to place a considerable obstacle in the way of exchange-rate adjustments. This was thought at the time to be advantageous, since it underlined the need for monetary integration.

If now the German mark is upvalued (as seems probable soon), the German Government will probably have to pay a subsidy to German wheat farmers to compensate them for the reduction in the prices they receive (expressed in marks). Similarly, if the French franc is devalued, the common wheat price expressed in francs will rise. The French Government, to prevent a further unwanted stimulus to production, may therefore have to tax away the farmers' windfall gain from devaluation. Thus changes in exchange rates within the Community will tend to make the common prices increasingly fictitious.

The ultimate outcome is likely to be modification or outright abandonment of unified agricultural prices and joint financial

responsibility, and a return to separate national systems of support. Agricultural coöperation among the Six, including preferential access to each others' markets, is likely to continue, however—over the objections, no doubt, of competing suppliers such as the United States. It would not be surprising to see the Community's present system give way to a system like that which preceded the unification of prices. In that period, the members had different target prices. Price supports were financed nationally and buttressed by national import levies which applied to imports from other members as well as from the rest of the world. The levies were so administered as to give the members a margin of preference over outside suppliers in each others' markets.

As for monetary integration in the Community, the desirability is obvious but the will is not likely to be sufficient. The members of the Community are anxious to maintain stable exchange rates and to avoid trade and exchange controls within the Community. Their mutual dependence in trade and financial terms is so great that the incentive to avoid the disturbing effects of controls and changes in parities is strong. Yet this common economic interest is not likely to be sufficient to make possible an effective procedure for coördinating domestic economic policies. That would presuppose a common will to subordinate vital domestic economic objectives (full employment, industrial peace, price stability) to the Community's larger interests to a degree unlikely in the absence of an overriding political objective.

Still, consultation on domestic economic policies, exchange rates and balance-of-payments problems is likely to grow within the Community. It is probable, too, that the member governments and central banks will develop new means of mutual financial accommodation in exchange crises, although doubtless far short of a pooling of reserves. Thus, the Commission's proposals along this line, put forward last year, may in time be implemented in some form. Given the general shortage of international liquidity, measures of this kind are likely to be accepted and even welcomed by the larger international community.

v

As the Community loses its political momentum and changes internally, its external relations will also change. For example, the question of British membership will assume a different aspect.

A plausible argument can be made that General de Gaulle's retirement, in combination with prospective changes in the Community, make British membership more likely. In its present form, the common agricultural policy is a formidable obstacle to British membership. It would involve large additional foreign-exchange costs for Britain, which sterling could hardly bear. Britain would have to replace a large part of its food imports from North America and Oceania with higher-priced food from the European continent. Also, Britain would be a large net contributor to the common agricultural fund—a further burden on the British balance of payments.

The changes foreseen in the common agricultural policy would lessen these obstacles. A simple agreement to give French wheat, Dutch butter and Italian fruits and vegetables some degree of preferential access to the British market, in exchange for British membership in the customs union, would be much easier for Britain to swallow than the present system. Indeed, the prospective internal changes in the Community suggest that the problem of British participation might be dealt with in a much simpler way. EFTA and the Community might be linked in a free-trade area limited to industrial products. The continental countries would no doubt ask as a quid pro quo agricultural preferences in the British market.

Britain, it will be recalled, proposed an industrial free-trade area to the Six in 1956, while the formation of the Community was under consideration. At that time, the British Government was unwilling to consider full membership. The proposal was resisted on the Continent, not only by de Gaulle but also by the Commission and the "Europeans," because they saw it as a danger to the Community's political aim. More recently Britain, too, has been unwilling to consider anything but full membership, on the ground that anything less would imply a second-class status in the political Europe which was expected to follow. But if political union is no longer a real objective—if the Community becomes in time little more than an industrial customs union—these Continental and British objections may disappear.

Yet the elimination of certain obstacles, not least the General's personal veto, does not guarantee Britain's entry. That depends on whether British participation has sufficient positive support on both sides of the Channel—which is doubtful.

Both in Britain and on the Continent, much of the original support for British membership was political. Britain hoped to play a major role in the political entity that seemed to be forming. Those on the Continent who favored British membership did so because they believed that without Britain, Europe would be too small to play a world role or because Britain's presence was desired as a counterweight to Germany and France and to insure Europe's democratic character.

But if the prospect of political union has faded, these considerations, too, have lost much of their relevance. On the Continent, strong official support for British membership is largely confined to the Dutch, with some assistance from the Belgian and Italian Governments. But this support seems to be mainly a reflection of anxieties raised by Germany's strength, now increased by de Gaulle's departure and France's economic troubles. As such, it can hardly provide common ground between Germany and the other members to welcome Britain in. France's positive political interest in British membership is also hard to see, if the Community is now becoming essentially an economic enterprise.

The economic interest of the Six in British membership is also somewhat doubtful. France, with its balance of payments weakened and its competitive position impaired, is hardly interested in intensified British competition. The persistent weakness of sterling makes Britain a less attractive candidate, since membership raises a presumption, under the Rome Treaty, of mutual financial responsibility.

On Britain's side, too, with sterling's problems at the top of Whitehall's agenda, economic considerations seem likely to weigh against rather than for immediate participation. No doubt British industry would benefit substantially in the longer run from secure access to continental markets and from more competition at home. But with sterling weak, joining a tariff-free market of this size would probably aggravate, for a time at least, the balance-of-payments problem. A government whose monetary reserves are completely mortgaged and which lives perforce from one set of monthly trade figures to the next may have neither the energy nor the heart to take important financial risks for the sake of longer-term gains.

Furthermore, American policy on the question of British membership in the Common Market is also likely to change. As long as the EEC was seen in Washington as the growing point

of a European political union, the United States lent strong support to British membership. Three Administrations consistently supported British participation on the ground that it was essential to create the kind of European political entity with which the United States could live comfortably. Americans, like many Britons, considered British participation essential to balance Germany and France, to strengthen democratic institutions on the Continent and to help keep Europe "Atlantic" and "outward-looking."

But if there is to be no political union in Europe, this reasoning loses much of its relevance, and the question of British entry becomes for the United States primarily an economic problem. With our competitive position in world markets weakened and our trade balance in trouble, it would be surprising if the United States failed to raise objections to the inclusion of Britain in a preferential trading system which excluded the United States, especially with preferences for agricultural products involved. Given Britain's growing financial dependence on the United States, Washington's objections would probably weigh heavily in London.

Thus, in the matter of British membership as in the Common Market's own development, the weakening of the political *raison d'être*, along with changes in the economic scene, have altered prospects fundamentally. From this perspective, the lifting of de Gaulle's veto on political unification and British membership seems almost incidental.

The prognosis for the Common Market sketched here may seem unduly pessimistic to those who still see the Community as the first step toward a new political order in Europe. Yet if one can divorce one's thinking from this hope, which once fired the imagination of so many Americans and Europeans, and see the Community as it is today and as it seems likely to be tomorrow, the outlook is not entirely discouraging. Europe has prospered economically and its trade has expanded enormously as never before, although the Community has not developed much beyond a customs union. Europe has remained secure and democratic without political union. Problems there are aplenty, but is it unreasonable to hope that these blessings can continue, despite the troubles of the Common Market?

TOWARD A NEW BALANCE IN ASIA

AN AUSTRALIAN VIEW

By Bruce Grant

AUSTRALIA'S decision to keep forces in Malaysia and Singapore after Britain leaves in 1971 was taken in an election year, after the most searching public debate on defense and foreign policy in Australia's history and after a substantial official review. It represents, therefore, one country's practical assessment of Southeast Asia "after Viet Nam." In this sense, the decision may have significance outside Australia, for the light it throws on the development of Australian thinking, for the contribution it is intended to make to the security of the immediate subregional neighborhood and for the assumptions it appears to make about the broader question of stability in Asia, especially the role of the United States.

The reason for the public debate on defense was not only the imminent loss of the British connection in Southeast Asia, a symbolic moment which had been anticipated by Australian strategists and thinkers, if not by many Australian politicians. There was also uncertainty over the outcome in Viet Nam and American reaction to that outcome—a general suspicion that, just as the old policy covering relations with Britain had run out, so had the old policy covering relations with the United States. For the crude but central core of this Australian policy was to keep the United States engaged in Asia, especially Southeast Asia, at all costs, even if it meant military engagement—which the more ardent Australian supporters of the alliance with the United States in any case favored. This view was clearly put by Mr. B. A. Santamaria, a Catholic publicist, in an address to the National Press Club in Canberra on July 27, 1964. The alliance with the United States, he said, "should be regarded as so fundamental to Australian security that no Australian Government would ever equivocate about the alliance or the obligations which flow from it. Furthermore, it should be an incontrovertible end of Australian policy to do everything practical to keep the Americans actually engaged in Southeast Asia. Operations in hand are a better alternative than promises for the future." This kind of thinking about relations with America had been contested in

Australia, especially but not solely on the political Left. It was not contested until recently, however, by the governing Liberal-Country Party coalition which has been in power since 1949.

The Viet Nam conflict has made an increasing number of Australians aware that in trying to keep America militarily involved in Southeast Asia, they may contribute to the opposite result, unless the commitments are more carefully related to U.S. resources—moral and psychological as well as material. Although the late Mr. Harold Holt easily won the election of 1966 on a policy of military commitment in Viet Nam, stressing “loyalty” to the alliance with the United States, the Viet Nam war has become a doubtful electoral asset. After Mr. Johnson’s March 31 speech last year, the Opposition (the Australian Labor Party), which had long advocated a halt to the bombing of the North and talks with Hanoi, could claim that its policy was basically in harmony with Washington’s.

So the review of Australia’s defense policy was undertaken against a background of uncertainty about the continued presence in Southeast Asia of Britain and America, which a former Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, liked to call “our great and powerful friends.” Australians were reminded of their dependence on these two nations, especially the United States, not only for ultimate territorial protection, but also for the defense policies which Australia had pursued in Southeast Asia since the end of World War II and which had coalesced into what was known as a posture of “forward defense.” The objective of forward defense, although expressed in a variety of ways including collective security, was to keep conflict as far as possible from Australia. To this end Australia has been prepared since 1950 to commit forces to Malaysia, Thailand and Viet Nam, not to mention the U.N. Mandate of Papua-New Guinea. But it could not maintain this forward defense with its own military resources; each commitment was predicated on the prior commitment of either or both Britain and America. Now one prop was about to be removed and the other seemed to be loosening. The thought crossed many Australian minds that in these circumstances the best solution would be to abandon forward defense and withdraw Australian forces to the mainland.

Isolationism, which had had its most eloquent and humanitarian tradition in the Labor Party, now found a following among those who had supported the Viet Nam intervention and

who felt that the first of the Southeast Asian dominoes was about to fall. Their prescription was to pull up the drawbridge and man the battlements, preferably with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, many who had opposed the Viet Nam commitment argued that its lesson was not no more commitments but no more Viet Nams. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. E. G. Whitlam, put himself on the side of involvement in Asia with the pronouncement that "an isolationist Australia would be rich, selfish, greedy, racist and reactionary. Beyond doubt we would be supporting this sort of society with the nuclear bomb." In addition, a new and relatively unknown Prime Minister, John Gorton, came to power, proclaiming that the premises of Australian policies in Southeast Asia had to be reëxamined and presenting publicly a more critical and pessimistic mind than his predecessors. The debate thus opened up the full range of Australian hopes and fears about Asia.

It showed that despite uncertainty about great and powerful friends, Australians overwhelmingly favored retaining their obligations in Southeast Asia, including military commitments. No doubt there were many reasons for this: the fact that withdrawing the forces already in Malaysia would have been a more conclusive act than leaving them there; the hope that an Australian readiness to remain in Southeast Asia would strengthen Washington's resolve to do the same; the knowledge that significant Asian nations, such as India and Indonesia, were not opposed to an Australian presence. But a strong emotional element was the feeling that, if Australia was to function as a nation and not as an Anglo-American dependency, it must be prepared to stand on its own feet in Southeast Asia. Australians had come to realize that unlike Britons and Americans, they really had no choice between remaining in the region or withdrawing. In making the announcement of the post-1971 commitment, Mr. Gorton said: "Our own starting point was and is that we are part of and situated in the region." Labor showed its appreciation by contesting the form of the commitment but not the principle of regional responsibility.

The significance of the debate and the decision can be overstated.¹ The debate was muted and complicated by uncertainty

¹ The Australian forces will consist of two squadrons of Mirages, totaling 42 aircraft, 1200 ground troops and one fighting ship. It is a token force which might need to be supported from the Australian mainland or, as the Prime Minister publicly said, from "allies outside the region." (The Labor Party favored a commitment only of air squadrons.)

and self-serving prophecy on the Viet Nam issue. The decision was delayed to a point of hesitancy and the impression remains that Mr. Gorton was persuaded, rather than persuasive, in reaching it. The fact remains that a commitment has been made by Australia in Southeast Asia, not as a complement to a commitment by a major foreign power but as a substitute for it, that the obligation can be met only by maintaining national service and that the decision, pending the result of the election which must be held by November this year, appears to have the approval of the vast majority of the Australian people.

Walter Lippmann's proposal, published early in the debate, for a withdrawal of American bases to Australia and New Zealand presumably appealed to isolationists in the conservative ranks, but on this occasion, I found myself among those who opposed Mr. Lippmann, on the ground that his proposal would turn Australia into a vast American base and would render it politically impotent in Asia. Since Mr. Nixon became President, it is reported that the Lippmann proposal has acquired a new respectability.

II

The assumptions about the region on which the Australian Government based its decision are also interesting. The recommendations of the official review have not been disclosed, but it can be inferred from a range of evidence that the viewpoint before the Australian Cabinet was that Southeast Asia was a region of opportunity and potential for Australia rather than a place of threats and dangers. A more optimistic and complex picture was sketched for the policy-makers than was possible twenty years ago when Australia's forward-defense strategy began to be formulated. Then—and this was reflected in Australian agitation for the ANZUS (1951) and SEATO (1954) treaties—the situation in Asia fitted naturally into Australian folklore, which judged the island continent to be threatened by unspecified "Asiatic hordes," who were hostile toward and envious of Australia with its small population, long coastline and high living standard. Japan had just shown its colors; the cold-war structure of power was established; China had become a communist state, joining the Soviet Union in a global threat to that part of the world which Australians had always seen as the center of civilization. This civilized world had retreated from Asia as the

European colonialists were ejected; India had become a republic and neutralist, Indonesia was nationalist and troublesome. In those circumstances, Australia's regional environment was reasonably assessed to be hostile. Although it was a Liberal-Country Party alliance (Australia's conservative parties) which evolved the policy of "great and powerful friends," a Labor government would almost certainly have done the same. Australia's interests in this strange and unpredictable environment were obviously served by alliances with Britain and America. For many Australians in the post-World War II period, the double dependence was like that of a child on its parents—with Britain as the forgiving and understanding mother, the United States as the demanding and authoritative father. Thus forward defense was undertaken in Asia in the process of growing up, of emulation.

Without this adolescence, and as a white enclave in Asia, Australia would probably have reacted to the rise of nationalism and communism in Asia by retreating as South Africa did. Instead, Australia became involved in Asia at all levels, and although the engagement often seemed peripheral and proxy, the experience was a most significant factor in developing the assurance necessary to make the post-1971 decision. Asians were no longer undifferentiated "hordes," but nations, peoples and leaders with whom Australians had become familiar.

Also before the Government were some of the facts of development and growth in Asia of which Mr. Nixon made so much in his now celebrated article in *Foreign Affairs* (October 1967). Indonesia's change of course, the slow awakening of an Indian national interest in Southeast Asia, Japan's economic strength increasingly demanding political responsibility, the economic growth of Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand—all these lent credence to the view that in making what was virtually a new commitment, Australia was not plunging into a morass of alternating stagnation and revolution.

On the whole, however, Canberra was—and remains—cautious and even skeptical about the ability of Asian nations to achieve collective security as recommended by Mr. Nixon. The decision about Malaysia and Singapore was a practical response to circumstances brought about by the British Government's determination to step up the pace of its withdrawal, completing it by 1971 instead of 1975. It was hardly an intellectual conversion to "regionalism." It is true that it establishes the nucleus of a

regional security arrangement. Whatever Britain does, four nations—Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand and Australia, all former British possessions—will collaborate on defensive measures for Malaysia and Singapore. In addition, it carries regional political responsibilities, for clearly the success of this essentially Commonwealth arrangement will depend on the attitude of neighbors, especially Indonesia and the Philippines. But it is seen from Canberra as a very small piece in the jigsaw of South-east Asian stability, not to mention an Asian security system. Mr. Gorton expressly excluded the arrangement from a general strategic assessment of future SEATO and ANZUS obligations. He did not attempt to tie it in with the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) or the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), although Australia, Malaysia and New Zealand are members of the first, and Malaysia and Singapore are members of the second.

My impression is that while many foreign policy professionals see regionalism as an opportunity for an Australian role in Asia and the Labor Party particularly sees it as a release from excessive dependence on the United States, the present Government, probably supported by most Australians, would prefer that the United States maintain military power in Asia in direct contact with the border areas of Communist China. What is sometimes now called the Nixon-Kissinger strategy, which it is believed would interpose a collectivity of Asian states as a buffer between China and the United States, is not popular with Australian conservatives.

The arguments against it are principally two. The first is that the Asian states are not within hailing distance of a comprehensive and coherent regional security system. ASPAC is entirely dependent on Japan's intentions and Japan is not yet ready to move. Japan seems to be torn between a unique model of pacifist neutrality and a role as an independent great power which would enable it to enter the balance with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China. In addition, its emergence in Asia under a regional umbrella revives memories of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. For both these internal and external reasons, Japan's progress toward accepting a regional identity is judged likely to be slow. India has neither the economic nor the military capacity, and as yet has not expressed the desire, to undertake a security role outside its borders. Indonesia has shown a tenta-

tive interest, but its first priority is economic revival. It is at present the largest nation in ASEAN and would probably resist attempts to enlarge that organization or link it with another association, for this would reduce Indonesian influence.

In short, the three largest nations of non-communist Asia show varying degrees of unreadiness to assume regional security commitments on a sufficient scale. Without them the buffer zone would be little more than a strategic tripwire for American intervention, little change from what SEATO already provides. If the intention of the buffer is to avoid another Viet Nam, where the United States would be forced to honor obligations to a small client-state rather than to collective security, the regional system must include the major Asian states.

The second objection is that, as a global power, the United States cannot, or should not, retreat to what Zbigniew Brzezinski has called an "apocalyptic nuclear" position. It is said on behalf of the strategy of a regional buffer that it would reduce the danger of the United States, a nuclear power, becoming involved militarily in low-grade counterinsurgency wars which could escalate into conventional and perhaps nuclear conflict. But on the other hand, if the United States were invited to intervene after a conflict had gotten beyond the control of the local nations, it might have to intervene close to the threshold of war, whereas its earlier entry could have prevented an escalation to this point. In fact, its capacity to act preventively would be lessened. Once its threatened involvement had manifestly failed to deter, its entry would signal a determination which was not related to regional objectives but to the objectives of a nuclear power. In other words, the United States would be loath to act, and any action it undertook would imply the possibility of an unlimited war. Critics see the buffer-strategy, therefore, as a form of U.S. isolationism.

For these reasons, Asian regionalism is seen at present in Canberra as a profusion of bilateral and multilateral arrangements which are encouraging constructive and creative thinking about self-reliance but should not be forced to take on the burden of collective defense or try to replace American power. But the question may be asked, of course, whether this is merely an argument for the status quo, which fails to take account of the lessons of Viet Nam. Australian Government leaders place great hopes on American policy in Asia remaining unchanged; little thought seems to be given to the advantages of a change. The curious and

interesting prospect has arisen in Australian politics that a Labor government would be more inclined to encourage Washington to adjust its accumulated commitments in Asia, at a time when such encouragement might be most welcome in Washington.

III

The crux of the problem is China. The history of the containment of China by an anti-communist military strategy in Asia is well known. This strategy has been the political centerpiece of Australia's foreign policy in Asia for nearly twenty years, although the embroidery has included some intricate pettipoint on good relations with neutral nations like Indonesia and Cambodia. It has been an election winner and despite its fading appeal—not only because of Viet Nam and the Second Vatican Council, but also because Australia conducts a substantial trade with China—it is hard to discard.

Yet it must be discarded, in both Canberra and Washington, if the search for an equilibrium of power in Asia is to be fruitful. There is at present in Asia no combination of nations prepared to relieve the United States of the policeman's role, if that means enforcing order on China's non-Russian borders. If the United States wishes to be relieved of this role, it can follow one of two courses. It can retreat to a new strategic frontier, while proclaiming its old objectives, or it can remain and redefine its objectives.

The first course contains obvious dangers. How can the old policy be made to seem credible from a new strategic frontier, which would probably no longer be drawn through Thailand? A misreading would be invited, as Mr. Acheson's 1950 "defense perimeter" excluding Korea was misread. A more fundamental objection is that, as a global power, the United States cannot set arbitrary limits to its responsibilities in Asia. In fact, it can be argued that for a global power the notion of commitments extending protection to one country and not to another is unreal. The United States does not need a treaty relationship with a particular state to respond to its calls for help, and the existence of a treaty relationship with another will not guarantee that protection. It is hard to believe, for example, that the United States has any less interest in the independence of India than it has in the independence of Thailand.

The advantage in the second course—remaining but redefining objectives—is that it gives priority to a political initiative

which can be undertaken without an immediate change in the disposition of American military forces in Asia. Military pacts are easier to run down than to disband and although it is true that SEATO is little more now than the institution of an American commitment in Southeast Asia, some of its members will be keen to retain it for precisely that reason. But SEATO as a reassurance that the United States will not withdraw from Southeast Asia and SEATO as the instrument of a policy to contain and isolate China are different things. The real question has never been whether China should be permitted to regard Asia as its "sphere of influence." India, Japan and several other Asian states, not to mention the U.S.S.R., have long answered that question in the negative. The question is rather whether military containment based on American power is more effective than a neutral, independent Asia would be in controlling China. Once the policy has shifted from containment to a diplomatic and political balancing of China, the regional tissues formed in the last few years should develop some muscle.

Unless I am mistaken, a neutral Southeast Asia has been an American objective since President Kennedy. At the height of the Viet Nam war it was affirmed by officials of the Johnson Administration, such as Robert McNamara and William Bundy. In retrospect, it is notable how little anti-communist propaganda was used by Mr. Johnson and his officials to justify the Viet Nam intervention. The impression remains of a reasonable, if bewildered, government, hoping for a signal of reasonableness from the other side. It is perhaps too early to be sure how Mr. Nixon will undertake what is the central task of a leader in a democracy: creating understanding and eliciting public support for the nation's pursuit of its interests and responsibilities. But the need for a settlement in Viet Nam, and Washington's complex relations with Moscow and Peking, make anti-communism an improbable rationale, even for a conservative government in Washington.

In Australian politics, a small but strategically placed anti-communist constituency makes the task of adjusting to new objectives in Asia difficult for the present Government. The heavily Catholic and strongly anti-communist Democratic Labor Party has become an influential minority party since it split from the Labor Party in 1955. Under Australia's preferential voting system, a voter's second choice can be more important

than his first if his own candidate has only a small following, and the DLP has consistently told its supporters to give their second-preference vote to the Government parties. In other words, the DLP has effectively kept the Labor Party out of office, on the grounds that it is under leftist influence and if it came to power would endanger the "American alliance" by recognizing Peking, declaring Southeast Asia a neutral and nuclear-free zone, demanding control over American strategic installations in Australia and generally taking a "soft" line on ideological issues in foreign policy. The question is being increasingly asked in Australia whether the price the DLP demands and can exact from Liberal governments for "loyalty" to the alliance is not too high for the nation's self-respect. The DLP has now set its sights on self-reliance for Australian defense, including a nuclear capacity. Experts have estimated that the DLP program would raise Australian defense spending from the present figure of 5 percent of gross national product to between 7 and 10 percent.

Mr. Gorton has not responded to the DLP's call to arms and is being threatened with a withholding of preferences in selected electorates this year, which would return him to office with a painfully reduced majority. Whether the DLP can manage such a demonstration of its power over the Government parties without letting the Labor Opposition in has yet to be shown. While the DLP has this reserve power, however, Government spokesmen are going to be cautious about unnecessarily antagonizing it. The Government is at present caught between the obvious need for new security policies in Asia and the need not to disturb the conventional wisdom on Asia.

The Malaysia-Singapore commitment assumes additional importance against this uncertain political background. It represents the closest to a foreign policy consensus that can be expected. It does not prevent Australia from pursuing close relations with Japan, India and Indonesia, the necessary pillars of an independent, neutral Asia. At the same time it maintains the essentials of forward defense and political anti-communism. It can develop toward regionalism—or it can manifest the ANZUS treaty in action in Southeast Asia. The commitment is an unmistakable statement, which no future Australian Government will be able to ignore, of Australia's determination to play a role in Southeast Asia. Whether this role will be written in Canberra, Washington, Tokyo or Peking, no one here can be sure.

THE EAST REACHES FOR MARKETS

By Marshall I. Goldman

HERETOFORE, Western observers of economic reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have concentrated almost exclusively on internal changes. Most of us have been fascinated by the provocative debate and by the subsequent decision of the East European governments to emphasize such concepts as profit, interest, rent and managerial autonomy and to deēmhase centralized planning. This concentration on internal economic reforms has tended to divert attention from the equally significant changes that the East Europeans have introduced into their international economic structure.

The lack of discussion in the West about the reforms in Eastern Europe's foreign trade may be attributed to several factors. First, there has been no counterpart to the wide-ranging Liberman-type debates over internal reforms which would have drawn Western attention to the changes in the external economic activities of the communist countries. Second, because foreign trade has always entailed interaction with large numbers of non-communist traders, it has generally been assumed that some adaptation of non-communist methods was only to be expected.

Recently, however, the East Europeans have gone beyond mere adaptation. Apparently without debate or momentous pronouncements by senior officials, fundamental changes have been made in the way the East Europeans have been doing business with the West. To some extent the need for rationalization in the foreign trade sector has been necessitated by the desire to implement internal economic reforms. The East Europeans have come to recognize that they will need foreign machinery and technology to bring their productive efficiency up to world standards. For this they need foreign exchange. But the East Europeans have moved beyond the simple idea that exports are needed only to finance imports. They have also come to realize that they have forfeited valuable profit-making situations to capitalist businessmen.

Initially the communist leaders may have assumed that their rejection of autarchy and pursuit of trading sophistication would not entail major structural reforms in trade institutions and policies. But in what appears to be a counterpart of the domestic

reform movement, many of the external changes constitute a radical departure from past practices. Whether the innovations were first introduced by the communists or by Western traders, it is fair to say that the external economic innovations that are taking place in the foreign trade practices of the communist countries are as significant as the internal economic changes.

II

Traditionally, trade among members of COMECON (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) has been bilateral and on a barter basis. Fostered by the Russians, barter has also been the prime method of conducting trade between Eastern Europe and the developing countries and even with several developed countries. Moving beyond simple barter, in which one batch of goods is offered in exchange for another, prices are attached to the goods being exchanged so that bilateral clearing arrangements can be created. In this way each side can trade a more varied collection of goods, with the provision that each side should try to purchase approximately the same amount so that by the year's end neither will owe anything to the other. In principle, this should assure a balance, but in fact there are often imbalances when one side is unable to find anything worth buying.

Despite the superficial simplicity of bilateral trade, the members of COMECON have had severe criticisms of the system. The non-Russian members have bitterly complained about the unsuitability of the goods they have received in exchange, the uncompetitive prices they have had to pay and the unspendable credits they have accumulated which they have had no way of utilizing. Over the years, this has become the source of considerable friction. Many countries have felt they were not obtaining a full measure of value for the products they were producing and selling, especially in their trade with the U.S.S.R. For example, among the Czech grievances during their abortive renaissance of 1968 was the complaint that they had accumulated claims against the Soviets of about 10 billion crowns, or \$1.4 billion, which they could find no satisfactory way to spend.

Even the Russians have come to have misgivings about bilateral trade and barter. In the years 1958-65, the Soviet Government accumulated from barter deals a surplus equivalent to \$891 million, which they could not spend. Because of such problems Russian critics have acknowledged that after a point bi-

lateral clearing, instead of causing an expansion, may lead to a curtailment of trade. There is likely to be a holding back when one of the partners decides to demand the settlement of unbalanced clearing accounts in gold or hard currency or when a debtor seeks an extension of his debt which in effect then becomes a form of "technical credit."

Even though members of COMECON and the developing countries have become increasingly reluctant to involve themselves in bilateral and trilateral clearing arrangements, Western businessmen have sometimes not been so hesitant. Many of them take a chance in order to make a good though risky profit through such transactions. Consequently it has not been only the East Europeans and developing nations that have found themselves with claims that could not be utilized. Increasingly, various Western businessmen have found that they were being pressured to take either specific East European goods or soft-currency credits as part payment for their sales. These credits had been received in payment by the governments of Eastern Europe in exchange for sales made to the developing countries or other communist countries. In their eagerness to sell to the communist countries, Western firms have sometimes agreed to accept such payment in kind or in soft currencies because they thought they could resell these goods or credits at a discount in Western markets for hard currency. To compensate for the discount, Western firms generally have tried to mark up the prices of their own products, hoping in this way to provide themselves with a margin of safety. Occasionally even this has not been enough protection. One of the reasons why Krupp hovered on the verge of bankruptcy was that it had overextended itself in Eastern Europe and could not convert its repayments into hard currency at high enough prices.

The fact that different state trading organizations in Eastern Europe and private organizations in Western Europe often had claims on goods that they had no particular use for created an opportunity for alert businessmen and arbitragers. Clearly there was a need for someone who was willing to *swap* these goods and currencies for goods and currencies that might be more useful. Technically this is called "switching" and has become a multi-million dollar operation. Depending on the goods and countries involved, switching can be a complicated process. For example, a new accounting unit has come into existence as a part of the

switching process. It is called the "clearing dollar." The clearing dollar is not convertible and is really just a transferable claim on goods in a particular country. (In a sense it is only appropriate that COMECON should be associated with this latest variation of the dollar since it was the Russians who helped give birth to the Eurodollar.) A typical switch transaction, as described in *Business Europe* (December 14, 1966), works as follows:

A Belgian company offered to sell compressors to an agency of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Trade. In exchange, it was presented payment in clearing dollars drawn on Morocco. The Belgian firm then went to a "switch dealer" who offered the Belgians 90 hard dollars for 100 clearing dollars. The switch dealer knew of a fish importer in Hamburg who wanted to buy Moroccan sardines and was delighted to be able to buy 100 clearing dollars good in Morocco at the bargain price of 91 hard dollars, which included one dollar for commission. As a result of this switch operation, the Hamburg importer was able to buy his sardines at a lower price, the Belgian obtained his hard dollars, and the switch dealer received a commission. However, the Belgian exporter obviously had to be careful and sell his compressors to Hungary at a price that was about 10 percent higher than he normally would charge when payment was in hard currency. Even with higher prices this system facilitates the flow of trade, especially if bilateral clearing is the only other alternative.

Most of the COMECON countries encourage switching because, among other things, it permits them to convert their soft currency claims on the developing countries into hard currency. The developing countries, however, frequently complain when the communist countries resell their produce in Western markets for hard currency. The communist country ends up in a better trading position than the original producer. But the game can be played for profit by the developing countries as well. There are reports that countries like India have also started to convert their clearing dollars redeemable in Eastern Europe into hard dollars and Western goods instead of communist goods.

Those with long memories may recall that barter and switching were also important in Western Europe in the years immediately following World War II. The currency situation then was similar to that in Eastern Europe today. Barter, bilateral trade and switching are natural by-products when currencies are not convertible and countries want to engage in and expand their

foreign trade. Switching is a logical prelude to convertibility as in fact it turned out to be in Western Europe. Accepting a discount in the exchange rate of an East European currency is equivalent to a *de facto* devaluation.

As might be expected, because switching is such a complex operation, it is not a game for dabblers. On occasion, one member of COMECON may even end up competing against another member. For instance, one Boston chemical exporter reports that several times he has found himself buying chemicals from the Soviet Union and then reselling them directly to East Germany. Obviously Soviet trading agencies could have done this by themselves. Then why did the Russians permit an American to come in when they knew their goods were being bought and sent directly to their communist allies? As explained by the American exporter, once the Russians had met the terms of their bilateral trade agreement with East Germany for the delivery of chemical products, they still had some left over. If at all possible they wanted to sell these chemicals for hard currency. Although members of COMECON use only soft currency in their trade with one another, the American exporter knew that the East Germans were willing to pay hard currency because they were in urgent need of more of the chemical. Thus the American was able to sell to a communist country for dollars what he had bought from a communist country with dollars. Marxist purists would probably frown at the unorthodox nature of such transactions. But to the increasingly pragmatic traders in the Soviet Union, the important question is: Were the goods sold and did the Russians make a profit in dollars in the process?

There are other equally unexpected twists in the negotiations that take place between businessmen in the West and government officials in the East. For example, the Intercontinental Hotel Corporation wanted to build and operate a modern tourist hotel in Budapest. After considerable difficulty, Tower International, an American commission firm, entered the negotiations and managed to obtain an agreement from the Hungarian Planning Commission that the hotel would be included in the early years of the current five-year plan. There was one condition: the hotel construction would have to be financed with hard currency. With the commitment from the Planning Commission, Tower International then went to the Foreign Trade Bank of Hungary, which agreed that if the hotel were built, minimum yearly re-

payments in hard currency would be turned over to the builders. Armed with the Hungarian bank's guarantee, the American firm then was able to approach foreign bankers about the financing. And where did they turn? They went to the Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd., in London, a Soviet-owned bank. There they had no trouble in obtaining a \$6 million credit in hard dollars.

III

Financing an American firm so that it can build a hotel in Budapest is one of the more spectacular illustrations of the increasing sophistication of the communist countries in international trade and finance. This responsiveness is especially apparent in the increasingly close working relationships that are being established between communist and capitalist enterprises. Although it would have been unthinkable a decade ago, communist countries are encouraging mutual producing and merchandising arrangements between communist and capitalist firms.

These coöperative ventures take many forms. In some instances, foreign firms have been permitted to retain their managerial authority and on occasion they have been allowed to retain some degree of ownership. In the more restrictive variation of such an arrangement, the foreign partner is usually entitled to a certain portion of the production effort payable in the products produced. In the more permissive arrangement, which is becoming common in some areas of Eastern Europe, markets are divided up and profits are then retained by the respective sellers.

Some of the joint operations are quite imaginative. As of early 1968, there were over 120 such agreements between firms in Eastern Europe and firms in the West, involving varying degrees of participation and sophistication. Virtually all the members of COMECON except the U.S.S.R. have been involved in some way, and even the Russians are now indicating considerable interest in the possibilities of such arrangements. In fact the best article on the whole phenomenon is by a Russian, I. D. Ivanov, who ends his discussion by suggesting that "technical coöperation with the technically advanced firms of capitalist countries may be a useful tool in [Soviet] industrial branches."¹

¹ I. D. Ivanov, "Agreements on Technological Cooperation in Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe," *Voprosy Izobretatel'stva*, February 1968, p. 43. Translated in Joint Publications Research Service, Series *USSR International Economic Relations*, April 22, 1968, No. 32, p. 42. See also Emile Benoit, "East-West Business Cooperation: A New Approach to Communist Europe," *The New Republic*, February 18, 1967, p. 21.

The simplest type of arrangement is illustrated by a West German firm that sends a large consignment of fabrics to be sewn in a factory in Poland. The German firm provides the models and machinery and then markets the goods in the West under its own label. A slightly more complex arrangement brings together a Western and Eastern firm at a more advanced level in the production cycle. The Eastern firm becomes a permanent sub-supplier for the contractor in the West. The finished product may then be sold by the Eastern firm in Eastern markets and by the prime contractor outside of Eastern Europe. For example, a Polish furniture firm supplies semi-finished furniture to the Swedish firm IKEA, which then finishes and sells it throughout Europe. Similarly, Spilling-Werke of West Germany provides the boilers and Gants of Hungary manufactures the generators in jointly produced electric generating stations. Italjet of Italy has concluded an arrangement with Motokov in Czechoslovakia for the joint production of motorcycles; the Italians produce the frames and the Czechs manufacture the motors. English and Czechs have been jointly producing machinery for the manufacture of synthetic fabrics; West Germans and Hungarians are together producing boring machines and lathes. There is also an arrangement whereby tape recorders are to be produced by Universal in Poland for use by Grundig of West Germany. The Hans Beimler Locomotive and Electrotechnical Works in East Berlin coöperates with a French manufacturer who supplies diesel engines for some of its locomotives. Among the large Western firms involved in such arrangements are Renault, Saab, Babcock and Wilcox, and Bull-GE of France. Even American firms are participating. Simmons Machine Tools of Albany sells machinery in the United States produced by the Skoda Works of Czechoslovakia, with the trademark Simmons-Skoda. Coca-Cola is now being bottled in Hungary, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, and Pepsi in Rumania and Jugoslavia.

The advantage of such arrangements for the Western firm is that it is able to utilize the cheap labor supplies of Eastern Europe and to penetrate communist markets. Simultaneously the communist firm benefits from an infusion of orders, new technology, advanced marketing techniques and hard currency.

The next stage of East-West interaction comes when a capitalist and a communist firm form a consortium to bid for construction work in third countries. Frequently the relationship is one

where the two parties stand as independent commercial associates rather than as contractor and subcontractor. For instance, the Austrian firm of Simmering-Gratz-Pauker joined with Komplex, a Hungarian enterprise, to build electric power plants in Lebanon and India; the Hungarian firm supplied the turbogenerators. Simmering again joined with a Polish firm for a plant in Greece and with a Yugoslav enterprise for construction in India and Egypt. Rumania has joined with France and India to build a 2.5 million ton oil refinery in Haldia in West Bengal. There are numerous other examples including one where the Swiss firm of Brown-Boveri used Hungarian components for electrical equipment sold to the United States.

Some of the East European countries have also entered into corporate relationships with producers in less developed areas. Czech firms are working in India with Indian firms to produce electrical equipment and machine tools. Poland and Egypt have discussed the joint production of ships in the U.A.R. Yugoslavia is licensing and coöperating with an Indian company in the production of tractors. The Hungarians have set up a corporation to produce light bulbs in Ceylon, and even Bulgaria is jointly producing medicine in India, artificial leather in Singapore and assembling motor scooters in Morocco. The formation of these joint ventures has not always been widely applauded. Thus Syria and Algeria have resisted such companies whether they produce or only sell. Apparently they regard this sort of transaction as a form of financial imperialism, notwithstanding the fact that the prime owners may be communists.

Once the East Europeans have come to accept the basic principle of joint participation with non-communist partners, there seems to be little reason why they should limit themselves to operating in the communist and the developing countries. Several East European concerns have consequently united with Western enterprises to create joint stock companies which have been incorporated in Western Europe. Thus a Yugoslav firm and an Italian company have formed an affiliate to design, sell and service equipment for the petroleum industry. Similarly, the Bulgarian concern, Machinoexport, is working with the Dutch to sell, service and assemble lift trucks, and with the Italians has formed a trading corporation in Switzerland; it will sell grinding machines that have been built jointly in Bulgaria and Italy. Even the East Germans are investing beyond their borders; they

have contributed 49 percent of the capital for a new titanium dioxide factory to be built in Yugoslavia.

The ideological and political implications of these tendencies have obviously been disturbing to some in Eastern Europe. One of the Soviet complaints against Czechoslovakia which was seconded by the Poles was that the Czechs were turning too much to the West for their economic guidance. As we have seen, however, this tendency is not limited to the Czechs, and in their admirable fashion the Czechs did not hesitate to point this out. In *Hospodarske Noviny* (October 1968) five Czech economists at the Czech Foreign Trade Research Institute drew attention to the fact that Poland and Hungary have joint production agreements with West German concerns that are greater in scope than those entered into by Czechoslovakia. They went on to note that the Bulgarians, Poles and Russians have signed major licensing and production agreements with Italian (Fiat) and French (Renault) automobile manufacturers, thereby ignoring the East German and Czech auto industries which presumably could have rendered much of the financial and manufacturing assistance that was being sought.

IV

The Russians, too, have indicated they will not be restrained by COMECON borders, and some of their new arrangements are even more far-reaching in their implications than those already described.

Without any centrally directed or premeditated strategy, so far as can be seen, and without stopping to worry about the ideological implications of what they are doing, the Soviets are forming international corporations comparable to those in the West. They buy, service and even produce goods in foreign countries with the intention of selling or servicing the same or processed products in still other countries through overseas subsidiaries. Products from the mother country are sold wherever possible, but in many instances the only time the home country becomes involved is when it is necessary to send out managerial personnel or to send home profits.

One of the purest illustrations of this type of organization is the Soviet foreign banking network, structured very much on the lines of international finance capitalism. The Russians have formed a network of wholly owned banks spread across Europe.

The largest and most important of these is the Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd. in London, which has resources of more than \$700 million. This was the bank that financed the construction of the Hungarian hotel, and it also acted as agent in the massive Soviet gold sales in 1963 and 1965. Although the London Narodny Bank was actually formed shortly after the revolution, more recently its scope of operations has increased both in and outside the country and it has recently opened a branch in Beirut. It has plans to open additional branches in Frankfurt and Vienna. A related bank, Woschod Handelsbank, has been opened in Zurich, while the Russian-Iranian Bank operates in Tehran. Another Russian-owned bank, Banque de l'Europe du Nord, has existed for many years in Paris. Efforts to open a branch in Tokyo may succeed provided the Japanese are permitted to open a bank of their own in Moscow.

Similarly, in their quest for increased sales and profits the Russians have not let themselves be disturbed by the implications of running trading and manufacturing concerns overseas. They have established several trading corporations in the developing countries and Western Europe, with ownership usually shared with local firms. In March 1967, the Ethso Trading Company Ltd. was established in Ethiopia with the Russian agency Engermasheksport holding 51 percent of the stock. About the same time, the Russians through their automobile-exporting organization, Avtoeksport, took over an 80 percent interest in a Nigerian company called Vaateko. A few months earlier, the Soviet machinery-exporting organization, Machinoexport, joined with Tissage-Bedamo of Morocco to set up the Marimexport Company. All of these African companies were to import and service Soviet equipment and export other goods. The Russians have also jointly launched a shipping line with the Egyptians and have offered to build a tractor-assembly plant in Syria which would be largely Soviet operated.

The Russians have established similarly inspired arrangements in the more developed countries of the world. For example, in Britain a joint wholesale and service firm called Technical and Optical Equipment has been established with an English manager. Another jointly owned company, the Anglo-Russian Plant Hire Company, is trying to sell Soviet trucks in the United Kingdom. The sale and promotion of automotive equipment in Western Europe is obviously of great importance to the Russians,

particularly because it can lead to all kinds of other attractive ventures for them. Notwithstanding the fact that the Russians had to turn to the Italian and French automobile manufacturers to improve the production of their own cars, they have set up joint stock companies in France with French partners to service and sell Soviet automotive equipment in France (AKTIF-Auto); they have made similar arrangements with some Norwegians (Konela-Norge-Bell), Swedes (Matreco) and Finns (Konela). The most ambitious undertaking is the Belgian joint stock company, Scaldia-Volga, which not only sells and services Soviet cars, but assembles them in Brussels. It hopes to open a sales branch in Switzerland. The Russians also have a half interest in La Maison de Russie, the Russian-type department store in Brussels. In the United States they have licensed the Hippenstall Company of Pittsburgh to distribute a Soviet-developed process for a fluid sand foundry, with the Russians sharing in the royalties. Recently, the Russians agreed to convert Intourist's auto rental service into a Hertz franchise.

Soviet efforts in the oil industry illustrate even more vividly the direction in which Russian international corporations are heading. Oil exports have always been important to the Soviet Union. Even though its oil is relatively high in sulfur content, oil is a highly negotiable commodity and the Russian pricing system, which until recently ignored land and depletion costs, made it possible for the Russians to sell their oil at a low price. Because it is so essential and enters so easily into foreign trade, oil has been an excellent source of hard and political currency for the Russians. Heretofore they have been reasonably content to sell Soviet oil to foreign dealers and let them distribute it. Now there seems to be a more pragmatic attitude. The Russians are beginning to sell not only their own oil, but oil and natural gas that are initially purchased in other countries. This is partly because they are beginning to consume more of their own petroleum production; it is also because the Russians realize that there are profits to be made as middlemen. Furthermore, they are not only selling to foreign distributors, but they are beginning to refine and distribute it themselves through their own network of foreign refineries and filling stations.

The prototype of all Russian international corporations is Nafta, the oil company founded in December 1967. The Russians took 60 percent of the company's stock and their partners, two

Belgian coal companies, subscribed for the remaining 40 percent. One of the first things the corporation did was to acquire a 60-acre tract in Antwerp where the owners intend to build a tank farm and ultimately a refinery. Nafta hopes to import up to 500,000 tons of crude oil and 750,000 tons of refined oil a year. The Russians have publicly declared that they have no intention of limiting themselves to Belgium, but intend to expand their sales throughout the Common Market. The Russians also are the sole owners of a British oil importing and distributing company, Nafta Ltd., which hopes to open 100 gas stations in the British Isles. This is not a one-way street, however, for Western firms such as Shell Oil and ENI have opened up filling stations in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The Russians are presently buying natural gas from Iran and they are building a pipeline to Afghanistan. They have just been granted extensive drilling concessions in Iraq and they are also prospecting in Iran and Egypt. They hope to do the same in Algeria, Syria and Kuwait. Recognizing that the Russians have indeed become international oil traders, Western firms have become more willing to coöperate with them. Because of the disruption caused by the closing of the Suez Canal, some Western firms have agreed to swap customers and sources of supply with Russian oil exporting agencies. For example, a Swiss firm gave the Russians 3.5 million tons of Middle East oil for delivery to Soviet customers in Japan and Burma. In exchange the Russians gave the Swiss an equivalent amount of oil from the Black Sea, which the Swiss firm then sold to a French company. British Petroleum did much the same thing.

The Russians are also beginning to move into the fields of international transportation and insurance. Like the Scandinavian countries, the Soviets are now seeking to carry ocean shipping which neither originates in nor is intended for the U.S.S.R. The Soviet shipping agency, Sovracht, is making a determined effort to capture up to 25 percent of the traffic between Australia and Europe, and to do this it initially offered rate concessions of as much as 25 percent. The Russians are also competing for the international insurance business, although there is less evidence that they are cutting insurance rates. Inostrakh, the Soviet international insurance company, has established branches in Iran and Rumania. The Russian affiliate in England and Germany is the Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Company. In the

by now familiar pattern, a joint stock company has been formed with Austrian partners in Vienna called the Garant Insurance Company which, though primarily concerned with insuring East-West trade, is also seeking regular Western insurance and reinsurance.

v

These actions by the Soviet Union and the other members of COMECON signal a new approach to international commerce, finance and production. From a practical point of view, this is a natural direction to move in, since there are hard-currency profits to be made. Indeed, profit plus the desire to use foreign trade to implement internal economic reforms seem to be the stimuli behind the expansion into these new realms of international commerce. But unlike the internal reforms, which have been thoroughly debated and then acted upon, these external innovations seem to lack overall guidance and direction.

Little thought has been given to the ramifications of these new economic activities. One result of the increased participation in international commerce is an increase in tension within COMECON itself. Each country can see the advantage for itself in such moves toward the West and in Western modes of operation, but it cannot always see the wisdom of similar tendencies on the part of its allies. This is especially true of the U.S.S.R., which is particularly jealous of any COMECON member which appears to be moving too far and fast toward international economic involvement. It is not surprising, therefore, that Russian disapproval of Czechoslovakia's participation has not entailed a cutback of the Soviet Union's own efforts in this direction.

There are good reasons why the Russians have not lessened their outward probings. To be successful in international commerce, a nation must have ready access to products, producers and competitors in the outside market. Therefore, against their will, the East Europeans will find they must expose themselves more and more to the West and Japan. This will mean opening offices and information to foreign salesmen. Most of the East European countries have allowed Western salesmen to have permanent sales and buying offices in their capital cities for some time; now even the Russians are giving in. In the summer of 1968, the Japanese had at least 24 permanent sales offices in Moscow; and there were French, Italian and English firms as

well. Ultimately, if the Russians are to increase their sales and profits, foreign businessmen will not only have to be given greater access to officials and products inside the country, but Russian salesmen will have to be given greater access to markets and products outside their country as well. Conceivably this could have not only an economic but also a political impact.

As has been suggested, increased participation in international markets will almost certainly increase the possibilities for the success of internal economic reforms. Increased trade has already made possible the importation of more up-to-date machinery. But the interplay of external and internal reform is a two-way street. More involvement in foreign trade not only makes it possible to increase the efficiency of domestic production, it also necessitates it. If the Russians plan to increase their exports, their internal economic reforms must bear fruit so that Russian equipment can be produced more efficiently. This means increased innovation and increased productivity.

These developments may lead to increased pressure for convertibility of the ruble. Several economists in countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, whose economies rely much more heavily on foreign trade, have already called for convertibility. Presently Soviet foreign trade is a much smaller proportion of gross national product than is the case for the East European countries and therefore the Russians are not as dependent on flexible and responsive foreign trade procedures. Yet we have seen that the Russians are gradually moving in the same direction as the more outspoken members of COMECON and, if present trends continue, the Russians themselves may come around to the same conclusions.

These developments will undoubtedly create new opportunities and new competition for many Western and Japanese firms. But the problems and accommodations may be more difficult for the communist countries. This was illustrated by a Yugoslav legal counselor as he outlined the hazards of investing and operating overseas to a group of enterprise directors. After discussing such pitfalls as foreign tax laws, labor regulations and restrictions on the transfer of profits and capital, he felt it also necessary to warn against one additional danger. Remember, he cautioned, some countries periodically "nationalize or expropriate private property located on their territory." Certainly this must be a novel hazard for East European entrepreneurs to contemplate.

U.S. AID TO LATIN AMERICA: FUNDING RADICAL CHANGE

By George C. Lodge

WE are confronting in Latin America what is in essence an ideological crisis—a question of purpose. Given our national predilections this is the kind of problem we find most difficult to deal with. The temptation is to retreat, retrench and look inward. This is an impossibility: our wealth is too great not to share, our enterprise too successful and too useful not to expand, our interests—and the peace of the world—too vulnerable not to protect.

The central issue is revolution—radical, structural change in the political, economic and social systems of Latin America—and the relationship to it of the United States. Comforting and noncontroversial as it may be to speak in familiar technical terms of “development,” particularly “economic development,” we must accept the fact that real development is change; and that change necessarily raises questions of speed, direction and control which are in the largest sense inherently political and deeply controversial. In the Latin American environment particularly, the introduction of seemingly innocuous economic or technological change often in fact requires profound, permanent and radical alteration of existing systems.

Let us take food production, which has been hobbling along beneath the burden of rising population. We have generally supposed improving agricultural output to be a matter of better seed, more fertilizer, irrigation and the like. We have proceeded on the vague assumption that Latin American peasants resemble in some half-formed way the homesteaders of our own West—confident, Protestant entrepreneurs eagerly waiting for the means to a better life. We have treated Latin American states as though they were in fact representative of their people, able and willing to introduce the manifold changes which we encourage—and pay—them to promise, and prepared to mobilize efficiently a vast spread of governmental services to their rural areas. While some governments receiving assistance may have such capacity and determination, most do not. The Latin American peasant, generally speaking, is snared in an historical web of pressures and powers which allows him little con-

trol over his environment and deprives him of confidence and motivation. He feels little or no identification with his government or with what is called his nation; his sole concern is survival and the agonies that it involves. Disorganized, isolated and detached, he, like the Black American, has been denied power in his own country. While this condition has afflicted roughly only 20 percent of North Americans, it circumscribes the existence of perhaps 80 percent of Latin Americans. A change in the production of food, or any other sort of meaningful change, requires a fundamental realignment of the structures and the power which contain this condition. More than technology, it is a problem of land tenure, of markets, of credit, of motivation, of organization and of commitment. It is in the largest sense a political problem. The bonds that tie the peasants to their traditional marginal existence are not to be undone by governments dependent upon the existing power structure. That would constitute an unreal form of self-subversion. The job must be done by a variety of self-sustaining, largely nongovernmental, engines of change.

Here and there these engines are at work: campesino federations in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic; organizations of the radical Church, like those in Brazil, Chile and Panama; some trade unions; and various enterprises, such as the large commercial farms of Mexico, and certain integrated food production, processing and distribution activities of some U.S.-based multinational corporations.

They are contributing to the development of true communities in Latin America, helping them to form and organize in such a way that they can govern themselves, determine their values and goals and build the institutions and organizations necessary for a vigorous, responsive and lasting political system. These engines of change are providing a new confidence that power in the environment is not permanently fixed, that movement is possible; a new sense of purpose and legitimacy. And this matter of purpose is at the heart of Latin America's difficulties.

In Veraguas Province, Panama, for example, the problem of education is substantially irrelevant to the number of school-houses; it is rooted in the fact that the campesino sees no special purpose in having his child in school on time, regularly, year in and year out. He does not visualize for his child a life that is substantially different from his own. When, however, 25 cam-

pesinos joined together for a coöperative effort in the village of San Francisco, and when they discovered that the only person in the village who could keep the group's small accounts was the local priest, they recognized in a remarkably short time the need for education. As never before, they had their children in school on time and overtime.

Student organizations and nationalist guerrilla movements are also endeavoring to operate as engines of change, but so far with limited success. And, surprisingly perhaps, communism in Latin America has been dramatically unsuccessful in causing change. Its European-based Marxist ideology has consistently shown itself to be irrelevant to the Latin American reality. Its fealty to Moscow has made it an unacceptable form of neo-colonialism, an affront to nationalism; and in the clinch, Moscow has been unable to protect its Latin American offspring. Although the Soviet Union is stuck with the economic burden of Castro, it is plain that it does not support his brand of revolutionary warfare, and indeed, given Castro's open defiance of the party line as laid down by the Kremlin, it is questionable whether it is accurate or useful to call him and his followers elsewhere in Latin America communists. They are more precisely described as revolutionary nationalists who may or may not receive assistance from Moscow. The Soviet Union's principal efforts in Latin America are devoted to increasing its general influence by promoting trade and commerce and securing friendly governments by exerting pressure within the existing political structures—most notably today in Chile, Peru and Uruguay.

The changing nature of the cold war and the demise of the communist apparatus as an important threat in Latin America have removed the most readily understood and for some the most compelling purpose of our foreign policy and program in Latin America. While we have always denied that foreign aid was necessarily tied to protection against communists, there has been some question whether anyone really believed it. Anti-communism has served a useful purpose for us; it has allowed us to defer clarifying our own ideology, our vision of what we mean by a good community. It has permitted us to live with a fundamental contradiction between stability and change. We could insist upon changes of all sorts, as in the Alliance for Progress, but at the same time we could sustain institutions which thwarted change, arguing the necessity of stability. We have

spoken regularly of freedom, democracy and self-determination, the inference being that both change and stability were preconditions for the fulfillment of these political ideals. Because of communism, however, we were able to avoid facing the hard reality that in much of Latin America democracy is a euphemism and will remain so until the advent of the widespread political organization upon which democracy must rest. And because of communism we were able to skirt the issue of who was "determining" what for whom. Thus, because of communism we have been conducting a policy which has combined an offering of lip service to radical structural change with support for the status quo.

This is not to say that the Agency for International Development and the Alliance for Progress have not done good things. They have built roads, schoolhouses, hospitals and dams; they have financed housing, training and the introduction of new industry and technology; they have promoted exports, economic diversification and the passage of a sizable amount of reform legislation (much of it unimplemented). All this has been done, however, for the most part through local government and in collaboration with members of the existing power structure. While our assistance may have caused a marginal improvement in the standard of life for some, it has also, equally importantly, provided a source of patronage and political strength for the status quo.

And all too often a road, a bridge or a hydroelectric station has been considered to be in and of itself a good thing. All too often the question of whether the road or the bridge is located properly to promote the organization of the population for its inclusion into the nation, or whether the hydroelectric station and its output are so arranged as to bring power and light more cheaply to more people, receives little consideration. Our aid has in reality changed Latin America very little.

U.S. military assistance programs heighten dramatically the inherent conflict in our quest for both stability and change. The case of the Maryknoll priest, Father Thomas Melville, in Guatemala, is a relevant example. In the early 1960s guerrilla bands formed in the Guatemalan wilderness. It is imprecise and misleading to call the groups communists, for as far as can be determined, they were not uniformly the recipients of international communist assistance nor were they by any means under com-

munist orders. They were merely insistent upon change in the structures of Guatemalan power and therefore could well be called nationalist revolutionaries. They were quite successful for a time, until a special band of anti-guerrilla fighters was formed, presumably with the assistance of U.S. military groups which were in Guatemala for the purpose, and armed with U.S. equipment. The effectiveness of this special group was so impressive that landowners of Guatemala sought their services and emulated their procedures in the name of anti-communism. Father Melville, meanwhile, was engaged in organizing illiterate, impoverished Indians into a coöperative of sorts to improve their relationship with their environment. The local landowners, however, looked upon Father Melville's operations as subversive interference—the plot of communists. They therefore engaged anti-guerrilla vigilantes to harass the Father and his workers. The priest, arguing self-defense, went to some guerrilla friends and obtained guns, at which point he was expelled from the country. It is hardly stretching the point to say that here we had the United States arming and training men to shoot up U.S. priests. The conflict can hardly be overlooked.

Stripped of the protective rationale of anti-communism, we must now face the unveiled question of where we stand on revolution or radical change in Latin America. To answer this question we must identify our interests precisely. Our priorities would seem to be in the following order:

The chief concern of the Government of the United States must be the survival of the American people. Survival is threatened by the existence anywhere of chaos and disorganization. These produce socio-political vacuums which the bully and the predator are tempted to fill aggressively. In this day and age such aggression can bring the threat of total war.

The second concern of the U.S. Government must be the protection of the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in Latin America.

It follows from these primary and secondary objectives that the control of violent conflict is a vital interest of the United States.¹ The control of conflict requires the presence in any

¹ Some distinction must be made between necessary and avoidable conflict and violence. The Mexican revolution took a million lives; but few today would say that it had not been necessary. The hope must be that communities have become more sophisticated since then, more able to make less painful the revolution which nation-building seems to require inevitably.

community—national or international—of an effective police capable of apprehending and confining the bandit and the criminal. But in Latin America, banditry and criminality are neither the root nor the principal potential cause of violence; and care must be taken not to confuse such lawlessness with revolution, the right to which is deep in our own political and moral heritage. Our reason for being as a nation is linked to the pledge that *all* men have certain rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that governments are instituted “to secure these rights;” and that “whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government. . . .”

The cause of conflict in Latin America comes in large measure from the desire of increasing numbers to achieve these rights. In the context of the Latin American environment this achievement requires change which is sufficiently radical to deserve the name of revolution. It thus becomes the interest of the United States to promote that revolution; and it is a subsidiary interest to promote the revolution in such a way that the violent conflict which often accompanies radical change is minimized.

It should be emphasized that this objective is also in accord with our moral stance, corresponding to what we proclaim as the definition of the good community. And in as much as the revolution is inevitable it is axiomatic that our political interest lies in closer coöperation with it. We cannot win a war with the inevitable even though today we are dangerously close to trying.

The revolution in Latin America requires the mobilization of those political institutions which I have already referred to as engines of change, and which are essential for self-determination. Our policy thus should become solidly oriented toward sustaining these institutions rather than those of the status quo. This will undoubtedly arouse controversy between us and those who hold power in Latin America. They will tend to regard it as a policy of subversion, which in a sense it is. They will speak of intervention in the internal political affairs of sovereign states, which it is. They should be reminded, however, that our present policy also constitutes intervention, only on their behalf. It is time to recognize that almost any foreign assistance in Latin America is bound to be interventionary in one way or another.

It is easy, however, to overestimate the controversy and to ignore means by which it can be minimized. The fact is that

many government leaders in Latin America are themselves keenly aware of the need for radical change. But they are hobbled in their efforts to introduce it by recalcitrant oligarchs and conservative bureaucracies, both of which tend to be bolstered by our aid program; they are also impeded by insufficient organization for change outside of government. Many of these leaders would, therefore, secretly, if not publicly, welcome such a shift in U.S. policy.

Our alternative to adopting this policy would seem to be to continue our equivocation in the matter of change. This in turn will tend to force those urging change, from the radical Church to the revolutionary nationalists, into seeking assistance from other world powers, including the Soviet Union. In spite of the weakness of its hemispheric apparatus and its recent peaceful policies in Latin America, the U.S.S.R. still, of course, has the power to intervene if it feels it necessary to its world position.

The implementation of such a policy calls for substantial changes in the organization of our foreign assistance. What follows is an outline of such a reorganization, not intended as a full-fledged or final proposal but as an indicator of the direction in which U.S. policy must move.²

II

Although the total thrust of a new foreign assistance policy should be directed at the purposes set by the Alliance for Progress, this policy is best achieved by dividing programs into two general categories—those which work within existing structures and those which are designed to introduce basic, structural change. For this purpose AID, both in Washington and Latin America, should be replaced by two principal alternative assistance channels and perhaps several subsidiary ones. (A similar reorganization of U.S. assistance elsewhere in the world should undoubtedly follow.)

The first channel, which we shall call the New Alliance for Progress, should be a multilateral structure receiving perhaps 70 percent of U.S. assistance for Latin America. The second, which will be called the American Foundation, would distribute about 25 percent. The remainder might be distributed through other routes, such as the overseas investment corporation which has

² This plan is in part similar to that proposed by Teodoro Moscoso, first Coördinator of the Alliance for Progress, in a speech before the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, May 8, 1968.

been proposed for encouraging private investment in less developed countries.

The New Alliance would include programs designed to sustain, nourish and improve existing national growth structures. Essentially supplemental in nature, such programs would presuppose the existence of effective local structures capable of directing economic inputs into a coherent, purposeful development scheme. They would be designed, therefore, to assist national governments and those public and private institutions and enterprises which are generally connected with or endorsed by government. These programs, for example, would concern: health, education and public works; routine industrial development; military, police and civil administration training and assistance; trade and tariffs and export development.

Such programs are in essence non-revolutionary. Although they may well contribute to the gradual evolution of existing structures, they are primarily aimed at improving the conditions of life within them. While they are necessary and consistent with our interests, they may often obstruct change because they are still tied to national governments and therefore tend to support the status quo. For this reason they should be channeled through multilateral agencies, relieving the United States of sole responsibility for their effect. The blame should be shared regionally.

Latin American leadership would be better suited than the U.S. Government to harass and chide Latin American governments to make the most efficient use of large quantities of assistance; it would also be more sensitive to questions of priority, timing, concentration and focus. All programs in this category should be carried out under the direction of the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), acting for the Organization of American States. To implement its programs CIAP would use the World Bank, the International Development Association, the Inter-American Development Bank, regional development banks and such additional institutions as it may deem necessary. In order to coördinate the foreign assistance activities of these institutions, CIAP would have a regional office in each of the Latin American countries, replacing existing AID missions.

Programs under the New Alliance for Progress would be financed by contributions from Latin American governments, the

United States Government, and European government members of the Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development. The task of insuring that these funds were being used honestly and efficiently would fall upon the international institutions themselves, which experience has shown can be hard and tough in this regard—often more so than U.S. officials can or want to be. This proposal envisages an expansion of the existing programs which for the most part have worked well, and an extension and strengthening of Latin American control over these programs. The Alliance for Progress would continue as a true “alliance;” and opportunities for regional growth and integrated development independent of U.S. pressures and influence would be increased. Because of its regional character, the New Alliance would be more appealing to Europe and Japan, perhaps even enticing assistance from the Soviet Union. Training and technical assistance could be brought from many countries other than the United States. Israel in particular has much to offer. It is difficult today for AID to arrange for Israeli assistance to Latin America for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the Arabs. Then, too, regional control of military and police assistance and training would be a particularly salutary innovation, removing the United States at least one step from this sticky area and providing us with political distance and manoeuvring room which we do not now have.

But perhaps the most important effect of the New Alliance would be the added impetus which it would give to national and regional planning and thus to the integration of Latin America—at first commercially and economically and then politically. We have seen how damaging the close proximity of the United States and its officialdom can be to Latin American initiative. We cannot help ourselves; it is in the nature of things; we are large and powerful and our breath is heavy. The closer we are to the processes by which Latin Americans plan, establish priorities, identify their interests and determine actions, the more these processes will be distorted, dampened and defeated. We have long spoken about the necessity of “giving the Latin Americans the tools and letting them do the job for themselves,” but we have found it difficult to act accordingly. Our AID programs have become an increasingly self-defeating exercise with almost the opposite effect. We are fond of using the word “self-help,” but it is generally more a sham than a reality.

The regional organization of foreign assistance would also facilitate foreign investment. CIAP and the New Alliance, as part of their integration planning could, for example, greatly strengthen and expand the work of multinational investment companies such as ADELA, which would be natural allies of CIAP and the Inter-American Development Bank in building up the Latin American Free Trade Association.

The purposes of the New Alliance would be very much like those of its predecessor. While we can hope that it will find new and better ways to achieve them, we cannot expect the Alliance, by itself, to speed up the revolutionary process to the extent that U.S. and Latin American interests dictate.

III

U.S. objectives, therefore, require a second and quite distinct system of assistance programs to find and fuel the engines of change which work directly to revolutionize Latin American social and political structures. As the New Alliance would sustain local growth structures, the second category of programs would help to design and construct such structures where they do not exist and assist in the formation of new local organizations to exert pressure for radical change in existing structures.

It may appear that the two program categories are contradictory. In a sense they are and must be. Our purpose, however, is to make the contradiction more precise and manageable. The contradiction between change and stability exists today; we can be sure it will exist tomorrow. The vital interests of both the United States and Latin America lie in designing better ways of handling it.

Second-category programs would be essentially nongovernmental. They would seek to strengthen those organizations and institutions which can bring pressure to bear upon government and establish useful links with it. But they would be definitely distinct from government and in fact might often be hostile to the régime in power, or to parts of that régime. They are the critical levers required to set the process of change in motion and keep it moving.

These programs must by their nature be local—aimed at a particular community, organization, group or institution. The workings of our engines of change are fundamentally rooted in a particular place and a particular group of leaders and followers.

Confidence and participation in representative government develop at the local level. As continuing pressure comes to be exerted on the decision-making processes of the national government, the motivation and capacity for rural action on the part of government administrative officials grow. The campesino's trust in, and ability to use, his government increase in turn.

For some time Category Two programs would obviously be controversial; they would have to be handled with great care and delicacy, moving experimentally from small to larger undertakings. Even so, this new idea will be attacked; it would never survive the onslaught of the status quo if it were part of a large international bureaucracy.

Congress should, therefore, establish and fund an American Foundation for the purpose of launching Category Two programs, using a diversity of nongovernmental groups, institutes, centers and organizations, representing a broad spectrum of U.S. interests and talents, each with special capability to work with and assist a Latin American purpose-making institution. I am here suggesting that we make the most of the pluralism of American society, accentuating its great and varied strength and employing it to connect U.S. groups naturally to Latin American counterparts.

The Foundation would be under the direction of a distinguished Board of Trustees. Members of the board and the Foundation's president would be appointed by the President of the United States and should represent a broad spectrum of North American as well as Latin American interests and points of view. The reasons for the Foundation are fundamental: revolutionary change is underway; it is inevitable; it is in many ways essential and morally justified; the interests of world peace and of the United States require that this change be assisted: while it may require some conflict, the objective should be clearly to minimize violence. The objectives of the Foundation would be to make the revolution peaceful; to make it effective; to make it consistent with the best interests of the United States and Latin America. The commitment of the Trustees to these purposes would be an important factor in their selection. Before critics cry "sham" let it be emphasized that the Foundation would be frankly an instrument of the United States to foster nongovernmental U.S. organizations to find and fuel engines of change in Latin America. But while a creation of the U.S. Government, it would be dis-

tinct from it. Indeed, much of its validity would derive from its independence of government control.³

Acting in accordance with the principles of the Charter of Punta del Este and subsequent Alliance doctrine, the Foundation would, through grant and agreement, fund the activities of those U.S. institutions best suited to establish constructive relationships with change and purpose-making institutions in Latin America—such as organizations of the radical Church, peasant unions, trade unions, universities and change-oriented varieties of local and multinational enterprises. AID cannot reach many of these at all today; and its governmental connection prevents it from reaching others effectively and efficiently.

Perhaps most important would be the role of the Foundation in making possible direct ties between U.S. and Latin American universities, uncluttered by governmental considerations on either side. The Foundation could halt the futile and mutually debasing efforts of the U.S. Government in concert with some U.S. universities to make Latin American universities into replicas of our own. The basic problem of the university in Latin America is not that it is dissimilar from its U.S. counterpart but rather that it has remained detached from the community in which it exists and often largely ignorant of it.

Latin America needs above all else the study and the insight necessary to formulate its own independent purposes and goals. This study requires the discipline and detachment which only a great university can provide. It is perhaps presumptuous to suppose that the United States can play a significant role in such an important and precarious venture. But I believe that our Foundation, working with the best of North America's universities, could be of great use, if only perhaps in one pursuit: the support of greatly expanded research by Latin American scholars, with young U.S. counterparts and assistants, into the real nature and problems of their respective communities. Latin Americans should not come to the United States to study their region; we should go there to learn about their communities with them. U.S. scholars have a good deal to offer in research: the idea itself, first of all, of actually getting out into the streets, factories and fields and asking questions. Getting dirty and hot in the pursuit of knowledge is an unfamiliar notion to many. Then the tech-

³ While it seems farfetched at first blush, the Smithsonian Institution might offer something of a rough administrative model for the American Foundation.

niques of research have been highly developed in North America—the use of computers and advanced methods of inquiry, for example. All of this is essential to give the revolutionary process intelligent and deeply considered direction, and also to hasten its progress. It is extremely doubtful, however, that such activities could be carried out under the existing government-tied AID program with its bureaucratic overhead and political sensitivity.

But what happens, you may ask, when a Foundation-supported group is drawn into conflict with the status quo in Latin America? How do you deal with the implication of subversion in this situation? After all, we are bypassing government to introduce change to which government may be resistant.

Here is where the great advantage of separation from the U.S. governmental apparatus—the embassy and AID—becomes clear. Under our proposed scheme of things, although the Ambassador would be informed about Foundation-supported activities in his country of assignment, he would have no official responsibility for them.

For those who say this is unrealistic, I would only point out that West German Government funds are given to a variety of nongovernmental institutions and organizations for development purposes in Latin America. Some of these funds undoubtedly, for example, end up assisting the organizations of the radical Church in northeast Brazil. I strongly doubt, however, that the German Ambassador is held responsible by the Brazilian Government for these activities in the northeast which, from time to time as we have seen, have caused it considerable discomfort.

The fundamental idea here is that we stop running our foreign assistance activities as though we were a statist monolith like the Soviet Union. Our greatest strength lies in our plurality of interests, points of view and competences. And by working through a number of independent groups we will also be better able to avoid the kind of cultural imperialism which tends to be a by-product of monolithic government-centered undertakings. Much of our current effort kindles this fear, which is entirely consistent with the apprehension of many U.S. critics about our own activities abroad.

There will be many questions raised about the American Foundation: Will not the U.S. Government interfere if a Foundation activity threatens the interest of a U.S. business? Will

not the Departments of State and Defense demand the right to approve Foundation projects? How long would an Ambassador refrain from acting against an offending program? The answers to these questions lie quite obviously in the acceptance of the fundamental purposes of the Foundation by those who wield power in the United States and in the intelligent administration of Foundation activities. To be successful it must rest upon a new sense of the vital interests of the United States and must be directed by men of considerable discretion and good sense.

IV

These proposed alterations in the philosophy and structure of U.S. foreign assistance would have a profound effect on the role of the Ambassador. In the replacement of the Agency for International Development and its foreign missions with the new structures mentioned, the Ambassador's responsibility for the administration of U.S. assistance programs would be eliminated.

Ambassadorial representation should not imply approval or disapproval of the régime in power; it should merely be recognition of an existing state of affairs and condition of power. Although as the representative of the President the Ambassador would be expected to make known the interests of the United States, it would not be his function—as it often is today—to seek to change the internal structures upon which the régime receiving his credentials rests.

Existing programs and functions of AID which are consistent with our new formulation of interests and objectives would be taken over either by the American Foundation and its related groups or by the New Alliance. The only AID programs of importance left orphaned by this scheme are those offering guarantees, incentives and assistance to U.S. private investment in Latin America. These should be expanded and placed under the supervision of the Department of Commerce or of the proposed overseas investment corporation. Some of the more experimental projects, involving the development of new entrepreneurial forms as engines of change, would, however, undoubtedly fall within the purview of the Foundation and the New Alliance.

Some may think it odd to suggest such a radical transformation of foreign assistance at a time when the existing program is in jeopardy and isolationist sentiment seems to be increasing in this country. A close look at Congressional attitudes toward

foreign aid, however, will show that the most serious criticism is coming from those who have long been the staunchest supporters of aid. These men are disturbed because foreign aid seems to be failing to achieve its own prescribed objectives. In fact, as we noted earlier, some feel that our aid is indeed retarding long-term growth, especially political development. It was Congressional initiative—not that of AID—which forced foreign assistance administrators to place greater emphasis on political development by adding Title IX to the Foreign Assistance Act several years ago. It is my belief that in this respect many leaders of Congress have been ahead of AID in realizing the necessity for a radically different approach.

Only by some such new approach can we hope to arouse the national enthusiasm required to raise the levels of U.S. foreign assistance to where they should be—at least 1 percent of the gross national product and in time hopefully more.

TIBET STRUGGLES TO SURVIVE

By Henry S. Bradsher

THE thirteenth Dalai Lama, Thupten Gyatso, the incarnation of Tibet's patron deity, Chenresi, "the Buddha of mercy," passed on to "the Honorable Field" in 1933, there to await rebirth as the present Dalai Lama in 1935. Toward the end of his long rule he was gravely worried by the communist suppression of Lamaist Buddhism in Mongolia, which for almost four hundred years had been dominated by the Tibetan form of religion. In creating a Mongolian nation on the Soviet pattern in the 1920s and early 1930s, Mongolian Communists destroyed almost all the monasteries which regarded the Dalai Lama in Lhasa as their spiritual leader, reducing organized religion to a few showpiece relics. The Dalai Lama warned his people that "unless we can guard our own country, it will now happen that the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, the Father and the Son, the Holders of the Faith, the glorious Rebirths, will be broken down and left without a name . . . the officers of the state, ecclesiastical and secular, will find their lands seized and their other property confiscated, and they themselves made to serve their enemies, or wander about the country as beggars do. All beings will be sunk in great hardship and in overpowering fear; the days and the nights will drag on slowly in suffering."

A quarter of a century later, his successor, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, fled from tightening Chinese Communist control of Tibet to exile in India. Now the prophecy has been fulfilled. The Tibet that long fascinated the world with its distinctive religion, its unusual religious government, the anachronism of its ways, has disappeared. The Cultural Revolution has brought destruction of even the showpiece relics of Lamaist Buddhism in its homeland. The inaccessibility which heightened the fascination of the high, mostly bleak land behind the Himalayan, Kun Lun and Tahsueh Mountains has been ended with the construction of roads and airports; yet by Chinese policy Tibet remains closed and largely unknown to the outside world.

The picture that emerges from Chinese publications, refugee reports and other sources is of a land being pushed into the modern world at great cost to its people. Electricity now lights some towns, intensified exploitation of the limited agricultural re-

sources has raised crop yields, small industries have been built and mechanical skills taught. Modern communications at the service of a determined central Chinese authority have finally made it possible to begin integration of Tibet into the Han Chinese cultural world that has been slowly creeping toward it for several millennia. The non-communist world has watched this Sinization of Tibet with an uncomfortable feeling that a simple, helpless people are being abandoned to an undeserved fate. But the world's conscience has been assuaged by the widely accepted notion that despite the uncertainties surrounding their historic relationships China has the legal—if not moral—right to do as it pleases in Tibet. Pricking that conscience is the fact that a Tibetan Lamaist Buddhist church-government structure exists in exile and hopes some day to go back to its homeland. If it ever does, both will have been transformed—the land harshly modernized and the church-government broadened by close contact with modern democratic thought and action.

II

Over the years, the expanding Chinese and British Indian empires nibbled at the edges of the Dalai Lama's realm, making it difficult if not controversial even to define what Tibet is. In broadest terms, it is the area inhabited by persons speaking Tibetan or related languages and recognizing the spiritual leadership of the Dalai Lama. They believe in Lamaism, a mixture of the elaborate symbolism and magic formulations of the Tantric Mahayana form of Buddhism with Tibet's pre-Buddhist Bon beliefs in innumerable spirits and fierce demons. The ethnographic area includes the Ladakh, Spiti and Lahul districts of northwest India, the Tawang Tract in India's Northeast Frontier Agency, small parts of Nepal lying north of the main Himalayan peaks, the semi-autonomous Indian protectorate of Sikkim, the independent kingdom of Bhutan and parts of the present Chinese provinces of Tsinghai, Kansu, Szechwan and Yunnan. The heart of this area of some 750,000 square miles is today's political Tibet, much of which is a barren and thinly populated three-mile-high plateau north and northwest of Lhasa. In the river valleys around Lhasa, which lies 12,000 feet above sea level and has a temperature range similar to Denver's, barley and wheat are grown and fruit trees are cultivated. The land becomes forested as it slopes eastward to the steep valleys where three of

Asia's greatest rivers, the Yangtse, Mekong and Salween, flow parallel only forty miles apart, through lowlands suitable for rice paddies.

Closest to the Chinese heartland, these relatively thickly populated eastern districts have seldom been under the political control of either Lhasa or Peking; their fierce independence is seen in today's Khamba guerrilla warriors. Parts of the Kham and Amdo districts in the east, including the birthplace near Koko Nor of the present Dalai Lama, have been so thickly settled by Chinese colonists that the Dalai Lama's own definition of Tibet now extends only as far east as Batang and Jyekundo, omitting much that was ethnographically Tibet. The 1953 Chinese census said there were 2.8 million Tibetans, but only 1.2 million of them—including some 180,000 lamas and monks—lived within Peking's definition of the country, which pushes the eastern boundary even closer to Lhasa than the Dalai Lama's definition. Encroachment of non-Tibetan peoples, particularly Nepalis in Sikkim and Bhutan, has also reduced the ethnographic area in the south.

The Dalai Lama, who is dependent upon India as his home in exile today, no longer mentions Tibetan claims (asserted as recently as 1947 when India became independent) to Himalayan areas like Sikkim, which British India detached from Lhasa's nominal control. But the Chinese have occasionally referred to these claims. In 1959 their spokesmen in Tibet asserted that the Tibetan "hand" should be reunited with its "five fingers": Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and the Northeast Frontier Agency. This claim is now dormant and the official Chinese position is unclear on all except the Northeast Frontier Agency and the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh (considered by the Chinese to be part of Sinkiang province rather than Tibet), which are involved in the Sino-Indian border dispute. But Tibet's history shows that the Chinese have a long memory for shadowy claims.

The modern Chinese claim to Tibet rests on four eighteenth-century Chinese military expeditions to Lhasa. By 1792 the Chinese had established themselves as supervisors of the government of the Dalai Lama, who had already held a peculiarly Eastern priest-patron relationship with the Chinese emperors. Tibet was, however, too distant, communications were too poor, economic rewards too small and the people too difficult for the declining dynasty in Peking to bother with much direct control.

Control waned, allowing British India to send a military expedition to Lhasa in 1904 out of fear of Russian influence there, but in a final blaze of Imperial Manchu glory less than two years before the 1911 Chinese revolution, another Chinese army marched into Lhasa—the first to conquer the Tibetans rather than come to aid them. The thirteenth Dalai Lama fled to British India and Tibet's new rulers began to shape the area into a Chinese province, as they were doing in Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. But by 1912 the revolution in China caused the disintegration of the occupation force, delaying for almost half a century the fate that has befallen Tibet in the last decade.

Not versed in the ways of the community of nations created in the West, unaware of the significance in international law of Tibetan military success in repulsing Republican Chinese attempts to reassert control, the Tibetan Government after 1912 simply wanted to be left alone. Its efforts to establish its formal independence of China were belated and weak; they were brushed aside by Britain, the most concerned bystander, which found it diplomatically convenient to continue to recognize an undefined Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet even though China had no power there. For forty years Britain dealt with Tibet as a country with *de facto* but not *de jure* independence, and the United States also took this position during and after World War II. Even today international legal experts sympathetic to the Dalai Lama's cause find it difficult to argue that Tibet ever technically established its independence of the Chinese empire, imperial or republican, before the new communist régime moved in 1950 to reassert the old Chinese claim by force of arms.

III

During the four decades of *de facto* independence, Tibet was governed by the thirteenth Dalai Lama and then by regents until the discovery and education of the fourteenth incarnation of the religious leader, Tenzin Gyatso. Tibet, according to an official description, "is a country in which political and religious affairs [were] carried on simultaneously, with their chief aims the propagation of Buddhism and the seeking of happiness for all souls on earth." The Dalai Lama headed a dual structure of government officials, some from old noble families and some from a special corps of monks, and of monastic religious officials. From time to time a National Assembly was called, more as a way of

rallying the opinion of the élite than for democratic consultation, but in general the country was run by an inbred aristocracy. Medieval intrigues ripped through Lhasa; during the nineteenth century five successive Dalai Lamas died mysteriously in their youth as regents maintained their power, and as recently as 1947 a former regent was apparently murdered in prison during a power struggle.

Both noble families and monasteries held estates. In theory they remained the property of the Dalai Lama, and were only temporarily assigned as rewards for service, but in practice much of Tibet's arable land and the peasants who worked it belonged to the lay and religious élite. While economic practices were primitive, what passed for legal practices were often barbaric: there was no central code of conduct, and no civil law governing how the land was exploited or how the peasants were treated; flogging was a common punishment and maiming was practiced despite a decree theoretically limiting it to punishment for treason and conspiracy against the state. Perhaps half the marriages were polyandrous, a woman's several husbands were usually brothers, and all children were legally considered those of the senior husband. This custom and the assignment of younger sons to monastic celibacy insured that land holdings were not fragmented and (aided by geographic and climatic rigors and the high prevalence of disease) kept the population static.

The Chinese Communists did not at first approach this social structure with avowedly reformist intentions. They called for "the peaceful liberation of Tibet," promising "regional self-government and freedom of religion" as they began to invade the country in 1950. Although they simply seized other remote parts of China militarily in consolidating control of the mainland, they recognized Tibet to be a special case. Holding it at gunpoint, they signed an "Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, 1951." While recognizing the regional government under the Dalai Lama, the agreement took the form of an internal, constitutional arrangement affirming that Tibet had long been part of China, rather than an international treaty adding Tibet to China. Under duress, the young fourteenth Dalai Lama and his advisers reluctantly accepted.

The agreement promised that "the central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet . . . [nor] the

established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama." "The religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and Lama monasteries shall be protected." "In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there shall be no compulsion by the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord. . . ."

However, the Chinese military administration in Lhasa moved quickly to assert its authority over the Dalai Lama's government by indirect means, which included forcing the removal of a prime minister who spoke out against Chinese violations of the agreement. Possibly spurred by communist talk of social and economic reforms, the Dalai Lama named a reforms committee which standardized tax payments and made some other minor changes. But the committee's proposals on the most critical problems—redistribution of the nobles' estates to the peasants and unification of justice under a central authority—were opposed by the powerful landholding nobles who dominated the Tibetan administration. These reforms were also blocked by the Chinese, who presumably wanted to get all the credit for land reform.

The Chinese, the Dalai Lama later charged, "did not lose any opportunity to undermine my authority and sow dissensions among my people . . . [They] commenced a reign of terror . . . forced labor and compulsory exactions, a systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monasteries, and execution of certain leading men in Tibet. . . ." Armed resistance began among the Khambas of eastern Tibet as early as 1954; by 1957 it had become guerrilla warfare, to which the Chinese replied by bombing and shelling monasteries and other centers of defiance. Both warriors and refugees had moved west to the Lhasa area by early 1959, heightening tension there over Chinese attempts to control the Dalai Lama's actions. A popular belief that the Chinese planned to kidnap the Dalai Lama led to mass meetings that repudiated the 1951 agreement and demanded freedom from Chinese rule. The Dalai Lama fled to India, and the Chinese crushed the Lhasa uprising of March 1959, in which some three thousand or more persons were killed.

IV

The dual civil and religious governmental structure which had been headed by the Dalai Lama was abolished by the Chinese

after his escape. The governmental gap was filled by a "preparatory committee" which the Chinese had established in 1956 with Tibetan figureheads to ready the country for a conformist role in the Chinese governmental system. Until 1964 the figureheads were the absent Dalai Lama himself and subsequently the second most important Tibetan religious figure, the Panchen Lama. The latter was chosen by the Chinese and educated for their purposes, but this pathetic figure eventually cried out in anguish over the suffering of his compatriots and the destruction of his religion, and was tossed aside; he is now reportedly in a labor camp. His successor was Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, a noble official who became the leading collaborator in the 1950s and was rewarded in 1965 by being made head of the new government of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Created to signify the final elimination of a special status differing from that of other Chinese minorities areas, the regional government had little time to serve its ostensible purposes before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution pushed it into obscurity.

In the last three years the Tibetan people have been treated to the spectacle of the occupation forces fighting among themselves. In 1966 Red Guards began to challenge the authority of General Chang Kuo-hua, commander of the 1950-51 invasion forces and then the dominant military and political figure in Tibet. After fighting in Lhasa had spread to other Chinese garrison towns, Chang was transferred to Szechwan province. Fighting continued. Estimates of deaths in January and February of 1968 ran to 700, including 250 Tibetans. Some collaborators were reported arrested and tortured by Red Guards, but the few Tibetans involved in the internecine warfare seem to have been youths educated by the Chinese to administer Tibet on behalf of Peking. Finally, last September, the forces of Mao Tse-tung won or compromised—the latter appears more likely—with the creation of a Revolutionary Committee, headed by the military commander for Tibet, Tseng Yung-ya. Tibetan exiles report that all semblance of civilian administration has disappeared; the Chinese army controls everything.

The Chinese have created light industry in Tibet, put secular education on a modern basis and redistributed some land. Because of the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution, the most recent information available on the reforms is that which was given out in 1965 at the time of the creation of the regional

government, when the population was reported at 1,321,500. There were then said to be 1,682 primary schools and seven middle schools with more than 60,000 students being taught the Chinese language and other subjects. Fifteen hospitals and 149 clinics had been opened and about 60 small and medium-sized industrial plants (including a woolen textile mill, cement factory, match factory, paper mill, pharmaceutical plant and turbine pump factory) employed some 25,000 Tibetan workers trained by the Chinese. More than 460,000 acres had allegedly been redistributed, most peasants getting only 0.59 of an acre, however. Irrigated farmland had increased by 30 percent, and according to official claims grain and livestock production rose 45.7 and 36.7 percent respectively from 1958 to 1964 under a system of "mutual aid teams." Tibetan exiles charge that farmers have been deprived of the benefits by heavy exactions to support the Chinese garrison. Indeed, they say the Tibetan people are often hungry and sometimes face starvation. A rigid rationing system is tied to performance of road-work quotas for many Tibetans.

The most profound change wrought by the Chinese in Tibet is the obliteration of organized religion. When the Dalai Lama reached India in 1959, he reported that the Chinese had already destroyed some 1,000 monasteries in eastern Tibet. According to refugee reports, the Lhasa uprising led to Chinese attacks on the seventeenth-century Potala palace at Lhasa and the three big monasteries nearby and, later, against other monasteries. Their irreplaceable records and books were burned, religious statues smashed, icon-like thangka wall hangings torn down; the lamas and monks were killed, put on road gangs or sent back to their villages. A few old lamas were left in Drepung monastery near Lhasa for the benefit of the occasional East European visitor, and a few other monasteries survived in the early 1960s. But renewed assaults by Red Guards eliminated these, and in 1967 the Dalai Lama said that Buddhist practices had been almost completely wiped out in Tibet. More recently he accused the Chinese of "destruction bent upon obliterating Tibetan identity."

v

Lamaist Buddhism is being kept alive today by the Himalayan border regions—the "five fingers"—and by the approximately 85,000 refugees, including some 5,000 lamas and monks, who fled into these regions and to India proper. A former British

prison for Indian independence leaders in the Bengali jungles has become one of their main religious centers. There learned men from Tibetan monasteries pass on their knowledge to young Tibetans, a process that has traditionally taken up to twenty years of verbal instruction but is now being modernized and accelerated. The prison-camp school of bamboo and thatched huts is typical of refugee accommodations. "There is, of course," commented the *Tibetan Review* published by refugees in India, "a total lack of any sign of opulence which one found in the bigger monasteries in Tibet. Even the poorest monastery in Tibet would seem palatial by comparison. But one feels that this is a kind of spiritual purification and has a value far more precious than gold and silk trappings." An Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies was opened in 1968 at the Sanskrit University at Varanasi (Benaras), India, and the Dalai Lama is planning a Tibetan National Library at Dharmasala, India, his home in exile. "Religion without learning is not possible," he says. Already foreseeing in 1957 an approaching danger, the Dalai Lama coöperated with the royal family of Sikkim in establishing the Namgyal Institute of Tibetology in Gangtok and helped it acquire Tibetan books. Some religious books were saved by refugees, some are available in monasteries in Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan, but some important texts may have been lost forever.

Secular education for refugee children in India is being financed almost entirely by the Indian Government. They are learning Hindi and English and normal academic disciplines. A number of foreign countries such as Switzerland, Norway and Japan are helping with scholarships to train Tibetans in the modern skills that a secular state would need. The establishment in 1967, with the Dalai Lama's coöperation, of a Tibetan Institute in Switzerland, where 700 refugees now live, drew a protest from Peking that it was "a gross intervention in the internal affairs of China, a political provocation which the Chinese people can never tolerate."

The adult refugees are predominantly farmers. India has settled 12,500 farmers on newly cleared land and Bhutan has provided for another 1,500. Craft centers have been opened in India and Nepal. Gold and silver that the Dalai Lama sent out of Tibet in 1951 to be hidden in Sikkim for possible future need (the amount has never been officially stated but is estimated to be up to \$3 million—a small fraction of the treasure left behind in

1959) have been invested in small-scale industries in India to earn money for the maintenance of the Dalai Lama's household. Between 18,000 and 20,000 refugees are building roads in the Himalayas for the Indian Government; they and some newly settled farmers are partially supported by U.S. surplus grain channeled through New Delhi.

In 1963 the Dalai Lama, acting as the head of an exile government, promulgated a constitution for the Tibet which he hopes will some day exist as an independent nation. The new constitution, he explained, "takes into consideration the doctrines enunciated by Lord Buddha, the spiritual and temporal heritage of Tibet, and the ideas and ideals of the modern world." Elected representatives of the people, he said, must be allowed "to play a more effective role in guiding and shaping the social and economic policies of the state." Ultimate powers were, however, reserved to the Dalai Lama. In March 1969, in a statement on the tenth anniversary of the Lhasa uprising, he said that "when the day comes for Tibet to be governed by her own people, the people will decide what form of government they will have. The system of governance by the line of the Dalai Lamas may or may not be continued. It is the will of the people that will ultimately determine the future of Tibet. In particular, the increasing political consciousness of our younger generation will be an influential factor."

This tendency toward democratization is partly a result of the exposure of exiled Tibetans to Western thought. Some might also take it as a response to Chinese Communist propaganda concerning their reforms in Tibet. But the Dalai Lama is opposing more than simply communists or militant atheists; he is opposing Chinese control, whether Communist or Nationalist. During the 1959 Lhasa uprising, Chiang Kai-shek sent a message to "fellow countrymen in Tibet" promising that, when the Communist régime fell, "our Government will meet your wishes in accordance with the principle of national self-determination." Refugee spokesmen in India, who remembered the Tibetan Army's defeat of Chinese Nationalist efforts between 1912 and 1949 to regain control of Tibet, found Chiang's attitude patronizingly insufficient. The *Tibetan Review* recently denounced Nationalist claims to have instigated and supported Tibetan resistance to the Communists and accused Taiwan of sabotaging the unity of the Tibetan refugees.

With Peking and Taipei in agreement that Tibet is part of China, the legal weakness of Tibet's claim to independence has deprived the Dalai Lama of the support he has sought from the world community. Tibet appealed to the United Nations for help at the start of the Communist invasion in 1950, when the United Nations was already engaged on the Korean side of China. The appeal was ignored, however, after Britain and India declined to support it on the grounds that Tibet's claim to independence was unclear. Appeals by the exiled Dalai Lama in 1959, 1961 and 1965 brought U.N. resolutions calling for respect of Tibetans' human rights—without naming China as having violated them. India, still striving for good relations with China before their 1962 border fighting, did not support the first two resolutions but in 1965 said that "the Tibetans have been subjected to a continuous and increasing ruthlessness which has few parallels in the annals of the world." The resolutions have been snarlingly rejected by Peking as interference in her internal affairs. The International Commission of Jurists tried to focus attention on the problem in 1960 with a Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet, which found that Chinese policy had "included genocide against the Buddhist religious group and also the large-scale violation of the most basic human rights." But world opinion has taken little notice of such resolutions and findings; it has, instead, added Tibet to the sad catalogue of lost and virtually forgotten causes.

At one time the absent Chinese Communists were defended in the United Nations by the Soviet Union, which in 1959 asserted that Tibet was an internal matter for China and that the so-called revolt there was only the suppression of a reactionary clique of feudal landlords. But the Soviet attitude toward Tibet changed as hostility between Moscow and Peking grew and reached a peak during the Cultural Revolution. "The Tibetans fought for their national freedom and independence in 1959," Radio Tashkent said two years ago. "The Tibetans continue their struggle for their survival and independence, and their independence struggle, like that of other nationalities, will never be subdued." *Kommunist*, the Soviet Communist Party's theoretical journal, reported that some Tibetans are being resettled in the interior of China and that "in Tibet, where there were formerly hardly any Chinese, they now constitute about a third of the whole population."

The Soviet denunciation of Chinese policy in Tibet, after years of approval, aroused in Tibetan exiles a hope of powerful new support for their cause. It is an unpromising hope. The Soviets are using any handy stick to beat "Mao's clique," and this stick may well be dropped when that purpose is served. The Tsarist and Soviet Russians, who expanded into Moslem Central Asia and shaped it to a Russian mold, may find it difficult to chastise the Chinese for following an almost identical policy in Tibet.

Hopes of greater support from the Indian Government are also unpromising. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru initiated a policy of combining sympathy for the Tibetans with cautious detachment from their cause when he accepted Tibet's status as part of China in a 1954 treaty giving up India's old British-acquired special rights there. He refused to allow the Dalai Lama to proclaim an exile government in India in 1959. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is under little moral or political pressure to change this policy at a time when she is plagued by other and far stronger pressures. Besides, India is tightly locked in a dispute with China over India's Himalayan borders and is diplomatically unable now to argue that it is really Tibet's border which China has illegally perched upon.

VI

Amid accounts of the benefits which Communist rule has brought to Tibet, Chinese publications have hinted at trouble that goes beyond "the criminal schemes of reactionary serf-owners" and involves ordinary Tibetans. Popular opposition has undoubtedly fed the guerrilla movement, which never died after the Lhasa uprising. Chinese complaints of "robberies and demolitions" on the eastern and northeastern highways into Tibet and charges that the Dalai Lama "actively organized and trained remnant bandits who have fled abroad to harass frontier areas of the motherland" are testimony to the fact of armed resistance. But details are hard to come by. Red Guard publications said there were 100,000 guerrillas at the time of the Lhasa uprising. The Dalai Lama has quoted Chinese documents as saying 87,000 Tibetans, not all guerrillas, were killed between the outbreak of the uprising and September 1960, when Chinese military pressure had reduced the guerrillas to small units. All India Radio has quoted reports of popular uprisings last summer in two areas of southern Tibet, one led by students, one by farmers.

Peking has alleged that Chinese Nationalist planes from Taiwan began dropping American-made weapons to the guerrillas in 1958. But Taiwan is 1,800 miles from central Tibet; India and Nepal are geographically better located to aid guerrillas. At least until the 1962 Sino-Indian border fighting, India apparently was reluctant to get involved. Some sources say this attitude has now changed, but the only public indication of this comes from Peking. The Chinese Communists charged last January that the Indian Government has financed, armed and trained "Tibetan traitor bandits headed by the Dalai [Lama] . . . and sent them into Chinese territory to carry out harassment and sabotage activities." The United States was accused of being "the stage manager" of this disruptive activity. "Agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency constantly sneak into the dens of the [guerrillas] to engage in clandestine activities," Peking asserts.

Nepal's position is more difficult than India's. The 9,000 Tibetan refugees in Nepal include some in northern border areas beyond Kathmandu's effective control. Some are guerrillas who from time to time stage raids into Tibet. Peking, which is competing hard against India for Nepal's favor, has not raised any public objections to this situation.

Guerrilla activities are unlikely to change the situation in Tibet significantly. They constitute harassment rather than a liberation movement, although the Dalai Lama called upon Tibetan exiles in March "to strive toward liberation" of their homeland. He added that Tibetan independence "in the near future depends primarily upon our own efforts" but he did not spell out what might be done. Despite the Cultural Revolution, the Dalai Lama does not express much hope that 1911 will repeat itself with a collapse of the Chinese central government that would allow Tibet to regain control of its own affairs.

So the prospect appears bleak. But, with a spiritual serenity, the Dalai Lama believes that the outward appearance of a solid Chinese grip on his homeland might not represent reality, that perhaps all is not so black as the suffering of this life makes it seem. With a religious charity, he hopes the next generation of Chinese leaders might be "more reasonable." But he and his people now in exile know that, if ever they do return to Tibet, it will be a different place. The old Tibet they left behind has ceased to exist.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY. BY PAUL RAMSEY. New York: Scribner, 1968, 554 p. \$12.50.

A Protestant theologian wrestles with the problems of force, justice and peace. In a highly rational and multi-faceted analysis, the author concludes that no easy generalizations are possible.

THE CONFLICT OF GENERATIONS: THE CHARACTER AND SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDENT MOVEMENTS. BY LEWIS S. FEUER. New York: Basic Books, 1969, 543 p. \$12.50.

In this fine survey of student movements in the West during the last two centuries, the author identifies a common thread of the parricide wish everywhere. The analysis is often keen, but least incisive on the recent student revolts in the United States.

LAW, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE. BY EUGENE V. ROSTOW. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1968, 133 p. \$5.00.

A spirited defense of Presidents Truman (in Korea, Berlin, Greece, Turkey and Iran), Kennedy (in Cuba) and Johnson (in the Middle East and in Viet Nam), by the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

TOTALITARIAN RULE: ITS NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS. BY HANS BUCHHEIM. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1968, 112 p. \$4.50.

A fine theoretical exploration, though heavily indebted to Hannah Arendt's "The Origins of Totalitarianism." Somewhat discursive but full of insight.

LINKAGE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE CONVERGENCE OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS. EDITED BY JAMES N. ROSENAU. New York: Free Press (for the Princeton Center of International Studies), 1969, 352 p. \$8.50.

Twelve imaginative essays exploring the boundaries between national and international systems. A fruitful though somewhat strained experiment.

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS: WORLD POLITICS IN OUR TIME. BY JOHN G. STOESSINGER. New York: Random House, 1969, 455 p. \$7.95.

A treatment of world politics in terms of three conceptual principles: the struggle for power and order; the East-West and colonial-anticolonial struggles; and the gaps between perception and reality and their impact on world politics. (The third edition of a work that first appeared in 1961.)

NOTE—By special arrangement with World Affairs Book Center, readers of FOREIGN AFFAIRS may obtain, *post free*, any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, with check or money order, to Desk FA, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

WHY FEDERATIONS FAIL: AN INQUIRY INTO THE REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL FEDERALISM. EDITED BY THOMAS M. FRANCK. New York: New York University Press, 1968, 213 p. \$7.50.

The first systematic analysis, through four case studies, of the reasons for the disintegration of federations. A welcome addition to the literature on the federative process.

A METHODOLOGICAL PRIMER FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS. BY ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI AND OTHERS. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968, 484 p. \$8.50.

The authors attempt to chart a course through the labyrinth of recent methodological work in political science. They exhibit a strong preference for the behavioral persuasion and dismiss the more traditional theorists somewhat cavalierly.

MINUTES OF THE SIXTIES. BY JAMES EAYRS. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968, 273 p. \$5.95.

A Canadian reporter etches some sharp vignettes from dramatic moments in recent history.

A PECULIAR PEOPLE. BY BARNET LITVINOFF. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1969, 308 p. \$7.50.

A valuable and highly informative account of Jewish communities in the modern world. The author predicts greater assimilation for American Jewry.

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF FASCISM. BY DENNIS EISENBERG. New York: A. S. Barnes, 1968, 348 p. \$7.50.

A revealing though somewhat exaggerated account of neo-Nazi, Fascist and other extreme right-wing groups in the world today.

A TIME FOR HYSTERIA: THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO DISARMAMENT. BY MORTIMER LIPSKY. New York: A. S. Barnes, 1969, 293 p. \$6.00.

A passionate and politically naïve plea to the "common man" to initiate disarmament throughout the world.

THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. EDITED BY KARL W. DEUTSCH AND STANLEY HOFFMANN. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1968, 280 p. \$10.00.

Eleven scholars of international law honor Professor Leo Gross in this *Festschrift*. They have honored him well. All the essays are topical, perceptive and valuable.

THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY. BY THOMAS M. FRANCK. New York: Macmillan (for the Center for International Studies, New York University), 1968, 344 p. \$8.95.

A plea for judicial arbitration of the world's great political problems. A heroic effort, but one which will not convince those adherents of the Realpolitik school whom the author tries—not very successfully—to demolish.

PUBLIC POLICYMAKING REEXAMINED. BY YEHEZKEL DROR. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968, 370 p. \$7.50.

A heavily behavioral and systems-analysis approach to the subject. Turgid prose and plentiful use of quantification techniques lead to rather commonplace conclusions.

CONTENDING APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. EDITED BY KLAUS KNORR AND JAMES N. ROSENAU. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Princeton Center of International Studies), 1969, 297 p. \$7.50.

A balanced and sophisticated group of essays emphasizing the compatibility of tradition and science in the study of international politics.

CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY. BY JOHAN KAUFMANN. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1968, 222 p. \$7.00 (Leyden: Sijthoff, Gldrs. 25).

Part manual and part analysis, this is an unusual and often witty book reflecting the author's experiences as a Dutch diplomat.

AS OTHERS SEE US. BY GÖRAN PALM. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968, 249 p. \$6.95.

The "have-nots" of the world look at and accuse the West, through the eyes of an empathetic young Swedish social activist.

MODERN DIPLOMATIC LAW. BY MICHAEL HARDY. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1968, 150 p. \$5.00.

This monograph contains much useful technical information.

THE DIPLOMATIC PERSUADERS. EDITED BY JOHN LEE. New York: Wiley, 1968, 205 p. \$8.50.

Informative glimpses into government-mass media relations in fifteen countries.

GEWALTFREIER AUFSTAND: ALTERNATIVE ZUM BÜRGERKRIEG. BY THEODOR EBERT. Freiburg: Rombach, 1968, 408 p. DM. 32.

Few scholarly works could be more timely than this "Intelligent Man's Guide to Non-Violent Insurrection." Lucidly written, based on Indian and American experience and informed by contemporary sociological theories, this book should interest rebels and non-rebels alike.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. EDITED BY ASBJÖRN EIDE AND AUGUST SCHOU. New York: Wiley, 1968, 300 p. \$17.50.

Fourteen essays on human rights prepared under the auspices of the Norwegian Nobel Institute. Useful but in need of connecting tissue.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

A HISTORY OF WARFARE. BY FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1968, 584 p. \$15.00.

In this beautifully illustrated book, the old British soldier provides a stimulating survey of the major wars and battles throughout history. His book suggests that he would like to change the old motto "If you want peace, prepare for war" to "If you want peace, understand war."

THE BITTER WOODS. BY JOHN S. D. EISENHOWER. New York: Putnam, 1969, 506 p. \$10.00.

In this account of Hitler's 1944 Ardennes offensive, well told from the Allied point of view, the author concludes that the German attack in the West permitted the Russians to advance farther into Germany, with far-reaching results for the postwar division of Europe.

MEN WHO PLAY GOD. BY NORMAN MOSS. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 352 p. \$6.95.

A fast-paced though well-researched book about the birth of the H-Bomb and the statesmen and scientists who have thought most about its implications. There is a particularly good chapter on Herman Kahn.

THE WAR TO END ALL WARS. By EDWARD M. COFFMAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 412 p. \$9.75.

A first-rate study of the military experience of the United States in the First World War. The author's conclusion that the Allies could not have won the war without American help is a debatable one, however.

PRESIDENT WILSON FIGHTS HIS WAR. By HARVEY A. DEWEERD. New York: Macmillan, 1968, 457 p. \$12.50.

A fine military history of the background and impact of the American war effort in Europe during World War I. President Wilson and General Pershing emerge as the author's heroes.

THE SILENT WEAPONS. By ROBIN CLARKE. New York: McKay, 1968, 270 p. \$4.95.

A British scientist appeals to the world's scientific community to deny its coöperation in the development of chemical and biological warfare arsenals. A long shot.

ARMS CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By DAVID V. EDWARDS. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, 200 p. \$7.50 (Paper, \$4.50).

A serious, succinct and realistic study of the present limitations and the future possibilities of arms control.

ROMMEL AS MILITARY COMMANDER. By RONALD LEWIN. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1968, 262 p. \$8.95.

The author assesses Rommel as one of the great commanders of all time and as a man who preserved his honor to the end.

UNLESS PEACE COMES. EDITED BY NIGEL CALDER. New York: Viking, 1968, 243 p. \$5.75.

A grim forecast about the weapons of the 1980s. Samples include "robots on the march," "psychic poisons" and "infectious clouds."

MILITARY OCCUPATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY. By MARTIN AND JOAN KYRE. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1968, 198 p. \$6.00.

A useful study of U.S. military government policies from the Mexican war through Viet Nam. The author emphasizes the relationship between national politics at home and occupation policies abroad.

GUERRILLA: KRIEG OHNE FRONTEN. By WERNER HAHLEWEG. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1968, 297 p. DM. 26.

A concise factual overview of guerrilla warfare from ancient times to the war in Viet Nam.

USES OF THE SEAS. EDITED BY EDMUND A. GULLION. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall (for the American Assembly, Columbia University), 1968, 202 p. \$2.45 (Paper).

Six excellent essays exploring the strategic, political and economic implications of future ocean science.

THE WEAPONS MERCHANTS. By BERNT ENGELMANN. New York: Crown, 1968, 224 p. \$4.95.

A sensationalist account of clandestine international arms deals, with a thinly disguised anti-American bias.

General: Economic and Social

COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. BY P. J. D. WILES. New York: Praeger, 1969, 566 p. \$12.50.

Hardly a thought, alive or dead, theoretical or practical, escapes comment in this wordy, sometimes witty, idiosyncratic treatise.

AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD: SIX LECTURES ON DIRECT INVESTMENT. BY CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 225 p. \$6.75 (Paper, \$1.95).

The lecture form exempts the author from pursuing all the ideas he launches, but he covers a lot of ground.

THE ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN AID. BY RAYMOND F. MIKESELL. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968, 300 p. \$7.95.

Solid, thorough and clear, with fairly concrete recommendations for the best use of aid at different stages of development.

THE OPEN ECONOMY: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE. EDITED BY PETER B. KENEN AND ROGER LAWRENCE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 391 p. \$12.50.

Interesting technical papers coming out of Columbia's International Economics Workshop.

THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION: ORIGIN, OPERATIONS, AND EVALUATION. BY JAMES C. BAKER. New York: Praeger, 1968, 271 p. \$17.50.

The only full-length account of the work of the World Bank's affiliate that helps finance private business. Though his verdict is very favorable, the author, like other observers, wonders whether "IFC could have done more."

ECONOMIC THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. EDITED BY BRUCE M. RUSSETT. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968, 542 p. \$7.95.

A collection of some interesting, often unsatisfactory, attempts to apply economic theory to political problems.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE CRISES: AN ESSAY IN ECONOMIC PATHOLOGY. BY PAUL EINZIG. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968, 205 p. \$6.00.

After decades of anatomizing crises while they were still warm, the British journalist has produced a clear and remarkably complete *catalogue raisonnée* of the elements of the problem that somehow seems more like an introduction than a synthesis.

PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST NATIONS. BY FREDERIC L. PRYOR. Homewood (Ill.): Irwin, 1968, 543 p. \$8.50.

A major venture in comparative economics, inevitably heavily laden with analytical apparatus. It breaks down some stereotypes but produces only a few conclusions to replace them.

WIRTSCHAFTSREFORMEN IN OSTEUROPA. EDITED BY KARL C. THALHEIM AND HANS-HERMANN HÖHMANN. Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1968, 309 p. DM. 32.

Nine substantial country studies and two more general papers on the economic reforms in communist countries.

FROM UNDERDEVELOPMENT TO AFFLUENCE: WESTERN, SOVIET, AND CHINESE VIEWS. EDITED BY HARRY G. SHAFFER AND JAN S. PRYBYLA. New York: Appleton, 1968, 441 p. \$4.95 (Paper).

Distinguished from other books of readings on development by the inclusion of much Russian and Chinese material.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES: GREECE, ISRAEL, TAIWAN, AND THAILAND. PREPARED BY THE COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. New York: Praeger, 1968, 215 p. \$10.00.

Thoughtful, critical case studies helpful in understanding the role of aid and investment in growth.

FINANCING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FISCAL POLICY FOR EMERGING COUNTRIES. BY ROBERT B. BANGS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 212 p. \$7.50.

Tax and spending policies to promote growth under different conditions, by a U.S. government economist with experience in less developed countries.

L'ÉCONOMIE SOCIALISTE: PERSPECTIVES DE L'AN 2000. BY ROBERT MOSSÉ. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1968, 328 p. Fr. 31.90.

Thirty years' worth of papers by a leading French economist neatly pointed to the problems of creating a democratic, consumer-oriented socialism in the next thirty.

LA DERNIÈRE CHANCE DU TIERS MONDE. BY MAURICE GUERNIER. Paris: Laffont, 1968, 339 p. Fr. 21.80.

Eloquent plea by a former French official for a global development strategy emphasizing common markets, education, self-help and unpolitical multilateral aid.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICIES. BY MAURICE DOMERGUE. New York: Praeger, 1968, 196 p. \$13.00.

A practical guide by an OECD official.

The United States

THE POLITICS OF WAR. BY GABRIEL KOLKO. New York: Random House, 1969, 685 p. \$12.95.

A substantial and carefully researched analysis of American policy, 1943-1945, particularly good on the interplay between domestic and international forces in the shaping of foreign policy. The author suggests that the American leaders, in their efforts to build a *Pax Americana*, refused to see the limits of American power in the postwar world.

AMERICAN POWER AND THE NEW MANDARINS. BY NOAM CHOMSKY. New York: Pantheon Books, 1969, 404 p. \$7.95.

The author, a passionate opponent of the Vietnamese war, singles out the American intellectual establishment, especially the "technical experts," for special responsibility. As a polemic the book is arresting; to proclaim it as "a monument of scholarship," as the publisher does, is a vast exaggeration.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. BY HENRY A. KISSINGER. New York: Norton, 1969, 143 p. \$3.95.

These three essays are largely drawn from previously published articles and books, but the synthesis is artfully done and provides a good cross-section of Mr. Kissinger's thinking on foreign policy.

TANGLE OF HOPES: AMERICAN COMMITMENTS AND WORLD ORDER. BY ERNST B. HAAS. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, 306 p. \$7.95.

A systematic analysis of American involvements in international organizations today, with some thoughtful policy recommendations.

NO MORE VIETNAMS? THE WAR AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. EDITED BY RICHARD M. PFEFFER. New York: Harper and Row (for the Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs), 1968, 299 p. \$5.95.

Twenty-six scholars explore the lessons of Viet Nam. The spectrum of views is fairly wide, with a pronounced tendency toward the critical.

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORLD POWER. BY SENATOR GALE W. MCGEE. Washington: National Press, 1968, 274 p. \$6.95.

The Senator from Wyoming defends the American involvement in Viet Nam as an essential price of world leadership.

THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON. BY ERIC F. GOLDMAN. New York: Knopf, 1969, 531 p. \$8.95.

President Johnson seen as a tragic figure not because of what he *did* but because of what he *was*. "Seriously flawed in personal characteristics," he could not command the trust of the American people. Though he "could win votes, enact laws, maneuver mountains," a weak ego undid him in the end.

THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE: IDEAS, POWER AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA. BY ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. Boston: Houghton, 1969, 313 p. \$5.95.

Six probing essays on violence in America, the role of the intellectual, college unrest, the cold war, Viet Nam and the prospects for American politics. Some of this material has been published before but it is skillfully woven together and handy to have between covers.

FIRES IN THE IN-BASKET: THE ABC'S OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. BY JOHN P. LEACACOS. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1968, 552 p. \$8.95.

This is one of the most intelligent and balanced studies of the State Department to have appeared in recent years. The author has provided a wealth of valuable information in a most readable manner.

THE PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMAT. BY JOHN ENSOR HARR. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 404 p. \$11.50.

An excellent in-depth analysis of the Foreign Service officer corps of the U.S. Foreign Service. The author concludes with some sane managerial recommendations.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. EDITED BY EDGAR B. NIXON. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1969, 3 v. \$32.50.

These three beautifully executed volumes cover the four years of FDR's first term. The documents collected here shed considerable light on America's reactions to the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, the Italo-Ethiopian war, war debts and the birth of the Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America.

POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS. BY JAMES L. SUNDQUIST. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968, 560 p. \$8.75.

The author of this first-rate piece of research maintains that the legislative successes of the Johnson Administration on matters of domestic policy were attributable not only to President Johnson's own efforts but in even larger measure to those of political activists within the Congress.

THE DRUGSTORE LIBERAL. BY ROBERT SHERRILL AND HARRY W. ERNST. New York: Grossman, 1968, 200 p. \$4.95.

Humphrey emerges from this book as a man who cannot say "no" to anyone, a peculiar mixture of sincerity, responsibility and instability.

REPUBLICAN PAPERS. EDITED BY MELVIN R. LAIRD. New York: Praeger, 1968, 500 p. \$7.95; Garden City: Doubleday, \$1.95 (Paper).

The Republican credo on most of the crucial questions of domestic and foreign policy is set forth here in 29 "discussion papers."

AGENDA FOR THE NATION. EDITED BY KERMIT GORDON. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968, 620 p. \$6.95; Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, \$3.50 (Paper).

Eighteen men—all members of the American intellectual establishment—have contributed essays on major domestic and foreign policy issues. The quality is almost uniformly high.

THE GOLDWATER COALITION: REPUBLICAN STRATEGIES IN 1964. BY JOHN H. KESSEL. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968, 371 p. \$8.50.

A lively and fairly sophisticated postmortem on the formation of the political coalition that won Senator Goldwater the Presidential nomination in 1964.

AGENTS OF CHANGE: A CLOSE LOOK AT THE PEACE CORPS. BY DAVID HAPGOOD AND MERIDAN BENNETT. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968, 244 p. \$5.95.

The authors interviewed several hundred Peace Corps Volunteers in seventeen programs all over the world. The result is a useful and informative book largely reflecting the views of the Volunteers themselves.

THE DISSENTING ACADEMY. EDITED BY THEODORE ROSZAK. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 304 p. \$6.95.

An "anti-textbook" prepared by eleven critics of the academic establishment. The contributors are most unhappy with the ways in which their subjects are presently researched and taught.

ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II. BY ROBERT A. DIVINE. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969, 107 p. \$5.95.

The author of these four sensitive essays maintains that "Roosevelt's claim to greatness must rest on his achievements in domestic affairs" rather than on his conduct of foreign policy.

WAR, PEACE, AND THE PRESIDENCY. BY HENRY PAOLUCCI. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, 241 p. \$6.95.

The political credo of a conservative on the major domestic and foreign policy issues confronting the United States.

AMERICA: THE CHANGING NATION. BY GERALD PRIESTLAND. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1969, 341 p. \$6.75. (London: Eyre, 1968, 42/.)

The Washington correspondent of the BBC paints a broad-brush, generally not unattractive, picture of recent American responses to domestic and international crises.

TALK ABOUT AMERICA. BY ALISTAIR COOKE. New York: Knopf, 1968, 310 p. \$5.95.

Forty-one broadcasts, all given on the BBC. Most of them wear well.

ALL BUT THE PEOPLE: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND HIS CRITICS, 1933-39. BY GEORGE WOLFSKILL AND JOHN A. HUDSON. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 386 p. \$7.95.

The entire spectrum of criticism of FDR's policies from 1933 to 1939. The savagery of the attacks is equally fierce from both Left and Right extremists.

THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY. BY JOHN W. HENDERSON. New York: Praeger, 1969, 324 p. \$6.95.

A factual, straightforward and, on the whole, favorable assessment of the USIA.

The Western Hemisphere

PENTAGONISM: A SUBSTITUTE FOR IMPERIALISM. BY JUAN BOSCH. New York: Grove Press, 1969, 141 p. \$5.00.

Bosch's thesis—that the "Pentagonism" of the military-industrial complex is the new form of imperialism and world manipulation—loses its way in a wilderness of misconceptions, emotional bias, errors of fact and naïve clichés pedantically expressed.

COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA. BY PAUL J. DEUTSCHMANN AND OTHERS. New York: Praeger, 1968, 123 p. \$15.00.

A study of the perception of change, and communication as an agent of its dissemination, among urban professionals and technicians.

LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS. BY CLIFFORD A. HAUBERG. Minneapolis: Denison, 1968, 303 p. \$4.95.

Descriptions of revolutionary movements in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. The sources are secondary, and the treatment conventional and cursory.

CASTRO, THE KREMLIN, AND COMMUNISM IN LATIN AMERICA. BY D. BRUCE JACKSON. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, School of Advanced International Studies), 1969, 163 p. \$2.45 (Paper).

The political interactions of the Russian, Cuban and Latin American governments are set forth in an authoritative, concise and clear manner.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE MANUFACTURING EXPERIENCE OF MEXICO AND PUERTO RICO. BY W. PAUL STRASSMANN. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, 353 p. \$12.50.

An inquiry into the diffusion, innovation and absorption of technology with some suggestions for improving these very imperfect processes.

ZAPATA: THE IDEOLOGY OF A PEASANT REVOLUTIONARY. BY ROBERT P. MILLON. New York: International Publishers, 1969, 159 p. \$5.95 (Paper, \$2.25).

A competent account of the program, tactics and thought of the peasant revolutionary, Zapata, and his relation to other elements in the Mexican revolution. Several novel interpretations are presented.

CAPITAL FORMATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO. BY JOSEPH S. LA CASCIA. New York: Praeger, 1969, 190 p. \$15.00.

A technical investigation, with extensive statistical analysis, of changing patterns of Mexican capital formation during 1959-1966.

LAND REFORM AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN BOLIVIA. BY DWIGHT B. HEATH AND OTHERS. New York: Praeger, 1969, 464 p. \$18.50.

A detailed, complete description of agricultural and social systems in Bolivia, together with proposals for change. The authors' awareness of the cultural milieu is gratifying.

A CENTURY OF BRAZILIAN HISTORY SINCE 1865: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS. EDITED BY RICHARD GRAHAM. New York: Knopf, 1969, 233 p. \$3.95.

Twenty-three essays, for the most part historical, illuminate a wide and interesting cross-section of Brazilian politics and culture during the last hundred years.

CUBANS IN EXILE: DISAFFECTION AND THE REVOLUTION. BY RICHARD R. FAGEN AND OTHERS. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, 161 p. \$5.95.

A statistical survey, based on questionnaires, of the attitudes of Cuban exiles in the United States concerning the Castro revolution. An interesting final chapter considers the meaning and consequences of the exodus.

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN THE CARIBBEAN. BY SIR HAROLD MITCHELL. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1968, 520 p. \$10.00.

Each Caribbean country and territory is competently considered in its political and economic aspects. Region-wide analyses are also provided in particular fields. A useful volume.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS. BY CARLEEN O'LOUGHLIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, 260 p. \$8.75.

An expert and clearly written analysis, broadly conceived, of an area long neglected by American scholars.

THE CARIBBEAN: ITS HEMISPHERIC ROLE. EDITED BY A. CURTIS WILGUS. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1968, 202 p. \$7.50.

Papers presented at the 17th annual Caribbean Conference at the University of Florida, covering a wide range of subjects. Several studies are instructive; too many are brief and shallow.

DIVIDED ISLAND: FACTION AND UNITY ON SAINT PIERRE. BY WILLIAM A. CHRISTIAN, JR. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 212 p. \$7.50.

The author of this searching analysis of the Pétainist-Gaullist division on the French island of Saint Pierre maintains that the divisions that plagued the island were those of France herself in microcosm. Reminiscent of Laurence Wylie's "Village in the Vaucluse."

Western Europe

ANATOMY OF EUROPE. BY ANTHONY SAMPSON. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 462 p. \$7.95.

A penetrating look at the new Europe, at its architects, its characteristic institutions and its ways of life—and at its student critics who would lead it into different paths. Intelligent and readable, and highly informative, by a veteran observer of the British anatomy.

JOURNAL D'UNE ÉPOQUE (1926-1946). BY DENIS DE ROUGEMONT. Paris: Gallimard, 1968, 596 p. Fr. 35.

The record of a writer's thoughts and experiences, first in Europe and then, during the war, in the Americas. Uneven in depth, but thoroughly absorbing and interesting.

THE SYSTEM: THE MISGOVERNMENT OF MODERN BRITAIN. BY MAX NICHOLSON. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 455 p. \$10.95.

A radical indictment of how earlier forms and principles have hobbled British life in the last decades. "Perhaps nowhere in the world is the gap between readily realizable potential and total actual performance more pronounced than in Britain." A revealing and symptomatic work, by a sometime administrator.

EXPERIENCES. BY ARNOLD TOYNBEE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 417 p. \$8.75.

"Few countries have experienced so great a change of fortune as Britain has between 1889 and 1969," and few men lived through that change more consciously than Toynbee. The historian and the moralist combine to give the reader thoughts and maxims on a vast variety of subjects. Stimulating and civilized always, familiar and exasperating sometimes.

THE YEARS OF THE WEEK. BY PATRICIA COCKBURN. London: Macdonald, 1968, 287 p. 42/.

The fascinating story of a London news-sheet which in the 1930s dug up and occasionally invented news to promote radical anti-Fascism. Told with verve and insight by the editor's wife.

THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL FROM BRITAIN 1870-1914. EDITED BY A. R. HALL. London: Methuen, 1968, 190 p. (New York: Barnes and Noble, distributor, \$5.00; Paper, \$2.50.)

At a time when foreign investment is of increasing interest, this collection of rather specialized essays about Britain's experience before the First World War is of more than historical interest.

THE GENERAL! BY PIERRE GALANTE. New York: Random House, 1969, 242 p. \$5.95.

A series of amiable anecdotes, interspersed with trenchant quotations from de Gaulle himself.

WHY FRANCE FELL. BY GUY CHAPMAN. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, 403 p. \$7.95.

A close analysis of France's military defeat, "... the result of twenty years' blindness to the facts of 1914-18." The relation between political failure and military disaster could perhaps have been probed even more deeply. Written by a veteran of the First World War and a student of French affairs.

LA FIN DE LA III^e RÉPUBLIQUE: 10 JUILLET 1940. BY EMMANUEL BERL. Paris: Gallimard, 1968, 366 p. Fr. 25.

The political aftermath of France's military defeat—or the road to Vichy. A popular sequel to Chapman's book.

PIERRE LAVAL AND THE ECLIPSE OF FRANCE. BY GEOFFREY WARNER. New York: Macmillan, 1969, 461 p. \$8.95.

An absorbing and judicious account of the life and times of a wildly controversial figure. A young historian examines the evidence and stresses Laval's efforts at Realpolitik. In some situations, principle may be a surer guide than attempted realism.

LE PROGRESSISME EN FRANCE SOUS LA 4^e RÉPUBLIQUE: LES HOMMES—L'ORGANISATION—LES ÉLECTEURS. BY JACQUES VAUDIAUX. Paris: Cujas, 1968, 261 p. Fr. 30.

A scholarly study of a small group of left-wing deputies who, while insisting on their independence, usually sided with the Communists. It could also be entitled the Perils of Fellow-Traveling.

THE NEW JACOBINS: THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE POPULAR FRONT. BY DANIEL R. BROWER. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968, 265 p. \$7.95.

A useful study of Communist tactics which prescribed support of non-radical governments. "Ironically . . . the Popular Front was more successful for the French Communists than for the Russians."

CRISIS AND DECLINE: THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY IN THE POPULAR FRONT ERA. BY NATHANAEL GREENE. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 361 p. \$11.00.

The clash between socialist hopes and totalitarian realities hastened the collapse of France's Socialist Party. A thorough and absorbing story, ably recounted by an American historian.

FRENCH REGIONAL PLANNING. BY NILES M. HANSEN. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968, 319 p. \$12.00.

A solid study of France's far-reaching efforts at regional planning, written primarily for economists, but of general political interest.

THE SPIRIT OF MAY. BY J.-J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969, 116 p. \$4.95.

A breathless, passionate and surprisingly superficial defense of the students' uprising. The author cites his successful "The American Challenge" to prove that he had diagnosed the deep dissatisfactions before the eruption of last May confirmed their existence.

THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION OF GERMANY: POLITICS AND THE MILITARY, 1945-1949. BY JOHN GIMBEL. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, 335 p. \$8.75.

An American scholar judiciously examines the formation and substance of our policies which embodied national interests as well as ideals. Based partly on new evidence from American and German archives.

THE NAZI PERSECUTION OF THE CHURCHES, 1933-45. BY J. S. CONWAY. New York: Basic Books, 1968, 474 p. \$10.00.

Another hard look at the problem of collaboration and resistance in the relations of the Third Reich to organized Christianity. Based on some new sources and focused largely on Nazi policy, the author, an English historian, shares the revisionist conclusions of recent critics of the Christian response to Nazi totalitarianism.

GERMANY BEYOND THE WALL: PEOPLE, POLITICS . . . AND PROSPERITY. BY JEAN EDWARD SMITH. Boston: Little, Brown, 1969, 338 p. \$8.95.

A general appraisal of much-neglected East Germany, by a political scientist who toured the country thoroughly and studied its problems. He is impressed by the economic miracle that the other Germany has wrought, and corrects—perhaps too strenuously—the earlier view of a drab society with little success or support.

DAS ÖSTERREICHISCHE REGIERUNGSSYSTEM: GROSSE KOALITION ODER ALTERNIERENDE REGIERUNG? BY KARL-HEINZ NASS-MACHER. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1968, 243 p. DM. 21.

A rather ponderous effort to place Austria's practice of coalition governments in a general framework of parliamentary politics.

ZU GROSS FÜR ÖSTERREICH: SEIPEL UND BAUER IM KAMPF UM DIE ERSTE REPUBLIK. BY VIKTOR REIMANN. Vienna: Molden, 1968, 414 p. Schillings 160.

The political struggles of post-1919 Austria, as reflected in the lives of the two principal antagonists, a cleric and a socialist. A popular work.

LE PORTUGAL ET SALAZAR. BY CHRISTIAN RUDEL. Paris: Éditions Ouvrières, 1968, 158 p. Fr. 11.50.

The principal aspects of Portuguese society and politics briefly examined.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE UNPERFECT SOCIETY: BEYOND THE NEW CLASS. BY MILOVAN DJILAS. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1969, 267 p. \$5.00.

Intended originally as a sequel to his "The New Class," the present work has a quite different intellectual framework, reflecting the author's departure from Marxism. The most interesting portions of the book are the most personal—Djilas' internal and external struggles over the last decade or so, years largely spent in prison.

DISARMAMENT AND SOVIET POLICY, 1964-1968. BY THOMAS B. LARSON. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969, 280 p. \$6.95.

This study of Soviet attitudes toward disarmament since Khrushchev is designed as a sequel to Alexander Dallin's "The Soviet Union and Disarmament" (1965).

THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND MODERN SOCIETY. BY GEORGE FISCHER. New York: Atherton Press, 1968, 199 p. \$7.50.

Using as his basic data the careers of some 300 top party executives, the author pushes his analysis in two directions: toward the detection of trends in Soviet society and toward a refinement of models for social structures.

BASIC LAWS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOVIET STATE. TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY HAROLD J. BERMAN AND JOHN B. QUIGLEY, JR. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, 325 p. \$4.00 (Paper).

A useful collection of laws and decrees relating to the legislative, administrative and judicial aspects of the Soviet state.

THE RUSSIANS. BY LEONID VLADIMIROV. New York: Praeger, 1968, 249 p. \$6.95.

The author, a former Soviet journalist, obviously knows much about life in his country. One could wish, however, that he had emphasized areas he knows best—such as the world of journalism—and not attempted to cover the waterfront.

AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN THE U.S.S.R. EDITED BY ROBERT CONQUEST. New York: Praeger, 1969, 139 p. \$5.00.

A concise account of the vicissitudes of the Russian peasant since 1917, but with emphasis on the post-Stalin years.

THE ECONOMICS OF SOVIET OIL AND GAS. BY ROBERT W. CAMPBELL. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1968, 279 p. \$8.50.

A study emphasizing the economic aspects of the Soviet oil and gas industry, in particular the decision-making process.

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE SOVIET UNION. EDITED BY ALEX SIMIRENKO. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969, 439 p. \$14.95.

A collection of essays by twelve specialists on the state of the discipline in the various social sciences.

SOCIAL WELFARE IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY BERNICE Q. MADISON. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968, 298 p. \$8.50.

A solid historical and functional study of social welfare programs and services.

LENINGRAD: A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET URBAN GOVERNMENT. BY DAVID T. CATTELL. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Institute of Public Administration), 1968, 171 p. \$12.50.

A close study of urban government and administration in a major though far from typical Soviet city.

"JUNE 22, 1941": SOVIET HISTORIANS AND THE GERMAN INVASION. BY VLADIMIR PETROV. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1968, 322 p. \$5.95.

A translation, with commentary, of A. M. Nekrich's book on the background of the German invasion of Russia, which appeared in 1965, and of some of the critical reviews and attacks which ensued. Interesting for the controversies surrounding de-Stalinization.

THE ROADS TO RUSSIA. BY ROBERT HUHNS JONES. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1969, 326 p. \$6.95.

A scholarly account of U.S. Lend-Lease to Russia during World War II.

LENIN'S LAST STRUGGLE. BY MOSHE LEWIN. New York: Pantheon Books, 1968, 193 p. \$4.95.

An able account of the last phase of Lenin's career, the agonizing year before his completely disabling stroke of March 1923.

THE CHORNOVIL PAPERS. COMPILED BY VYACHESLAV CHORNOVIL. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968, 246 p. \$6.95.

Quite revealing documents—memoranda, petitions and the like—by a Ukrainian journalist and other intellectuals who suffered incarceration in connection with the ongoing tensions between Moscow and the Ukraine.

TAISTELU LENINGRADISTA JA SUOMI. BY HELGE SEPPÄLÄ. Helsinki: Söderström, 1969, 280 p. Fmk. 23.

An engrossing study of how Finland's political and military policies have been influenced by the adjacent Neva region. Utilizing to advantage recently published Soviet studies, the book, written by a high-ranking officer, sheds much new light, especially on Finland's role in the siege of Leningrad.

PÄIVÄKIRJANI PÄÄMAJASTA 1941-1944. BY W. E. TUOMPO. Helsinki: Söderström, 1968, 266 p. Fmk. 15.

A high-ranking staff officer's diary, viewing military and political developments from within Mannerheim's headquarters during the Continuation War and throwing new light on the Finnish commander-in-chief.

PRAGUE'S 200 DAYS: THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BY HARRY SCHWARTZ. New York: Praeger, 1969, 274 p. \$5.95.

A specialist on communist affairs for *The New York Times* effectively recounts the aborted Czechoslovak effort at "self-liberation" during the months from January to August 1968.

LE PRINTEMPS DE PRAGUE. BY PAVEL TIGRID. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1968, 278 p. Fr. 18.

A valuable documentary history of the background to the "Dubcek era," up to the Soviet intervention of August 1968.

AUGUST 21ST: THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BY COLIN CHAPMAN. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968, 123 p. \$1.45 (Paper).

A brief account of the Soviet intervention, by the foreign news editor of *The Sunday Times*, London.

THE CZECH BLACK BOOK. EDITED BY ROBERT LITTELL. New York: Praeger, 1969, 303 p. \$6.95.

An important source, with many documents, for the Soviet invasion of August 1968, prepared by the Institute of History of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

EAGLES IN COBWEBS: NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN THE BALKANS. BY PAUL LENDVAI. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 396 p. \$6.95.

An interesting discussion, by a Hungarian-born journalist, of the recent and diverse trends in Yugoslavia, Rumania, Albania and Bulgaria.

LA GRÈCE À L'OMBRE DES ÉPÉES. BY JEAN-FRANÇOIS CHAUVEL. Paris: Laffont, 1968, 280 p. Fr. 14.90.

A French journalist's account of events in Greece from the coup of April 21, 1967, to the departure of the King in December.

VICTOIRE D'UNE DÉFAITE: BUDAPEST 1956. BY MIKLÓS MOLNÁR. Paris: Fayard, 1968, 363 p. Fr. 28.50.

Reflections on the Hungarian revolution of 1956, by a former Hungarian journalist, now a professor of history in Geneva. The concluding chapter ponders some of the enduring features of the event.

THE SOCIAL EDUCATION OF BULGARIAN YOUTH. BY PETER JOHN GEORGEOFF. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1968, 329 p. \$10.00.

An extensive description of the form, content and purpose of contemporary Bulgarian public education.

The Middle East

FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, 1948-1967. BY NADAV SAFRAN. New York: Pegasus, 1969, 464 p. \$10.00 (Paper, \$2.95).

A book of original approach and high quality covering the interlocking Arab-Israel conflict, inter-Arab disputes and great-power competition. Detailed study of the military establishments and arms policies of Israel and the Arab states is central to the analysis. The conclusions, necessarily controversial, are well argued.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI IMPASSE. EDITED BY MAJDIA D. KHADDURI. Washington: Robert B. Luce, 1969, 223 p. \$4.95.

A collection of previously presented essays and lectures representing what might be called the moderate position, taking full account of the Arab point of view and intended by the editor to counterbalance the torrent of pro-Israel publications since June 1967. Glubb Pasha, Arnold Toynbee, John S. Badeau and Harry N. Howard are among the authors.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE STORY OF PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA'S CAMPAIGN FOR A NEGOTIATED PEACE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES. BY SAMUEL MERLIN. South Brunswick: Yoseloff, 1968, 490 p. \$8.50.

A blow-by-blow account of the few months in 1965 when the Tunisian leader urged the Arab world to take a new and realistic look at the Palestine problem, with additional comment on his political philosophy. The author, an Israeli citizen, is director of political studies at the Institute for Mediterranean Affairs in New York.

GUERRE ET PAIX EN PALESTINE OU L'HISTOIRE DU CONFLIT ISRAËLO-ARABE (1917-1967). BY SIMON JARGY. Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1968, 218 p. Swiss Fr. 21.

Told well and with a sure touch, it is still the same and now very familiar story.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: TEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. EDITED BY JOHN W. HALDERMAN. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969, 193 p. \$7.50.

A symposium which concentrates on the legal aspects of the Arab-Israel dispute but does not neglect their political context. Contributors include Arab and Israeli scholar-diplomats and American experts in international law.

CROSSCURRENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BY JAMES P. WARBURG. New York: Atheneum, 1968, 244 p. \$6.50.

The author's primer shows understanding and moderation in its treatment of Arabs and Jews, reserving its harshest judgments for the policies of outside powers, particularly the United States.

THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. EDITED BY WALTER LAQUEUR. New York: Citadel Press, 1969, 371 p. \$7.95.

A convenient collection of documents, plus significant articles and speeches previously published but often not easily available.

THE LIGHTNING WAR. BY W. BYFORD-JONES. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968, 229 p. \$5.00.

One of the best of the popular accounts of the war, written in frank admiration of Israel's military achievement.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF EGYPT. BY P. J. VATIKIOTIS. New York: Praeger, 1969, 512 p. \$9.50.

Egypt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in a new and broad interpretation stressing internal politics and the process of cultural change.

LA LONGUE MARCHÉ D'ISRAËL. BY JACQUES SOUSTELLE. Paris: Fayard, 1968, 338 p. Fr. 20.

Always a man with a cause, Soustelle gives a sympathetic, almost lyrical account of the Zionist movement and the Jewish community in Palestine up to 1949. Based on many sources and intensely interesting in spots.

NATION-BUILDING AND COMMUNITY IN ISRAEL. By DOROTHY WILLNER. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 478 p. \$10.00.

Primarily a specialized work on land settlement and social structure, this book also relates immigration and settlement to the ideology and politics of the Zionist movement and the Jewish community in Palestine both before and after independence.

OIL AND ARAB REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By KAMAL S. SAYEGH. New York: Praeger, 1968, 357 p. \$20.00.

A description of the current workings of the international oil industry in the Arab world, and of ways in which Arab participation may be increased, with a proposed new approach or "model" leading to an Arab Oil Community and an Arab Common Market.

OMAN: A HISTORY. By WENDELL PHILLIPS. New York: Reynal, 1968, 246 p. \$6.95.

A representative for the King of Oman and Dependencies presents a history of that country from earliest times through the crises that brought it to the world's attention during the 1950s.

South and Southeast Asia

A SENSE OF ASIA. By SOL SANDERS. New York: Scribner, 1969, 339 p. \$7.95.

A Bangkok-based journalist, recently Edward R. Murrow Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, deplors American foreign policy but believes that national security demands U.S. involvement in Asian problems.

INDIA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA: PARTNERS IN ASIA? EDITED BY J. D. B. MILLER. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968, 214 p. Aust. \$6.50.

Fourteen political and economic specialists discuss how these three countries with distinct national interests and outlooks respond to major developments in world affairs.

INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. EDITED BY BIDYUT SARKAR. New Delhi: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1968, 133 p. Rs. 16. (Bombay: Bhatkal Books International, distributor.)

Distinguished South and East Asian scholars discuss the economic, social, scientific and cultural developments affecting their nations.

THE INDIA-CHINA BORDER: A REAPPRAISAL. By GONDKER NARAYANA RAO. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1968, 106 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, \$4.25.)

Largely a bitter attack on the pro-China view taken by Alastair Lamb in his 1964 "The China-India Border."

INDIA'S POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS. By T. RAMAKRISHNA REDDY. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1968, 164 p. \$6.50.

India's conception of the United Nations and its attitudes toward amending the Charter, peacekeeping forces, financing and colonialism. Focus is on the General Assembly and its main committees.

STUDIES IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE: THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE. By GILBERT ETIENNE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968, 343 p. \$7.95.

An analysis of the rural economy of India and in particular the factors that influence agricultural production. Essential administrative and educational problems are also considered.

LES VIET CONG. By JACQUES DOYON. Paris: Denoël, 1968, 310 p. Fr. 19.

Relations of the National Liberation Front's officers with South Vietnamese villagers and how they recruit and indoctrinate them.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

CHINESE COMMUNIST POLITICS IN ACTION. EDITED BY A. DOAK BARNETT. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, 620 p. \$12.50.

Leadership, personalities, techniques of control and mobilization in rural areas and policies toward key social groups in China's changing political culture.

REVOLUTIONARY IMMORTALITY: MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By ROBERT JAY LIFTON. New York: Random House, 1968, 178 p. \$4.95 (Paper, \$1.95).

Mao's psychology and revolutionary style as they bear on a series of personal and historical exigencies of his and China's situation.

LE PLUS GRAND DRAME DU MONDE: LA CHINE DE TSEU HI À MAO. By LUCIEN BOBARD. Paris: Gallimard, 1968, 333 p. Fr. 20.

A powerful account of China's rise to power by this celebrated *France-Soir* journalist, himself China-born.

THE CASE OF PENG TEH-HUAI, 1959-1968. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968, 494 p. HK\$60.

A documentary history of Marshall Peng's spectacular career as a soldier and how he forfeited Mao's favor by rebelling against an opportunistic agricultural policy that oppressed the broad peasant masses.

TWO INNOCENTS IN RED CHINA. By JACQUES HÉBERT AND PIERRE ELIOTT TRUDEAU. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 152 p. \$5.50.

The diary of a trip made in 1960 by two Québécois, one an author and publisher and the other the Liberal Party leader and now Prime Minister of Canada. Neither should be called innocent.

ECONOMIC TRENDS IN COMMUNIST CHINA. EDITED BY ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN AND OTHERS. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968, 757 p. \$17.50.

Twelve experts on population, manpower resources, agriculture, industry, labor and foreign trade in mainland China.

WORK INCENTIVE PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1953-1965. By CHARLES HOFFMANN. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968, 148 p. \$6.00.

A description of the complex of material and non-material incentive mechanisms that used to motivate China's huge agricultural and industrial labor force.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK. By ROBERT PAYNE. New York: Weybright and Talley, 1969, 338 p. \$10.00.

An undocumented biography of Nationalist China's leader who, this prolific writer on China asserts, has been corrupted by power.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MONGOLIA: A GENERAL REFERENCE GUIDE. By A. J. K. SANDERS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968, 232 p. \$6.25.

A uniquely valuable handbook, with emphasis on the social sciences, compiled largely from the Mongolian press over the last three years. Appendixes include biographical notes, chronology, a gazetteer and information on dialect and scripts.

COLLECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAO-CH'I, 1958-1967. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968, 405 p. HK\$90.

Complete texts of Liu's available letters, speeches, reports and other writings, almost all published by government and party-controlled agencies. Chronological, ending with Liu's 1967 "Confession" and "Self-Examination."

MADAME MAO: A PROFILE OF CHIANG CH'ING. BY CHUNG HUA-MIN AND ARTHUR C. MILLER. Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968, 314 p. HK\$30.

The place in Chinese affairs of a woman important as a political force and as Mao Tse-tung's wife; derived mostly from Red Guard publications during the Cultural Revolution and from former friends and acquaintances.

MASS BEHAVIOR IN BATTLE AND CAPTIVITY: THE COMMUNIST SOLDIER IN THE KOREAN WAR. EDITED BY SAMUEL M. MEYERS AND ALBERT D. BIDERMAN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, 377 p. \$11.00.

This study of Chinese communist indoctrination and social-control systems and their influence on prisoner-of-war behavior shows how a controlling group, whether anti-American or anti-communist, induces mass behavior.

AUSTRALIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1961-1965. EDITED BY GORDON GREENWOOD AND NORMAN HARPER. Melbourne: Cheshire (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs), 1968, 503 p. Aust. \$8.75.

The third volume in this series designed to present key trends and major problems and to place the evolution of Australian policy in an international context.

AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE CO-OPERATION. EDITED BY T. B. MILLAR. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1968, 125 p. Aust. \$3.75 (Paper).

Australians and New Zealanders discuss threats to their security created by changes in British and American policies in Asia, nuclear weapons and other problems and prospects of defense coöperation.

Africa

THE AFRICAN PREDICAMENT: A STUDY IN THE PATHOLOGY OF MODERNISATION. BY STANISLAV ANDRESKI. New York: Atherton Press, 1969, 237 p. \$6.95.

Addressing general readers more than his fellow sociologists, Professor Andreski discusses a series of central problems faced by African states. Though the author's pessimism about Africa's future is evident, the lack of an explicit central organizing theme leaves the book's overall argument somewhat out of focus.

HANDBOOK OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: A GUIDE TO THE ARMED PHASE OF THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION. BY KWAME NKURUMAH. New York: International Publishers, 1969, 122 p. \$1.50 (Paper).

Continuing to see himself as the guardian of African revolutionary fervor, the exiled leader calls for the formation of an All-African People's Revolutionary Army to liberate the continent from capitalist neo-imperialism, and outlines his blueprint for its organization, tactics and objectives.

THE BLACK MAN IN SEARCH OF POWER. London: Nelson, 1968, 182 p. 30/.

Seven correspondents of *The Times* (London) survey racial conflict between dominant whites and increasingly politically conscious non-whites in Britain, the United States and southern and central Africa.

THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ETHIOPIA. BY KENNETH R. REDDEN. Charlottesville: Michie Co., 1968, 290 p. \$15.00.

Including the text of the constitution, this volume by an American law professor surveys the legal, judicial and administrative structure of Ethiopia. This is the first in a series of books on African legal systems sponsored by the University of Virginia School of Law.

COMMERCE EXTÉRIEUR DE DÉVELOPPEMENT: LE CAS DE LA ZONE FRANC. BY MICHÈLE SAINT MARC. Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1968, 367 p. Fr. 30.

Intelligent, detailed analysis of rich materials *mérite un détour* around some questionable generalizations and a gap where France ought to be.

BIAFRA, AN II. BY FRANÇOIS DEBRÉ. Paris: Julliard, 1968, 222 p. Fr. 15.50.

A sympathetic glimpse through the eyes of a French journalist into war-torn Biafra during mid-1968. Includes an interview with Colonel Ojukwu.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF WEST AFRICA. BY J. H. PRICE. New York: Humanities Press, 1968, 266 p. \$5.50.

A treatment of the legal and constitutional development of the English-speaking West African states from the colonial period through independence, by a lecturer at the University of Bradford.

IN WHITEST AFRICA: THE DYNAMICS OF APARTHEID. BY WILLIAM R. FRYE. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968, 222 p. \$6.95.

This first-rate analysis of contemporary South Africa will be found partisan and emotional by some, especially in its call for foreign pressure, and, if need be, intervention, to destroy apartheid. But the author, an American journalist, has researched his subject well, and argues with intelligence and style.

APARTHEID: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA. EDITED BY EDGAR H. BROOKES. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968, 228 p. \$4.50.

Speeches, extracts from statutes, letters, party declarations and other sources are usefully assembled under the editorship of a historian, formerly a Senator in the South African Parliament. Notable by their absence are documents concerning black politics, preventive detention and statements by black leaders such as Luthuli, Mandela and Sobukwe.

WHISPERS FROM A CONTINENT. BY WILFRED CARTEY. New York: Random House, 1969, 397 p. \$8.95.

Those unfamiliar with the rich and growing literature of Black Africa will find this critical survey of recurrent themes in African poetry, fiction and autobiography illuminating. The author teaches African literature at Columbia University.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain*: British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 10022. *United Nations*, *International Court of Justice*: United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org.*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 10027. *Int. Labor Office*: 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005. *Food and Agric. Org.*: National Agency for International Publications, 317 East 34th St., New York 10016. *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom*: 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development*: 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 91st Congress, 1st Sess. New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

AFRICA

SURVEYS of African Economies. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1968.
Vol. 1. Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Gabon. 365 p. \$5.00.
A SURVEY of agriculture in Ethiopia. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1969. 44 p. (ERS—Foreign, 254.)

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL policies in Africa and West Asia. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1968. 74 p. (Foreign Agricultural Economic Reports, 49.)
CHEMICAL fertilizer projects: their creation, evaluation and establishment. N.Y., 1968. 52 p. (Fertilizer Industry Series, no. 1; E.68.II.17.) 75¢.

ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT

MILITARY implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Hearings, Committee on Armed Services, Senate, Feb. 27–28, 1969. Washington, 1969. 141 p.
NONPROLIFERATION Treaty. Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on Exec. H., 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., Feb. 18–20, 1969. Washington, 1969. pp. 301–519. Pt. II.
FIELD test program: preliminary report. Washington, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969. v.p.
FURTHER documents on disarmament: the disarmament negotiations, 1967. London, HMSO, 1968. 314 p. (Cmnd.3767.) £1.5s.

ASIA AND PACIFIC OCEAN

PEKING's approach to negotiation; selected writings, compiled by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 24, Mar. 10, 1969. Washington, 1969. 94 p. (Com. Print.)
NATURAL resources survey of the Labuk Valley, Malaysia. N.Y., 1968. 117 p. (DP/SF/UN/18-Malaysia.)
IMPROPER practices, commodity import program, U.S. foreign aid, Vietnam. Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, Feb. 25, 1969. Washington, 1969. 52 p. (S. Rept. 91–84.)

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

FUTURE United States foreign trade policy; report to the President submitted by the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. Washington, 1969. 101 p. \$1.00.
INTERNATIONAL legislation on shipping. N.Y., 1968. 34 p. (E.69.II.D.2.) 75¢.
WORLD trade in steel and steel demand in developing countries. N.Y., 1968. 201 p. (E.68.II.E.4.) \$3.00.
WORLD Bank atlas: population and per capita product. Washington, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1968. n.p.

DEVELOPING NATIONS

STUDIES on selected development problems in various countries in the Middle East, 1968. N.Y., 1968. 76 p. (E.68.II.C.4.) \$1.50.

RECRUITMENT and selection in the public service of developing countries. N.Y., 1969. 77 p. (ST/TAO/M/42.)

EASTERN EUROPE

AGRICULTURAL statistics of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, 1950-66. Washington, Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 1969. 110 p. (ERS—Foreign, 252.)

ASPECTS of intellectual ferment and dissent in Czechoslovakia, prepared at the request of Sen. Thomas J. Dodd, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act . . . , Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, Mar. 6, 1969. Washington, 1969. 165 p. (Com. Print.)

DIE ENTWICKLUNG der aussenwirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Polens nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, by R. P. Rochlin. Cologne, Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, n.d. 205 p.

THE SOVIET approach to negotiation; selected writings, compiled by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, Senate, pursuant to S. Res. 24, Feb. 26, 1969. Washington, 1969. 92 p. (Com. Print.)

FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

POLICIES and actions to improve the U.S. balance of trade and balance of payments: 1968 reports by the National Export Expansion Council. Washington, Dept. of Commerce, 1968. 56 p.

A REVIEW of balance of payment policies. Hearings, Subcommittee on International Exchange and Payments, Joint Economic Committee, Jan. 13-15, 1969. Washington, 1969. 257 p.

A SYSTEM of national accounts. N.Y., 1968. 246 p. (E.69.XVII.3.) \$3.50.

FOREIGN AID

THE LOCAL currency proceeds of foreign aid, by A. E. Lachman. Paris, OECD, 1968. 162 p. (Development Centre Studies.) \$2.50.

HUMAN RIGHTS

SEMINAR on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, New Delhi, India, 27 Aug.-9 Sept. 1968. N.Y., 1968. 47 p. (ST/TAO/HR/34.)

CONSTITUTIONS, electoral laws and other legal instruments relating to the political rights of women; report of the Secretary-General. N.Y., 1968. 147 p. (E.69.IV.2.) \$2.00.

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